Jackman v. WMAC Inv. Corp., Civ. A. No. 83-C-477.

• Decision Date: 14 June 1985
• Docket Number: Civ. A. No. 83-C-477.
• Citation: 610 F. Supp. 290
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Wisconsin
• Parties: John JACKMAN, Plaintiff, v. WMAC INVESTMENT CORPORATION, Defendant.

610 F. Supp. 290

John JACKMAN, Plaintiff, v. WMAC INVESTMENT CORPORATION, Defendant.

Civ. A. No. 83-C-477.

United States District Court, E.D. Wisconsin.

June 14, 1985.

Terry E. Nilles, Milwaukee, Wis., for plaintiff.

Gilbert W. Church, Milwaukee, Wis., for defendant.

DECISION

REYNOLDS, Chief Judge.

This is a diversity action for compensation due under a deferred compensation plan between the defendant and its executive employees. On November 19, 1984, the Court granted the plaintiff's motion in limine excluding extrinsic evidence of the parties' intent in drafting the agreement. The parties stipulated that this ruling predetermines the outcome of this issue at trial, and stipulated to the entry of judgment to permit the defendant to appeal.

The parties' stipulation reserved the issue of the plaintiff's entitlement to an award of attorneys' fees as "expenses" under § 109.03(6) Wis.Stats. which provides:

(6) Wage claim. In an action by an employe against the employer on a wage claim, no security for payment of costs is required. In any such proceeding the court may allow the prevailing party, in addition to all other costs, a reasonable sum for expenses. No assignee of a wage claim shall be benefited or otherwise affected by this subsection except as expressly provided by § 109.09.

There are no reported decisions construing this statute. Oral argument on the plaintiff's motion was heard on March 29, 1985, and the Court issued a bench decision for the plaintiff which forms the basis for this written decision.

The plaintiff contends that the authorization for a "reasonable sum for expenses" should be construed to include attorneys' fees, since legal fees comprise the bulk of any employee's expense in pursuing a wage claim. Moreover, construction of the statute to include attorneys' fees comports with the common usage of the term "expenses." Finally, the plaintiff argues that the proposed construction is consistent with the public policy behind the statute, since it recognizes the inequality in bargaining power between employers and their employees and encourages employees to pursue wage claims.

The defendant argues that there is no specific authorization for an award of attorneys' fees in § 109.03(6), and consequently, an award of fees would be in derogation of the American Rule that requires litigants to bear their own legal expenses. The defendant also contends that the legislative history of this statute demonstrates that the authorization for expenses was never intended to include an award of attorneys' fees. Finally, the defendant urges the Court to exercise its discretion to deny an award even if the statute is construed to include attorneys' fees as expenses; since the plaintiff doesn't need the money, the defendant denied the initial claim in good faith, and the fees requested are excessive under the circumstances.

The parties agree that the plaintiff is the prevailing party at this stage of the litigation, and that the plaintiff's claim for deferred compensation is a wage claim under § 109.03. Thus, the only issue is whether an award of attorneys' fees is authorized under § 109.03(6) Wis.Stats.

The legislative history of this statute is not helpful in resolving this dispute. The statute dates back to 1931. The 1931 statute is identical to the present provision, except there was a ten dollar limit on allowable "expenses." The statute remained essentially unchanged until 1975, when the legislature eliminated the ten dollar limit without comment.

The defendant argues that attorneys' fees were never contemplated as allowable expenses, since ten dollars was insufficient to pay a...