JACKSON CMTY. COLL. v. TREASURY DEPT.
| Decision Date | 06 October 1999 |
| Docket Number | Docket No. 210887. |
| Citation | 241 Mich. App. 673,621 N.W.2d 707 |
| Parties | JACKSON COMMUNITY COLLEGE, Petitioner-Appellee, v. MICHIGAN DEPARTMENT OF TREASURY, Respondent-Appellant. |
| Court | Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US |
George J. Brannick, Jackson, for the petitioner.
Jennifer M. Granholm, Attorney General, Thomas L. Casey, Solicitor General, and Kevin T. Smith, Assistant Attorney General, for the respondent.
Before: HOEKSTRA, P.J., and McDONALD and METER, JJ.
ON REHEARING
In this case involving the Michigan Income Tax Act of 1967, M.C.L. § 206.1 et seq.; MSA 7.557(101) et seq., respondent appeals by leave from the circuit court's ruling, in an appeal from a decision by the revenue commissioner, that (1) the circuit court had jurisdiction to hear the appeal and (2) petitioner's tuition increase for the 1995-96 academic year was low enough that its students, under M.C.L. § 206.274; MSA 7.557(1274), could claim a tax credit on their 1995 tax returns for a percentage of the tuition and fees they paid to petitioner. Because we conclude that the circuit court lacked jurisdiction over this matter, we vacate the court's decision.
On December 22, 1996, an amendment of the statute took effect.1 A "qualified institution of higher learning" is now defined as an institution that, among other things, has certified that it will not increase "fees and tuition rates" by a specified amount during the ensuing academic year.2 MCL § 206.274(8)(b)(iv) and (v); MSA 7.557(1274)(8)(b)(iv) and (v) (emphasis added). The amendment is retroactive to January 1, 1996. See 1996 PA 484, § 3(1).
Petitioner believed that because its tuition increase for the 1995-96 academic year was lower than the annual average percentage increase in the United States consumer price index for 1994, it was a "qualified institution of higher learning" and its students could claim a tax credit under M.C.L. § 206.274; MSA 7.557(1274) for fees and tuition paid to petitioner in 1995. Respondent disagreed, arguing that petitioner was not a "qualified institution of higher learning" because the increase in petitioner's tuition and fees, combined, exceeded the annual average percentage increase in the United States consumer price index for 1994. A hearing referee adopted petitioner's position, but the revenue commissioner did not follow the referee's recommendation and instead ruled for respondent. Neither petitioner, respondent, the hearing referee, nor the revenue commissioner addressed the effect of the 1996 amendment; instead, each assumed that the pre-1996 version of the statute applied to the dispute and focused on whether the term "tuition" contained in that version included fees.
Petitioner sought review of the revenue commissioner's decision in the circuit court. Along with arguing the substantive merits of the case, respondent contended that the circuit court had no jurisdiction to hear the appeal because exclusive jurisdiction was vested in the Michigan Tax Tribunal or the Court of Claims. On October 10, 1997, the court issued an opinion in which it held that (1) the circuit court's jurisdiction was proper under M.C.L. §§ 24.301-24.303; MSA 3.560(201)-3.560(203), provisions of the Administrative Procedures Act (APA), because this was a "contested case" under M.C.L. § 24.203(3); MSA 3.560(103)(3), another provision of the APA; and (2) the plain language of the tax credit statute, during the period applicable to the instant case, mandated that only "tuition"—and not "fees"—be included in the eligibility computation. The court therefore held that petitioner was a "qualified institution of higher learning" for the 1995 tax year. The court noted that the tax credit statute had since been amended to include fees in the eligibility computation, but the court—like the parties, the hearing referee, and the revenue commissioner—did not address the fact that this amendment was to be retroactive to January 1, 1996, and applicable to 1995 tax returns.
Respondent argues that the circuit court had no jurisdiction to hear the appeal because (1) exclusive jurisdiction for cases arising under the Income Tax Act is vested in the Tax Tribunal or the Court of Claims, and (2) circuit court jurisdiction under the APA was inappropriate because the instant case was not a "contested case" under M.C.L. § 24.203(3); MSA 3.560(103)(3). This Court reviews jurisdictional questions de novo. Dep't of Natural Resources v. Holloway Constr. Co., 191 Mich.App. 704, 705, 478 N.W.2d 677 (1991). Where a court is without jurisdiction in a particular case, its acts and proceedings are null and void. Fox v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Michigan, 375 Mich. 238, 242, 134 N.W.2d 146 (1965).
