Jackson-Hicks v. E. St. Louis Bd. of Election Comm'rs
| Decision Date | 17 February 2015 |
| Docket Number | No. 5–15–0028.,5–15–0028. |
| Citation | 27 N.E.3d 247 |
| Parties | Emeka JACKSON–HICKS, Petitioner–Appellant, v. The EAST ST. LOUIS BOARD OF ELECTION COMMISSIONERS, and its Members, Elmer D. Jones, Chairman, Edna R. Allen, Vice–Chairman, and Joseph McCaskill, Secretary, and Alvin L. Parks, Jr., Candidate for Mayor, Respondents–Appellees. |
| Court | United States Appellate Court of Illinois |
Eric W. Evans, Roth Evans P.C., Granite City, for appellant.
Garrett P. Hoerner, Becker, Paulson, Hoerner & Thompson, P.C., Belleville, for appellee Alvin L. Parks, Jr.
Richard Sturgeon, Belleville, for other appellees.
delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.
¶ 1 In this expedited appeal, we are asked to determine whether substantial compliance with the signature requirement for an independent candidate's nomination papers is sufficient to retain his name on the ballot for an upcoming mayoral election. For the following reasons, we conclude that it is.
¶ 3 The petitioner, Emeka Jackson–Hicks, a candidate for the office of mayor of East St. Louis, filed an objector's petition with the East St. Louis Board of Election Commissioners (the Board) challenging the nomination papers of incumbent candidate Alvin Parks, Jr. (Parks). See 10 ILCS 5/10–8 (West 2012)
. The petitioner maintained that Parks' name should be excluded from the ballot for the February 24, 2015, consolidated primary election on the grounds that his nomination papers failed to include the minimum number of voter signatures required by law.
¶ 4 On December 10, 2014, the Board held a hearing on the petitioner's objection. See 10 ILCS 5/10–9 (West 2012)
. The evidence before the Board established that pursuant to section 10–3 of the Election Code (10 ILCS 5/10–3 (West 2012) ), Parks' nomination papers required a minimum of 136 voter signatures. The evidence further established that although Parks had garnered a total of 171 signatures, 48 had been deemed invalid. His nomination papers thus included a total of 123 valid signatures, 13 short of the minimum required. Notably, when arguing that the petitioner's objection should be denied, the respondents cited Atkinson v. Schelling, 2013 IL App (2d) 130140, 370 Ill.Dec. 502, 988 N.E.2d 700, as controlling precedent.
¶ 5 At the conclusion of the hearing, the Board unanimously voted to deny the petitioner's objection and subsequently issued a written statement of its findings and decision. See 10 ILCS 5/10–10 (West 2012)
. In its written statement, the Board held that although Parks had been statutorily required to obtain 136 valid signatures on his nomination papers, he had substantially complied with the requirement by obtaining 123. The Board thus ruled that Parks' name would remain on the ballot for the February 24, 2015, consolidated primary election.
¶ 6 On December 12, 2014, in the circuit court of St. Clair County, the petitioner filed a petition for judicial review of the Board's decision. See 10 ILCS 5/10–10.1 (West 2012)
. On January 12, 2015, the cause proceeded to a hearing. At the hearing, citing Atkinson and Merz v. Volberding, 94 Ill.App.3d 1111, 50 Ill.Dec. 520, 419 N.E.2d 628 (1981)
, as directly on point, the respondents maintained that the Board had rightfully determined that Parks' name should remain on the ballot because he had substantially complied with section 10–3. In response, noting that Atkinson had been decided by the Second District Appellate Court and Merz had been decided by the First District, the petitioner argued that the circuit court was bound to follow the Fifth District's decisions in Powell v. East St. Louis Electoral Board, 337 Ill.App.3d 334, 271 Ill.Dec. 820, 785 N.E.2d 1014 (2003), and Knobeloch v. Electoral Board, 337 Ill.App.3d 1137, 272 Ill.Dec. 826, 788 N.E.2d 130 (2003), both of which held that substantial compliance with a mandatory provision of the Election Code is insufficient. The respondents countered that Powell and Knobeloch did not involve section 10–3 and that both cases predated Goodman v. Ward, 241 Ill.2d 398, 350 Ill.Dec. 300, 948 N.E.2d 580 (2011), in which the supreme court acknowledged that substantial compliance can satisfy a mandatory provision of the Election Code. Agreeing with the respondents, the circuit court ultimately concluded that it was “bound” to follow Atkinson and affirmed the Board's decision.
¶ 7 On January 20, 2015, the petitioner filed a timely notice of appeal. On February 6, 2015, we granted the petitioner's motion to expedite her appeal pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 311(b)
(eff. Feb. 26, 2010).
¶ 9 On appeal, citing Powell and Knobeloch, the petitioner asserts that the Board erroneously determined that substantial compliance with section 10–3
's signature requirement is acceptable. The petitioner further suggests that Atkinson and Merz were wrongly decided and established an amorphous and unworkable standard.
¶ 10 The respondents maintain that the provision at issue is directory rather than mandatory and that even if it is mandatory, Atkinson, Merz, and Goodman support the Board's decision. The respondents further distinguish Powell and Knobeloch as “inapposite to this case.”
