Jackson Cnty. Employees' Ret. Sys. v. Ghosn
| Decision Date | 11 June 2021 |
| Docket Number | NO. 3:18-cv-01368,3:18-cv-01368 |
| Parties | JACKSON COUNTY EMPLOYEES' RETIREMENT SYSTEM, et al., Plaintiffs, v. CARLOS GHOSN, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of Tennessee |
MEMORANDUM
Pending before the Court are Defendant Nissan Motor Co., Ltd.'s ("Nissan") Motion for Partial Reconsideration or Certification for Interlocutory Appeal of the Court's December 29, 2020 Order (Doc No. 147) and Defendant Carlos Ghosn's ("Ghosn") Motion for Certification of Interlocutory Appeal. (Doc. No. 151). Plaintiffs filed Responses in Opposition (Doc. Nos. 155, 156), and Defendants filed Replies (Doc. Nos. 157, 165). Nissan also filed a Notice of Supplemental Authority. (Doc. No. 189). For the reasons discussed below, Defendants' motions will be DENIED.
On August 5, 2019, Ghosn moved to dismiss the claims against him and Nissan moved to dismiss the claims brought against it under the Financial Instruments and Exchange Act of Japan ("FIEA") for lack of personal jurisdiction. (See Doc. Nos. 77, 68).1 The Court, in its discretion, exercised pendent jurisdiction over Nissan with respect to the FIEA claims. (See Doc. No. 136 at 11-14). The Court also determined that it has personal jurisdiction over Ghosn. (Id. at 19-24).
On January 12, 2021, Nissan filed the pending Motion for Partial Reconsideration or Certification for Interlocutory Appeal of the Court's December 29, 2020 Order (Doc No. 147). On January 19, 2021, Ghosn filed the pending Motion for Certification of Interlocutory Appeal (Doc. No. 151) with respect to the same Order.
While the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not to explicitly address motions to reconsider interlocutory orders, "[d]istrict courts have authority both under common law and Rule 54(b) to reconsider interlocutory orders and to reopen any part of a case before entry of final judgment." Rodriguez v. Tenn. Laborers Health & Welfare Fund, 89 F. App'x 949, 959 (6th Cir. 2004) (citing Mallory v. Eyrich, 922 F.2d 1273, 1282 (6th Cir. 1991)). Thus, district courts may "afford such relief from interlocutory orders as justice requires." Id. (quoting Citibank N.A. v. FDIC, 857 F. Supp. 976, 981 (D.D.C. 1994)) (internal brackets omitted). This standard "vests significant discretion in district courts." Id. at 959 n.7. Courts traditionally will find justification for reconsidering interlocutory orders when there is (1) an intervening change of controlling law; (2) new evidence available; or (3) a need to correct clear error or prevent manifest injustice. Louisville/Jefferson Cty. Metro Gov't v. Hotels.com, L.P., 590 F.3d 381, 389 (6th Cir. 2009).
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292:
When a district judge, in making in a civil action an order not otherwise appealable under this section, shall be of the opinion that such order involves a controlling question of law as to which there is substantial ground for difference of opinion and that an immediate appeal from the order may materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation, he shall so state in writing in such order.
28 U.S.C. § 1292(b). Review under Section 1292(b) "should be sparingly applied" and "is to be used only in exceptional cases." In re Miedzianowski, 735 F.3d 383, 384 (6th Cir. 2013); see also In re Trump, 874 F.3d 948, 952 (6th Cir. 2017) (). "The burden of showing exceptional circumstances justifying an interlocutory appeal rests with the party seeking review." DRFP, LLC v. Republica Bolivariana de Venezuela, 945 F. Supp. 2d 890, 918 (S.D. Ohio 2013). "[D]istrict court judges have broad discretion to deny certification even where the statutory criteria are met." Lofgren v. Polaris Indus. Inc., --- F. Supp. 3d ---, 2021 WL 1022751, at *2 (M.D. Tenn. Mar. 16, 2021) (citation omitted).