A litigant seeking judicial review of an administrative agency's decision has three potential avenues of relief: (1) the method of review prescribed by the statutes applicable to the particular agency; (2) the method of review prescribed by the APA, M.C.L. § 24.201 et seq.; MSA 3.560(101) et seq.; or (3) an appeal under M.C.L. § 600.631; MSA 27A.631, a provision of the Revised Judicature Act (RJA). Living Alternatives for the Developmentally Disabled, Inc. v. Dep't of Mental Health, 207 Mich.App. 482, 484, 525 N.W.2d 466 (1994).
The statutes applicable to the Department of Treasury provide for review in the Tax Tribunal or the Court of Claims. See M.C.L. § 205.22(1); MSA 7.657(22)(1). Specifically, M.C.L. § 205.22(1); MSA 7.657(22)(1) provides that "[a] taxpayer aggrieved by an assessment, decision, or order of the department may appeal the contested portion ... to the tax tribunal... or to the court of claims." (Emphasis added.) Petitioner contends that because it was not the taxpayer for purposes of the instant dispute, M.C.L. § 205.22(1); MSA 7.657(22)(1) did not govern its choice of forums to review the dispute and it was therefore entitled to proceed in the circuit court. Respondent contends that petitioner, by seeking tax refunds for its students, was essentially equivalent to a "taxpayer" for purposes of M.C.L. § 205.22(1); MSA 7.657(22)(1) and was therefore required to pursue its claim in either the Tax Tribunal or the Court of Claims. A review of the relevant statutory provisions leads us to conclude that petitioner was required to proceed in the Tax Tribunal.
At the outset, we acknowledge that a cardinal rule of statutory construction is to enforce a clear and unambiguous statute as written. See Sun Valley Foods Co. v. Ward, 460 Mich. 230, 236, 596 N.W.2d 119 (1999), and Adrian School Dist. v. Michigan Public School Employees Retirement System, 458 Mich. 326, 332, 582 N.W.2d 767 (1998). At first blush, M.C.L. § 205.22(1); MSA 7.657(22)(1) seems clear and unambiguous in providing for appellate review in the Tax Tribunal or the Court of Claims only for the taxpayer. However, "a statute may appear to be clear on its face, but be rendered ambiguous by its interaction with other statutes." People v. Valentin, 457 Mich. 1, 10, 577 N.W.2d 73 (1998). Here, we find that M.C.L. § 205.22(1); MSA 7.657(22)(1) is rendered ambiguous by the existence of M.C.L. § 205.779(3); MSA 7.650(79)(3), a provision of the Tax Tribunal Act indicating that cases commencing after December 31, 1976, and formerly appealable to the State Board of Tax Appeals and Corporation Tax Appeal Board were thenceforth to be appealed to the Tax Tribunal.
The former statute governing appeals to the State Board of Tax Appeals stated that "[a]ny person, firm or corporation aggrieved by any assessment, decision, or order of the department of revenue may... have an appeal from such assessment, decision or order to the state board of tax appeals hereby created." See former M.C.L. § 205.7; MSA 7.657(7), 1970 CL 2057. Accordingly, M.C.L. § 205.779(3); MSA 7.650(79)(3), in stating that "[a]ll [cases appealable to the State Board of Tax Appeals and Corporation Tax Appeal Board] commencing after December 31, 1976 shall be made to the state tax tribunal," essentially indicates that "[a]ny person, firm or corporation aggrieved by any... decision ... of the department" shall appeal to the Tax Tribunal. Here, while we agree that petitioner was not the taxpayer for purposes of the instant dispute, we nevertheless find that petitioner was indeed aggrieved by a decision of the department,3 and M.C.L. § 205.779(3); MSA 7.650(79)(3) therefore provided it with an avenue for appellate relief in the Tax Tribunal.
M.C.L. § 205.22(1); MSA 7.657(22)(1) and M.C.L. § 205.779(3); MSA 7.650(79)(3) conflict to a certain extent: the former statute provides for appellate review in the Tax Tribunal only for the taxpayer, while the latter statute provides for appellate review in the Tax Tribunal for any aggrieved person, firm, or corporation. As stated in People v. Webb, 458 Mich. 265, 274, 580 N.W.2d 884 (1998):
[W]hen this Court construes two statutes that arguably relate to the same subject or share a common purpose, the statutes...
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