Jackson Lumber Co. v. Walton County

• Decision Date: 29 March 1928
• Parties: JACKSON LUMBER CO. et al. v. WALTON COUNTY.
• Court: Florida Supreme Court

116 So. 771

95 Fla. 632

JACKSON LUMBER CO. et al. v. WALTON COUNTY.

Florida Supreme Court

March 29, 1928

Rehearing Denied April 17, 1928.

En Banc.

Proceeding by Walton County against the State, for the validation of bonds in which certain parties intervened. From a final decree validating the bonds, the Jackson Lumber Company and others appeal.

Affirmed.

Whitfield J., and Ellis, C.J., dissenting.

On Petition for Rehearing.

Syllabus by the Court

SYLLABUS

In bond validation proceedings, judge might permit filing supplemental petition showing change of interest rate effected after filing original petition (Rev. Gen. St. 1920 § 3296, and § 3298, as amended by Laws 1927, c. 11854). Under the provisions of section 3298, Rev. Gen. Stats., as amended by chapter 11854, Laws of 1927, the circuit judge before whom bond validation proceedings were pending had authority to permit the filing of a supplemental petition showing that the rate of interest which the bonds should bear had been changed from 'either 5 1/2 or 6 per cent. per annum,' as prescribed in the original resolution of the board of county commissioners, to '5 1/2 per cent. per annum,' such amendment having been effected after the filing of the original petition by subsequent action of said board.

Where authority to issue bonds came directly from statute giving board authority to fix interest, amendment to petition in validation proceedings, alleging change in interest rate held not to invalidate proceedings (Rev. Gen. St. 1920, § 3297, and § 3298, as amended by Laws 1927, c. 11854; Sp.Act 1927, c. 13530, § 1). The amendment thus made in the rate as named in the original resolution did not invalidate the proceedings because in this case the authority of the board to issue the bonds was not dependent upon the action of the electorate, but came directly from a legislative act, under which any rate fixed by the board would have been valid provided it did not exceed six per cent.

Statute's title showing subject is authorizing county bond issue for roads and bridges covers any county or state roads and bridges in county which might be designated in body of act (Sp. Act 1927, c. 13530; Const. art. 3, § 16). Where the title of an act shows that the object and subject of such act is to authorize a bond issue to provide funds for the construction, repair, etc., of 'certain roads and bridges in Walton county,' and to provide taxation to pay the same, the language used is broad enough to cover and direct attention to any roads and bridges in the county that might be designated in the body of the act, whether county or state roads; and the fact that some of the roads so designated in the body of the act are state roads does not necessarily render the title insufficient or misleading, it having been decided that the construction or improvement of that part of a state road located within a county may be a county purpose as to that county.

Local act's imposing on board of county commissioners powers and duties incidental to issuing bonds and levying tax for county purpose does not constitute regulation of class of officers (Const. art. 3, §§ 20, 24). Where authority is granted by special or local act for the board of county commissioners of a county to issue bonds and levy a tax for a county purpose, the powers and duties vested in or imposed upon the county commissioners by the act with reference to the issue and sale of the bonds, the use and application of the proceeds, and the levy of taxes to pay the principal and interest, are but incidental to the main purpose, and hence not in conflict with section 20 of article 3 of the Constitution, as being a regulation of the jurisdiction or duties of a class of officers.

Act authorizing board of county commissioners to issue bonds held not to invade board's discretionary powers (Act of Legislature approved June 3, 1927). An act which authorizes but does not compel, a board of county commissioners to issue bonds for a designated purpose, and which provides the amount thereof, the maximum rate of interest, the procedure to be followed, the levy of taxes therefor, and the manner in which the proceeds shall be applied, is not invalid as being an unauthorized invasion by the Legislature of the discretionary powers of such county board.

