Jackson Nat'l Life Ins. Co. v. Heyser, CIVIL ACTION NO. 12-5051

• Decision Date: 18 September 2013
• Docket Number: CIVIL ACTION NO. 12-5051
• Citation: Jackson Nat'l Life Ins. Co. v. Heyser, CIVIL ACTION NO. 12-5051 (E.D. Pa. Sep 18, 2013)
• Parties: JACKSON NATIONAL LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY, Plaintiff, v. JOHN E. HEYSER, as Executor of the Estate of William E. Keen, THOMAS JULIANO, and JOSEPH FREDERICK ALT, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Pennsylvania

JACKSON NATIONAL LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY, Plaintiff, v. JOHN E. HEYSER, as Executor of the Estate of William E. Keen,THOMAS JULIANO, and JOSEPH FREDERICK ALT, Defendants.

CIVIL ACTION NO. 12-5051

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

September 18, 2013

MEMORANDUM

BUCKWALTER, S. J.

Currently pending before the Court in this action is (a)John E. Heyser's ("Heyser")Motion in Limine to Preclude the Testimony of Thomas Juliano and Joseph Frederick Alt and (b) the Motion for Summary Judgment of ClaimantThomas Juliano("Juliano") and Joseph Frederick Alt("Alt").For the following reasons, Heyser's Motion in Limine is granted and Juliano and Alt's Motion for Summary Judgment is granted.

I.FACTUAL RECORD

This case involves an interpleader action filed by Jackson National Life Insurance Company to determine the proper recipient of an annuity.The annuity was purchased by the decedent, William E. Keen("Keen"), on April 23, 2010, with a date-of-death value of $394,770.33.(Juliano & Alt Mot. Summ. J., Ex.A.) Keen originally named his estate as the beneficiary of the death benefit.(Id.)The annuity broker listed on the application is ClaimantJuliano.Thereafter, on July 22, 2010, Keen signed an Annuity Service Request form, which changed the beneficiary of his annuity to Thomas Juliano and Joseph Frederick Alt(collectively "Claimants") in equal shares.

Keen passed away on April 30, 2012.Under his Will, which he originally executed on September 1, 2010, the residuary beneficiaries of the estate consisted of six charities, including the Montgomery County Association for the Blind, Senior Adult Activities Center of Montgomery County, Norristown Ministries, Inc., Boy Scouts of America, Cradle of Liberty Council of Montgomery County, Eagleville Chapter 523 of the Patriotic Order of Sons of America, and Lower Providence Presbyterian Church.(Juliano & Alt Mot. Summ. J., Ex. E.)The Will appointed John E. Heyser as Executor.(Id.)Notably, Heyser had previously been given a Power of Attorney over Keen's affairs via document executed on February 23, 2005.(Id., Ex. F.)

Subsequently, on May 29, 2012, Claimant Juliano submitted an Annuity Death Benefit Claim Form, seeking his share of the annuity.(Juliano & Alt Mot. Summ. J., Ex. D.)Executor Heyser contested that payment via letter dated June 5, 2012, as follows:

Gentlemen:

I understand that the above annuity policy purchased by William Keen improperly named Thomas Juliano, the brokerage agent who arranged for purchase of the policy, as a 50% beneficiary and that he has submitted claim forms requesting payment.

On behalf of the estate, I object to payment of the policy proceeds, or any portion thereof, to Thomas Juliano, and request that payment be delayed until a determination is made concerning the legality and propriety of the brokerage agent being named a beneficiary is determined.

Please advise me and my attorney, James L. Hollinger, if you need somethingmore at this time to await a determination.Also, if you plan to make payment despite this communication, please advise me immediately so that we can proceed with court action.

(Juliano & Alt Mot. Summ. J., Ex. F.)In light of this objection, Jackson National Life Insurance Company filed the present interpleader action, on September 4, 2012, and was dismissed from the matter upon deposit of the funds at issue with the Clerk of this Court.

