Jackson County Bd. of Election v. Paluka

• Decision Date: 10 March 2000
• Parties: (Mo.App. W.D. 2000) Jackson County Board of Election Commissioners, et al., Respondent, City of Independence, Respondent, William Snyder, Respondent, v. Renee Paluka, et al., Respondent, Paul Levota, Appellant, Missouri Ethics Commission, Appellant. WD58196 (Consolidated with WD58209) 0
• Court: Missouri Court of Appeals

13 S.W.3d 684 (Mo.App. W.D. 2000)

Jackson County Board of Election Commissioners, et al., Respondent, City of Independence, Respondent, William Snyder, Respondent, v. Renee Paluka, et al., Respondent, Paul Levota, Appellant, Missouri Ethics Commission, Appellant.

WD58196 (Consolidated with WD58209)

Missouri Court of Appeals Western District

03/10/2000

Appeal From: Circuit Court of Jackson County, Hon. W. Stephen Nixon

Counsel for Appellant: Jane A. Rackers, Douglas J. Patterson and Huyen T. Pham

Counsel for Respondent: Philip F. Cardarella and Russell C. Purvis

Opinion Summary: The Missouri Ethics Commission, et al., appeals the Jackson County Circuit Court's ruling that the names of candidates Renee Paluka and William Snyder must remain on the ballot for City Council for the City of Independence, Missouri. The Ethics Commission had determined that the names of these two candidates must be removed from the ballot because they did not meet the deadline for submitting financial disclosure statements, pursuant to sections 105.483 to 105.492.

Held: Because the Independence City Clerk failed to meet the statutory requirement of providing express, direct written notice to the candidates of their obligation to file their financial disclosure statements, the trial court did not err in ruling that the names of the candidates shall remain on the ballot. The judgment is affirmed.

James M. Smart, Jr., Judge

This expedited appeal arises out of a declaratory judgment action filed by the Jackson County Board of Election Commissioners and the City of Independence to resolve a ballot issue related to the April 4, 2000, city elections. The case concerns the notice to be provided to candidates for municipal office as to their statutory obligation to file personal financial interest statements pursuant to section 105.487 RSMo 1999 Supp.

On April 4, 2000, the Jackson County Board of Election Commissioners will conduct a general election which will include contests for seats on the City Council of the City of Independence, Missouri. William G. Snyder is currently a candidate for District 4 of the City Council. Renee Paluka is a candidate for District 3 of the council. Under sections 105.483 to 105.492 RSMo 1994, Snyder and Paluka, along with the other candidates for Independence City Council, were required to file with the Missouri Ethics Commission personal financial disclosure statements on or before December 8, 1999, to avoid late filing fees, and on or before December 15, 1999, to avoid being removed from the ballot.¹.

Following the initial deadline, the Ethics Commission noticed that Snyder and Paluka failed to file their personal financial disclosure statements. The Commission sent separate letters to them on December 13, 1999, advising them that they missed the initial deadline, and warning them of the penalty of removal from the ballot if they should fail to file by December 15, 1999. Paluka and Snyder received the correspondence, including a blank form, from the Ethics Commission on December 15, 1999, which was the final deadline. Paluka and Snyder each completed the financial disclosure statement form and transmitted their forms by fax. The fax in each case was received in the office of the Ethics Commission after 10:30 p.m. on December 15.

On December 22, 1999, the Executive Director of the Ethics Commission, Charles Lamb, notified the city clerk by letter that Snyder and Paluka did not timely file their financial interest statements as required by section 105.492 RSMo and accordingly were disqualified from ballot participation. Snyder and Paluka protested. On December 28, 1999, the Jackson County Board of Election Commissioners filed a declaratory judgment action seeking a determination by the Circuit Court of Jackson County as to whether Snyder, who was a candidate on the primary, was disqualified, and whether the election board was obligated to remove his name from the ballot. The election board named as defendants the City of Independence, the Ethics Commission, Snyder, and Snyder's opponents in the February 8, 2000, primary election. The City of Independence also sought declaratory relief concerning Paluka, who was a candidate for the general election, but was not required to participate in the primary. A hearing was conducted on January 4, 2000, and on January 6, 2000, the court ruled summarily that Snyder's and Paluka's names should remain on the ballots. The Ethics Commission and Paluka's ballot opponent, Paul Levota, appeal.

The Commission's Standing

The Ethics Commission and Levota contend on appeal that the circuit court erred in determining that the names must remain on the ballot. In response, Paluka and Snyder assert first of all that the Ethics Commission is without standing to appeal the judgment of the trial court. We turn first to the standing issue.