In support of its partial motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, Nissan submitted that "[t]he exercise of pendent personal jurisdiction is a matter of discretion" and argued that the Court "should decline to exercise pendent jurisdiction" because: (1) the class size for the FIEA claim would be larger than the class size for the Exchange Act claims, (2) the FIEA claim involves unsettled issues of Japanese law, and (3) it would be unfair for Nissan to defend claims based on Japanese securities traded on the Tokyo stock exchange and that arise under Japanese law. (See Doc. No. 105 at 10-15; Doc. No. 125 at 2-4). The Court, in its discretion, decided to exercise pendent jurisdiction over Nissan with respect to the claims under FIEA. (See Doc. No. 136 at 11-14). In the motion for reconsideration, Nissan contends that the Court's ruling was in error and raises new arguments regarding the validity and application of pendent personal jurisdiction in the present case. Generally, courts will not reconsider a decision based on arguments not presented bya party in its prior motion. See Al-Sadoon v. FISI*Madison Fin. Corp., 188 F. Supp. 2d 899, 901-02 (M.D. Tenn. 2002). The Court does not find cause to do so here.
In its remaining arguments, Nissan does not identify an intervening controlling decision or newly discovered evidence not previously available. Instead, it argues that "unique features of this case - which the Court's decision does not directly address - render the exercise of pendent personal jurisdiction clear error." (Doc. No. 148 at 16). Specifically, Nissan contends that "although the Court acknowledged [its] argument that 'the class size for the FIEA claim would be much larger than that for the Exchange Act claim', [the Court] did not explain why the exercise of pendent personal jurisdiction is nonetheless appropriate" and that the Court "did not discuss the impact of [the foreign nature of the FIEA claims] on the pendent personal jurisdictional analysis." (Id. at 18-20).
While the Court's prior Order and Memorandum may not have specifically discussed each of the points raised in Nissan's motion, the Court carefully considered each of the arguments made when deciding to exercise pendent personal jurisdiction and does not now find cause to reconsider that decision. See, e.g., D.E. v. John Doe, 834 F.3d 723, 728 (6th Cir. 2016) ().
In its Motion, Nissan requests that the Court certify its decision to exercise pendent personal jurisdiction over Nissan with respect to the FIEA claims for interlocutory appeal. (Doc. No. 148 at 8). Ghosn "seeks certification to resolve the legal question of what suffices to show specific personal jurisdiction in the globalized context of the Internet -specifically, whether the[facts of the present case] suffice[] to show (1) that [] Ghosn purposefully availed himself to the exercise of specific jurisdiction in the United States, (2) that this cause of action arose from [] Ghosn's contacts in the United States, (3) that the exercise of jurisdiction is reasonable under these circumstances and is therefore appropriate under the constraints of the Due Process Clause." (Doc. No. 152 at 5-6) ("Ghosn seeks interlocutory review of a purely legal question of whether the exercise of personal jurisdiction is constitutional in these circumstances.").
"As many cases recognize, there are actually two requirements within what this Court (and most others) has labeled as § 1292(b)'s first element: (1) The question involved must be one of law; and (2) It must be controlling." Lofgren, 2021 WL 1022751, at *3 (quoting U.S. ex rel. Elliott v. Brickman Grp. Ltd., LLC, 845 F. Supp. 2d 858, 865 (S.D. Ohio 2012)). In re City of Memphis, 293 F.3d 345, 351 (6th Cir. 2002) (internal citation omitted).
With respect to Nissan, the Court agrees that the Order addressed a controlling question because the Court would lack personal jurisdiction over one set of Plaintiffs' claims against Nissan if the Sixth Circuit were to decide that the pendent personal jurisdiction doctrine does not exist or apply. However, the Court is not convinced that the application of pendent personal jurisdiction in this case is conducive with review of an isolated legal question. See id. The Court considered the particular facts and circumstances in this case, judicial economy, convenience, and fairness to litigants to determine, in its discretion, to apply pendent personal jurisdiction. Any review of the Court's decision would be highly fact intensive and would likely require review of how the Court weighed the various considerations in reaching its conclusion. See DRFP, LLC, 945 F. Supp. 2dat 918 ("Interlocutory appeals are intended for situations in which the court of appeals can rule on a pure, controlling question of law without having to delve beyond the surface of the record in order to determine the facts.").
With respect to Ghosn, the Court agrees that the Order addressed a controlling question since all claims against Ghosn would be dismissed if the Sixth Circuit found personal jurisdiction should not be exercised over him. The question is not one purely of law because the Court applied the law to the particular facts in this case to determine that Ghosn had minimum contacts to warrant the Court's exercise of specific personal jurisdiction over him. See Lofgren, 2021 WL 1022751, at *4 n.6 (...
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