Legislature may enact statute giving board of county commissioners power to issue bonds for road purposes without vote of electors authorization of board of county commissioners to issue road bonds held tantamount to authorization of county which acts through commissioners (Const. art. 8, § 5, and art. 9,§ 5; Sp. Act 1927, c. 13530; Rev. Gen. St. 1920, § 1475). An act authorizing an issue of county bonds by the board of county commissioners of a county for road construction within the county, without giving the electors of the county any opportunity to express themselves at an election upon the question as to whether or not the bonds should be issued or taxes levied for their payment, is within the legislative power to enact, and, however contrary it may be to the political principle of local self-government, is not in conflict with our Constitution, there being no provision therein guaranteeing such right to the voters or citizens of the county. The authorization granted to the board of county commissioners is tantamount to an authorization to the county, which acts through them in such matters, within the meaning of section 5 of article 9 of the Constitution.

Courts have no power to decide whether required notice of local or special statute was published; inquiry as to whether notice of local or special statute was published is exclusively legislative function; passage of special or local act at Legislature's regular session is legislative judgment that proper notice was published (Const. art. 3, § 21). It has long been a settled principle of constitutional construction in this state that, under the language now employed in section 21 of article 3 of the Constitution, the courts have no power to inquire and decide whether notice has been published as prescribed therein, the same being made by the Constitution an exclusively legislative function and duty; and the passage of a special or local act at a regular session of the Legislature is a legislative judgment that proper notice has been duly published and that legal evidence thereof was 'established in the Legislature' before the bill was passed, by which judgment the courts are concluded. The remedy for the alleged abuse of this power on the part of the Legislature lies with the people by change of their Constitution and not by appeal to the courts to usurp a power withheld from them by the Constitution.

In absence of sufficient allegations of fraud, courts cannot go behind official legislative journals, regular and adequate on face, in passing on validity of statutes; on showing by certified copies of entries in Legislature's official journals that statute was constitutionally passed, striking answer alleging contrary held proper (Const. art. 3, § 17; Sp. Act 1927, c. 13530). Interveners' answer alleges that House Bill 1502, which afterwards became the act here in question, was passed through the Legislature in deliberate violation of the requirements of section 17 of article 3 of the Constitution, whereas a duly certified copy, attached to the petition for validation and made a part thereof, of the entries in the official journals of the Legislature, shows that the act was passed in accordance with such constitutional requirements. In the absence of clear and legally sufficient allegations of fraud, the courts cannot go behind the official legislative journals, where, as here, they are regular and adequate on their face, and permit their impeachment by parol evidence, or sustain as sufficient allegations which could only be proven by parol testimony or by some record of less dignity than the legislative journals. There was therefore no error in granting the motion to strike this portion of the answer.

Question of what constitutes county purpose for issuance of bonds is one for courts; Legislature cannot arbitrarily authorize county to assess taxes for purpose having no legal or practical relation to county purpose (Const. art. 9, § 5). The question of what constitutes a county purpose within the meaning of section 5 of article 9 of the Constitution is in the ultimate one for judicial determination in the light of the facts of each particular case. The Legislature cannot arbitrarily authorize a county to assess and impose taxes for a purpose that has no legal or practical relation whatever to any county purpose.

Party attacking statute as authorizing county tax for other than county purpose has burden clearly to allege and prove it; generally all reasonable presumptions will be indulged in favor of statute's constitutionality (Const. art. 9, § 5). The legislative determination as to what constitutes a county purpose is entitled to such weight as to require clear allegation and proof, showing the contrary, to justify the courts in overturning such legislative judgment, thus throwing the burden of allegation and proof upon the party attacking the legislative act; it being the general rule that all reasonable presumptions will be indulged in favor of the constitutionality of an act of the Legislature.

Facts alleged in interveners' answer held not to warrant finding statute authorizing county bond issue unconstitutional because expenditures authorized for designated state roads in county would not benefit county constitute county purpose (Sp. Act 1927, c. 13530, § 1; Const. art. 9, § 5). Under the facts alleged in the answer of the interveners, which are examined in the opinion, the holding is that they are not sufficient to warrant the...