Jackson ex rel. Jackson v. Suffolk Cnty.

• Decision Date: 20 February 2015
• Docket Number: No. 13–CV–394 JFBSIL.,13–CV–394 JFBSIL.
• Citation: 87 F.Supp.3d 386
• Parties: Elijah JACKSON, by and through his Parent and Legal Guardian, Julie Jackson, and Julie JACKSON, Individually, Plaintiffs, v. SUFFOLK COUNTY, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of New York

87 F.Supp.3d 386

Elijah JACKSON, by and through his Parent and Legal Guardian, Julie Jackson, and Julie JACKSON, Individually, Plaintiffs

v.SUFFOLK COUNTY, et al., Defendants.

No. 13–CV–394 JFBSIL.

United States District Court, E.D. New York.

Signed Feb. 20, 2015.

Alex Kriegsman, Kriegsman PC, Sag Harbor, NY, for Plaintiffs.

Frank A. Isner, Daniel P. Barker, and Jean K. Delisle of Smith, Finkelstein, Lundberg, Isler & Yakaboski, LLP, Riverhead, NY, for Southold Defendants.

Dennis M. Brown, Suffolk County Attorney, by Jason Bassett, Assistant County Attorney, Office of the County Attorney, Hauppague, NY, for County Defendants.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

JOSEPH F. BIANCO, District Judge:

On June 3, 2011, the East End Drug Task Force (the “Task Force”), including defendant Police Officer Kenneth D. Richert (“Richert”), executed a search warrant at 115 Broad Street, Greenport, New York, the residence (at that time) of plaintiff Julie Jackson (“Jackson”); her son, plaintiff Elijah Jackson (“Elijah”) (collectively, “plaintiffs”); and Jackson's husband, nonparty Jeffrey Jackson (“Jeffrey”). On February 17, 2012, the Task Force executed a search warrant at 8100 Main Street, East Marion, New York, the Jacksons' residence (at that time). During the second search, officers discovered cocaine and marijuana in the pocket of a jacket in a dining room closet, and arrested and charged Jackson and her husband with Criminal Possession of a Controlled Substance in the Fifth Degree, N.Y. Penal Law § 220.06(5), and Unlawful Possession of Marijuana, N.Y. Penal Law § 221.05. This lawsuit concerns the execution of those searches, Jackson's arrest, and her subsequent prosecution.

In this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action, plaintiffs allege that the “County Defendants”—Suffolk County (“the County”), the Suffolk County District Attorney's Office (“the District Attorney's Office”), the Task Force, and Richert—and the “Southold Defendants”—the Town of Southold (“Southold”) and the Southold Police Department (“SPD”)—violated plaintiffs' Fourth Amendment rights to be free from false arrest, malicious prosecution, malicious abuse of process, false imprisonment, and unlawful search and seizure, and also violated their Fourteenth Amendment equal protection rights. Plaintiffs also seek to hold the County and Southold liable under Monell. Presently before the Court are the County Defendants' and the Southold Defendants' respective motions for summary judgment pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 56. For the following reasons, the County Defendants' motion is granted in part and denied in part, and the Southold Defendants' motion is granted in its entirety.¹

In particular, the Court concludes that Jackson's unlawful search claim against Richert (relating to the June 3, 2011 search) survives summary judgment, because there is a genuine issue of disputed fact as to whether the search was executed in an unreasonable manner, in terms of the alleged gratuitous and unnecessary destruction of property during the search. Although defendants argue that the damage was incidental to the lawful search, the Court concludes that this issue cannot be decided on summary judgment in this case given the factual disputes in the record concerning the nature and scope of the items damaged, as well as alleged threats during the search regarding the destruction of property and other circumstances surrounding the search. Moreover, when the evidence is construed most favorably to plaintiffs, there is sufficient evidence of Richert's involvement with and/or coordination of the execution of the search to create a genuine factual dispute as to whether he was personally involved in the alleged destruction of property, or failed to intervene in the destruction of property by other officers. In addition, given these disputed issues of fact, qualified immunity on this claim cannot be decided at this juncture.

In other words, if Richert maliciously and/or gratuitously destroyed Jackson's property during the search with no legitimate law enforcement reason (as plaintiffs assert), he would not be entitled to qualified immunity.