¶ 12 There are three types of questions that a court may encounter when reviewing a decision of an electoral board: questions of fact, questions of law, and mixed questions of fact and law. Cinkus v. Village of Stickney Municipal Officers Electoral Board, 228 Ill.2d 200, 210, 319 Ill.Dec. 887, 886 N.E.2d 1011 (2008)
. “An administrative agency's findings and conclusions on questions of fact are deemed prima facie true and correct” and will not be disturbed unless they are against the manifest weight of the evidence. Id. “[F]actual determinations are against the manifest weight of the evidence if the opposite conclusion is clearly evident.” Id.
¶ 13 “[W]here the historical facts are admitted or established, but there is a dispute as to whether the governing legal provisions were interpreted correctly by the administrative body, the case presents a purely legal question for which our review is de novo. ” Goodman, 241 Ill.2d at 406, 350 Ill.Dec. 300, 948 N.E.2d 580
. Whether a statute is mandatory or directory is an issue of law that is also reviewed de novo.
O'Brien v. White, 219 Ill.2d 86, 97, 301 Ill.Dec. 154, 846 N.E.2d 116 (2006).
¶ 14 “A mixed question of law and fact asks the legal effect of a given set of facts.” Comprehensive Community Solutions, Inc. v. Rockford School District No. 205, 216 Ill.2d 455, 472, 297 Ill.Dec. 221, 837 N.E.2d 1 (2005). “[I]n resolving a mixed question of law and fact, a reviewing court must determine whether established facts satisfy applicable legal rules.” Id.
The “clearly erroneous” standard of review applies to mixed questions of law and fact. Cinkus, 228 Ill.2d at 211, 319 Ill.Dec. 887, 886 N.E.2d 1011
. A decision is considered clearly erroneous when a reviewing court is left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made. Id.
¶ 15 Because judicial review of an electoral board's decision is considered administrative review, we review the Board's decision, not the decision of the circuit court. Jackson v. Board of Election Commissioners, 2012 IL 111928, ¶ 46, 363 Ill.Dec. 557, 975 N.E.2d 583
. Here, the Board's determination that the statutory provision at issue requires only substantial compliance is a question of law (see O'Brien, 219 Ill.2d at 97, 301 Ill.Dec. 154, 846 N.E.2d 116 ), while its determination that Parks substantially complied with the statute presents a mixed question of law and fact (see Samuelson v. Cook County Officers Electoral Board, 2012 IL App (1st) 120581, ¶ 11, 360 Ill.Dec. 658, 969 N.E.2d 468 ).
¶ 17 In Powell, three mayoral candidates' names were kept off the ballot for their failure to comply with the statement-of-economic-interest requirement set forth in section 10–5 of the Election Code (10 ILCS 5/10–5 (West 2000)). Powell, 337 Ill.App.3d at 336, 271 Ill.Dec. 820, 785 N.E.2d 1014
. After noting that in Bolger v. Electoral Board, 210 Ill.App.3d 958, 959–60, 155 Ill.Dec. 447, 569 N.E.2d 628 (1991), the appellate court had determined that the requirement's use of the word “must” made the requirement mandatory, the Powell court rejected the candidates' contention that their good-faith substantial compliance was sufficient. Powell, 337 Ill.App.3d at 337, 271 Ill.Dec. 820, 785 N.E.2d 1014. The court further noted that in DeFabio v. Gummersheimer, 192 Ill.2d 63, 66, 248 Ill.Dec. 243, 733 N.E.2d 1241 (2000), the supreme court held that “a mandatory provision of the Election Code” must be strictly enforced. Powell, 337 Ill.App.3d at 338, 271 Ill.Dec. 820, 785 N.E.2d 1014.
¶ 18 In Knobeloch, we adhered to our holding in Powell when rejecting the candidate's argument that his substantial compliance with the notarization requirements of sections 10–4 and 10–5 of the Election Code (10 ILCS 5/10–4
, 10–5 (West 2000)) was sufficient. Knobeloch, 337 Ill.App.3d at 1139–40, 272 Ill.Dec. 826, 788 N.E.2d 130. We noted that both requirements used the word “shall” and that there was “no dispute” that the provisions at issue were “mandatory.” Id. at 1139, 272 Ill.Dec. 826, 788 N.E.2d 130. We further noted that a “mandatory provision is one that will describe the consequences of failing to follow its provisions.” Id.
¶ 19 In pertinent part, section 10–3
provides as follows:
“Nominations of independent candidates for public office within any district or political subdivision less than the State, may be made by nomination papers signed in the aggregate for each candidate by qualified voters of such district, or political subdivision, equaling not less than 5%, nor more than 8% (or 50 more than the minimum, whichever is greater) of the number of persons, who voted at the next preceding regular election in such district or political subdivision in which such district or political subdivision voted as a unit for...
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Jackson-Hicks v. E. St. Louis Bd. of Election Comm'rs
...be placed before the voters. On judicial review of the board's decision, the circuit and appellate courts affirmed. 2015 IL App (5th) 150028, 389 Ill.Dec. 755, 27 N.E.3d 247. We granted leave to appeal. Ill. S.Ct. R. 315 (eff. Jan. 1, 2015). For the reasons that follow, we reverse the decis......