II.MOTION IN LIMINE

By way of the pending Motion in Limine, Executor Heyser seeks to preclude consideration of any testimony or declarations from either Claimant Alt or Claimant Juliano pursuant to Pennsylvania's Dead Man's Act.This Act, which applies to federal diversity cases pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 601,¹ states that "[e]xcept as otherwise provided in this subchapter, in any civil action or proceeding, where any party to a thing or contract is dead . . . neither any surviving or remaining party to such thing or contract, nor any other person whose interest shall be adverse to the said right of such deceased . . . party, shall be a competent witness to any matter occurring before the death of said party . . ."42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 5930.The underlying policy seeks "to prevent the injustice which might flow from permitting the surviving party to an occurrence to testify favorable to himself and adversely to the decedent, which testimony decedent's representative would be in no position to refute."Bacon v. Riva, No. Civ.A.12-2498, 1993 WL 4132, at *2(E.D. Pa.Jan. 4, 1993)(quotingPerlis v. Kuhns, 195 A.2d 156, 158(Pa. Super.1963)).In order for the Act to apply, three conditions must exist: "(1) the deceased must have had an actual right or interest in the matter at issue; (2) the interest of thewitness—not simply the testimony—must be adverse; and (3) a right of the deceased must have passed to a party of record who represents the deceased's interest."Keegan v. Fahnestock & Co., Inc., No. Civ.A.95-5998, 1996 WL 530000, at *5(E.D. Pa.Sept. 16, 1996);Olson v. N. Am. Indus. Supply, Inc., 658 A.2d 358, 364(Pa. Super. Ct.1995).When a person is disqualified, he may not testify as to any transaction which occurred before the decedent's death; the prohibition is not limited to the actual transaction at issue.Schroeder v. Jacquiss, 861 A.2d 885, 887(Pa.2004).

The protections of the Dead Man's Act are "highly technical" and may be "easily waived" by the protected party.Id.The common law principle on waiver is clear: "a decedent's representative waives the Act by taking the deposition of or requiring answers to interrogatories from an adverse party, whether or not he places the results of such discovery on the record."Id. at 890.Where, however, the estate refrains from engaging in such discovery, the waiver principle is not implicated.Id.Nor does the estate bear the responsibility of raising the Act"on every conceivable pretrial occasion when inquiries are made of an adverse party," so long as it is not the Estate that has made the inquiries.Id.

In the present case, all three conditions for application of the Act have been met.Decedent Keen had an actual right or interest in the proceeds of his life insurance annuity.Claimants Alt and Juliano have an adverse interest to the proceeds of the annuity against the Keen's estate.Finally, Keen's right has passed to ExecutorJohn E. Heyser, who is a party of record in this litigation.

Claimants now argue that the protections of the Dead Man's Act have been waived by the actions of Executor Heyser in accusing Juliano of using "improper influence" over Keen.Pursuant to the principles set forth above, however, Claimants have failed to establish any such waiver.They have not shown that Heyser ever issued interrogatories to Claimants, requested their depositions, or even cross-examined them at any point.Moreover, Heyser properly objected to the Claimants' Declarations by filing this Motion in Limine.Finally, to the extent Claimants allege that Heyser's attack on a seemingly valid beneficiary designation is adverse to the estate and places Claimants' testimony at issue, their argument fails.Claimants fail to cite, and this Court has not found, any such case suggesting that an executor's mere challenge to a conveyance waives the protections of the Dead Man's Act.²Indeed, Heyser is acting entirely in his capacity as Executor of the Estate and maintains no adverse interest that somehow results in waiver.Accordingly, given the clear dictates of the Dead Man's Act, the Court declines to consider any testimony from Claimants Juliano or Alt.³

III.MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

A.Standard of Review

Summary judgment is proper "if the pleadings, the discovery and disclosure materials on file, and any affidavits show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law."Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(2).A factual dispute is"material" only if it might affect the outcome of the case.Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248(1986).For an issue to be "genuine," a reasonable fact-finder must be able to return a verdict in favor of the non-moving party.Id.

On summary judgment, the moving party has the initial burden of identifying evidence that it believes shows an absence of a genuine issue of material fact.Conoshenti v. Pub. Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., 364 F.3d 135, 145-46(3d Cir.2004).It is not the court's role to weigh the disputed evidence and decide which is more probative, or to make credibility determinations.Boyle v. Cnty. of Allegheny, 139 F.3d 386, 393(3d Cir.1998)(citingPetruzzi's IGA Supermkts., Inc. v. Darling-Del. Co. Inc., 998 F.2d 1224, 1230(3d Cir.1993)).Rather, the court must consider the evidence, and all reasonable inferences which may be drawn from it, in the light most favorable to the non-moving party.Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587(1986)(citingUnited States v. Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654, 655(1962));Tigg Corp. v. Dow Corning Corp., 822 F.2d 358, 361(3d Cir.1987).If a conflict arises between the evidence presented by both sides, the court must accept as true the allegations of the non-moving party, and "all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his favor."Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255.

Although the moving party must establish an absence of a genuine issue of material fact, it need not "support its motion with affidavits or other similar materials negating the opponent's claim."Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323(1986).It can meet its burden by "pointing out . . . that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's claims."Id. at 325.Once the movant has carried its initial burden, the opposing party"must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to material facts."Matsushita Elec., 475 U.S. at 586."[T]he non-moving party must rebut the motion with facts in the record and cannotrest solely on...