Jackson et al. v. Summerville

• Decision Date: 01 January 1852
• Citation: 13 Pa. 359
• Parties: Jackson et al. versus Summerville.
• Court: Pennsylvania Supreme Court

13 Pa. 359

Jackson et al. versus Summerville.

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

ERROR to the Common Pleas of Blair county.

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The case was argued by Miles, for plaintiffs in error. It was contended on their part, that from the relations of the parties, at the time of the sale by Summerville and wife to Jackson, no such fraud was made out by the evidence as would invalidate the contract between them, especially, after the lapse of eighteen years from the date of the transaction.

That the vendor is bound to represent truly the condition of his title, but the vendee is not bound to disclose his knowledge of facts which may increase the value of the property, for the purchase of which he is treating. Where the means of knowledge are equally accessible to both parties, each must judge for himself: 5 Barr 70, 469; 2 Wheat. 123; Story on Contr. sect. 181; 5 Barr 409. He contended that Garber had disclosed all the knowledge he obtained in relation to the Peters claim; and that the evidence did not prove that the vendors were misled.

He contended that the effect of the decree, in the action of partition, was to conclude the plaintiffs, in a two-fold way:

1. By working a change in the condition of the property, which was the subject of the decree, so far as the former relations of the parties were concerned, turning it from land into money, and substituting the valuation-money for the land.

2. By the application of the principle of legal estoppel, by reason of the relation which Ruth Summerville sustained to the decree, as well as by the operative effect of the judgment in rem: 2 Smith's Lead. Cases 490, 504; 30 Law Lib. 105, 440; 1 Binn. 299; 11 S. & R. 497; 14 S. & R. 186; 9 Cranch 143-4; 2 Pet. Dig. 534; 2 U. S. Dig. 230, 232; 11 Ohio 257; Hopkins v. Lee, 6 Wheat. 109; 4 Watts 280; 4 R. 288.

That the acquiescence of Mrs. Summerville and her children, for so long a period, after a knowledge of the defect, now alleged in Jackson's title, and of the acts done by them, in collecting and receiving the balance of the purchase-money, was to conclude and estop them upon equitable principles: Story on Contr. §§ 167, 168; 9 S. & R. 162-3; 12 Peters 198; 1 Baldwin 337; 1 Rawle 163, 171; 2 Barr 479; 7 W. & S. 125; 11 S. & R. 426-8; 2 Pa. Rep. 322; 2 Smith's Lead. Cases 437.

If the title under the deed recorded, and the decree, was merely a voidable title, was it not confirmed in Jackson, beyond the reach of the plaintiffs? 3 W. & S. 517; 8 Watts 280; 1 R. 171.

3. What was the effect of the sale and conveyance, by William Dorris, surviving executor of Christian Garber, deceased, to Gen. A. P. Wilson and Dr. Peter Shoenberger?

They were innocent purchasers, without notice, and upon principles already discussed in illustrating the application of the principle of equitable estoppel to the facts in evidence, they ought to have been protected from a recovery by the plaintiffs. But the court instructed the jury to find for the whole, in case they found for the plaintiffs at all. Jackson's declarations, that he had bought from Wilson and Shoenberger, were no evidence of the fact. The judgment then ought to be reversed on this last ground, if on no other.

As to the bills of exception to evidence. 1st bill. This depends upon the conclusiveness of the decree of the court, in the action of partition. If the decree was conclusive the evidence ought not to have been admitted.

S. Blair, for defendants in error. Constructive fraud may be confirmed, but actual fraud is not susceptible of confirmation: 1 W. & S. 138; 7 Barr 53; 4 S. & R. 485. The record does not show that Mrs. Summerville knew that Jackson had obtained his title by fraud; when she was told that she could get clear of her contract, she was not told how it could be done.

Election obtains only when the rights are inconsistent; election does not exist when the party is not informed of his rights. There was no new contract, nor any new consideration when the money was paid: 8 W. & S. 36; Id. 193; 17 S. & R. 16, 25; 3 Rawle 396. As to the time a party has to question and correct a fraud: 4 Howard 504, 561; 9 Barr 14.

Stevens, on the same side. A contract actually fraudulent is incapable of confirmation, though a new contract may be made respecting it: 8 W. & S. 31; 4 S. & R. 486. There is no case of actual fraud, where a party asking equity is required to do equity. The party having no title, has no equity to ask: 2 Watts 66.

As to the deeds to Shoenberger and Wilson. They refuse to take defence, and there was no proof that they had paid anything: 4 Watts 359.

As to the record in partition. A record may be good for part and bad for another part, as in the case of husband taking, at the valuation, land in which his wife is interested: 6 S. & R. 267; 8 Id. 167. There may be cases where a person is not bound to disclose; but he must not misrepresent.

The deed to Patrick Smith was given in evidence to show the price paid for the lot.

The opinion of the Court was delivered by COULTER, J.

The admission of evidence to impeach the deed from Summerville and wife, to Jackson, for fraud, was right. The character of the evidence was not objected to, and was unobjectionable. It is the object or purpose of the testimony which is made the ground of objection, and the test of its admissibility.

Positive or actual fraud vitiates all contracts into which it enters, and renders them null and void; differing essentially, in this particular, from contracts which, on account of their evil example, and their opposition to the law and its policy, have legal fraud imputed to them, without presence of actual guilt or covin. These last are merely voidable, and may be affirmed; but those which are void for actual fraud, cannot be affirmed by the party defrauded. Essentially a legal nonentity, even legal proceedings and judgments founded upon them must give way before the claim of the injured victim. In this case, the decree of partition had been made by the court; after which, Jackson, the defendant, purchased the title of Summerville and wife, one of the parties to the partition, and appeared in court, with his deed, and claimed to represent the Summervilles, and as their representative, elected to take the land at the appraisement, which was awarded to him by the court, and the partition ordered to be firm and stable for ever.

The children of Summerville and wife seek to recover the portion or purpart of the land their parents conveyed, because the deed from them was procured by actual fraud and deceit. The evidence offered and admitted conduced to prove the most startling and appalling fraud, by which extreme old age and imbecility were overcome by concerted falsehood and contrivance on the part of men of weight and character, in one of whom the deceived parties had unbounded confidence, and by means of which falsehood, they were induced to make a deed for their purpart, for less than half its value. The evidence tended to prove, not only a fraud upon the Summervilles, but upon the court; and its admission was only a just vindication of the dignity and purity of the judicial tribunals, and the public justice of the country. If the deed from Summerville had been forged, what just man will say that a decree procured by it ought not to give way to the violated rights of the party defrauded? And what is the difference, in the eye of elevated morals, between a deed forged, and one procured by falsehood and covin? In the eye of the law, there is a difference — one is punished as a crime, and in the other, the party is only deprived of his ill-gotten gains. The principle, that the judgments and decrees of courts, procured by actual fraud, are null to the extent of the fraud, as against the party defrauded, is as old as the times of Lord Coke, and is familiar in our...