Paluka and Snyder contend that the Ethics Commission did not file a cross-petition in the trial court for declaratory relief, and point out that the judgment does not require that the Ethics Commission engage in any act or refrain from any particular action. Although it is true that the Ethics Commission did not denominate its responsive pleadings as cross-petitions for declaratory relief, we note that the Ethics Commission did nevertheless ask, in the prayer portion of its answers, that the trial court rule that Snyder and Paluka are excluded from the ballot. Because this was an action for declaratory relief, the petitions of the Election Board and the City of Independence placed all aspects of the matter before the court. We are provided no authority indicating that a defendant in a declaratory judgment action is required to formally denominate its pleading as a cross-petition in order to argue for a particular result, especially when the petitions for declaratory relief set forth the position of that defendant. Therefore, we conclude that the Ethics Commission did sufficiently ask for relief in the trial court.

Snyder and Paluka also contend that even if the Ethics Commission did ask for relief below, it is not an aggrieved party because the trial court's order does not direct the Ethics Commission to do anything or to refrain from any action. The court's order, they note, is instead directed at the election authorities.

The right of appeal is created by statute; there is no right to an appeal without underlying statutory authority. United Labor Committee, Inc. v. Ashcroft, 572 S.W.2d 446, 447 (Mo. banc 1978). Section 512.020 RSMo 1994 provides that a party aggrieved by any judgment of a trial court may appeal, subject to certain limitations. A party who has not been aggrieved by a judgment has no right or standing to appeal. Bond v. California Compensation and Fire Co., 963 S.W.2d 692, 696 (Mo. App. 1998). Generally, for a party to be considered aggrieved, the judgment in question must "operate[] prejudicially and directly on his personal or property rights or interests." Shelter Mut. Ins. Co. v. Briggs, 793 S.W.2d 862, 863 (Mo. banc 1990). "[A]s used in section 512.020, 'aggrieved' means 'suffering from an infringement or denial of legal rights'." Government Employees Ins. Co. (GEICO) v. Clenny, 752 S.W.2d 66, 68 (Mo. App. 1988) (quoting Farrell v. DeClue, 382 S.W.2d 462, 466 (Mo. App. 1964)).

The Ethics Commission argues that the aggrievement requirement is not exactly the same for a state agency as for a private party, because a state agency does not have personal or property rights or interests but may have a statutorily created legal interest requiring protection. The Commission points out that in Missouri Health Facilities Review Comm. v. Administrative Hearing Comm'n, 700 S.W.2d 445 (Mo. banc 1985), the Health Facilities Review Committee received an adverse decision from the Administrative Hearing Commission. Id. at 448. The Health Facilities Review Committee's standing was challenged on appeal for reasons similar to those asserted in this case. The Missouri Supreme Court held that the Committee had standing because, "MHFRC is a policy-making agency in the field of health care and it has an interest in vindicating and upholding its official acts and procedures." Id.

The standing of the Labor and Industrial Relations Commission to appeal as an aggrieved party was addressed in Dubinsky Brothers, Inc. v. Industrial Commission of Missouri, 373 S.W.2d 9 (Mo. banc 1963). In that case, which was an appeal of a decision in an unemployment compensation case, both the Division of Employment Security and the Commission appealed the trial court reversal of orders allowing benefits, even though the claimant did not appeal. Id. at 11. The court held that both the Commission and the Division had a direct legal interest which gave them an independent right of appeal. Id. at 14.

This court followed Dubinsky in Missouri Div. Of Employment Sec. V. Labor and Indus. Relations Comm'n, 739 S.W.2d 747 (Mo. App. 1987), recognizing the right of the Commission to appeal where its decision had been reversed by the circuit court, even though the claimant did not appeal and the Division supported the decision of the circuit court. Id. at 749. While the position of the Labor and Industrial Relations Commission is distinguishable from that of the Ethics Commission in that the Ethics Commission does not administer any funds, the Ethics Commission shares with the Commission a concern for the implementation of the laws it administers. The Ethics Commission also adjudicates certain matters within its statutorily created jurisdiction. Section 105.955 RSMo. 1999 Supp. We conclude that the position of the Ethics Commission is relatively similar to that of the Health Facilities Review Committee, which was allowed standing to appeal in Missouri Health Facilities Review Comm v. Administrative Hearing Comm'n, 700 S.W.2d 445 (Mo. banc 1985). It appears also that section 105.997, which authorizes the attorney general to represent the Ethics Commission in state...