However, summary judgment is warranted on all the other claims. First, no independent substantive due process claim exists because the Fourth Amendment provides the source for a claim under Section 1983 for all of the alleged conduct. Second, the uncontroverted evidence demonstrates that there was, at a minimum, arguable probable cause to arrest Jackson under a theory of constructive possession for the drugs found during the search and, thus, the false arrest and imprisonment claim cannot survive summary judgment against Richert because he is entitled to qualified immunity. Third, plaintiffs point to no evidence that vitiated the probable cause during the prosecution and, thus, Richert is also entitled to qualified immunity on the malicious prosecution claim. Fourth, the malicious abuse of process claim cannot survive summary judgment because there is no evidence from which a rational jury could find a collateral objective by Richert and, in any event, Richert is entitled to qualified immunity. Fifth, the equal protection claim cannot survive summary judgment because, inter alia, there is insufficient evidence from which a rational jury could find that any racial or other discriminatory animus motivated Richert's (or any other officer's) actions. Finally, there is no evidence that a municipal policy, custom, or failure to train caused any injury and, thus, the municipal liability claims against the County and the Town of Southold cannot survive summary judgment.

I. Background

A. Facts

The following facts are taken from the parties' depositions, declarations, exhibits, and respective Local Rule 56.1 statements of facts. Upon consideration of a motion for summary judgment, the Court construes the facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. See, e.g., Capobianco v. City of New York, 422 F.3d 47, 50 n. 1 (2d Cir.2005). Unless otherwise noted, where a party's Rule 56.1 statement is cited, that fact is undisputed or the opposing party has not pointed to any evidence in the record to contradict it. Although the parties' Rule 56.1 statements of facts contain specific citations to the record, the Court cites to the Rule 56.1 statement instead of the underlying citation to the record.

1. The Task Force

The East End Drug Task Force is a multi-jurisdictional task force funded by the District Attorney's Office. (Southold Defs.' 56.1 ¶ 1.) The parties dispute whether Richert, a SPD Officer, was under the Task Force's exclusive control, command, and supervision while he was assigned to it from June 2010 to July 2013, such that Southold cannot be municipally liable in this case regardless of Richert's potential liability.

According to the Southold Defendants, from on or about June 1, 2010, through August 1, 2011, Richert was supervised by and reported to Suffolk County Senior Investigator James McAllister (“McAllister”), and James Rodden (“Rodden”) of the Task Force. (Id. ¶ 4.) From on or about August 1, 2011, through July 1, 2013, Richert was supervised by, and reported to, Suffolk County Senior Investigator Robert Flood, Rodden, and Senior Probation Officer Gil Maldonado (“Maldonado”) of the Task Force. (Id. ¶ 5.) Plaintiffs argue that Richert, who they claim led the searches at issue, was wearing an SPD badge, was paid by Southold, and was reporting his actions to SPD Detective John Sinning (“Sinning”), the Task Force's SPD liaison. (E.g., Pls.' 56.1 ¶¶ 2, 4.) Richert testified that (1) his salary was paid by Southold, but the District Attorney's Office compensated for overtime; (2) while he worked for the Task Force, a plainclothes unit, he would wear his SPD shield; (3) officers wore jackets that said East End Task Force; and (4) he told Sinning the Task Force was conducting an operation in Southold on June 3, 2011, and to come to the scene. (Richert Dep. at 15, 29–30, 36.) Contrary to plaintiffs' assertion, Richert did not testify that he reported his actions “as they occurred” to Sinning. Sinning was present during the search, and he stated he took direction from and was under the exclusive command and supervision of the Task Force. (Southold Defs.' 56.1 ¶ 8.)

2. The June 3, 2011 Search

On June 2, 2011, Richert obtained a search warrant on behalf of the Task Force for the Jacksons' home at 115 Broad Street. (Id. ¶ 24.) Suffolk County Court Judge James Doyle issued the warrant, which, per an affidavit from Richert, stemmed from Jeffrey's sales of cocaine to an undercover informant on two prior occasions. (Id. ¶¶ 25, 26; see June 3, 2011 Search Warrant, Southold Defs.' Ex. K.) Judge Doyle found probable cause to search for cocaine, currency, books and records reflecting illicit drug transactions, drug paraphernalia, and indicia of knowing possession, ownership, and/or control of the contraband and premises. (Southold Defs.' 56.1 ¶ 28.)

The Suffolk County Police Emergency Services (“SCPES”) and the Task Force, supervised by McAllister, executed the warrant on June 3, 2011. (Id. ¶¶ 9–10.) According to Richert, SCPES would “actually execute the search warrant, make the building or residence or whatever we have the warrant for the safe place,” and then Task Force officers would “do the search, actual searching.” (Richert Dep. at 19–20.) When asked whether he led the search, Richert stated that “[t]he bosses [McAllister, and Sinning for SPD] are in charge. I tell them what I think, I think we should do this or go here, you know, we keep the bosses abreast of what's going on through the whole investigation.” (Id. at 38.) Then, the searching officers “usually divide up the house and have partners or groups of people search room by room.” (Id. at 39.) Because Richert procured the warrant, he assisted in coordinating the officers' assignments. (See id. at 43.) He did not remember what rooms he searched. (Id. ) During the search, officers found marijuana in the pocket of a jacket in a basement closet,...