Jackson-Pringle v. Wash. Metro. Area Transit Auth.

• Docket Number: Civil Action 20-1880 (JDB)
• Decision Date: 28 July 2022
• Parties: JUDY JACKSON-PRINGLE, Plaintiff, v. WASHINGTON METROPOLITAN AREA TRANSIT AUTHORITY, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Columbia

1

JUDY JACKSON-PRINGLE, Plaintiff, v. WASHINGTON METROPOLITAN AREA TRANSIT AUTHORITY, Defendant.

Civil Action No. 20-1880 (JDB)

United States District Court, District of Columbia

July 28, 2022

MEMORANDUM OPINION

JOHN D. BATES UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Plaintiff Judy Jackson-Pringle brings this claim against her employer Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority (“WMATA”), alleging various forms of discrimination and unlawful employer activity under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. See Compl. [ECF No. 1] ¶¶ 43-65. The core of her claim is an allegation of unlawful retaliation in response to a 2017 internal complaint of sexual harassment. See id. at ¶¶ 7-39. The parties have completed discovery, and WMATA has moved for summary judgment on all counts. See generally Def. WMATA's Mot for Summ. J. [ECF No. 18] (“Mot.”). Because Jackson-Pringle's complaint was not timely filed, the Court will grant WMATA's motion.

Background

Jackson-Pringle is an African-American woman in her late 60s or early 70s who has worked for WMATA since April 2012. Compl. ¶ 5; cf. Tr. of Judy Jackson-Pringle Dep. [ECF No. 20-2] (“Jackson-Pringle Dep. Tr.”) at 208:1-3.^[1] She has worked at multiple locations and served in various positions over the years, most recently as a Bus Operations Manager at Andrews Federal Center Bus Garage. Jackson-Pringle Dep. Tr. [ECF No 18-7] at 11:8-12:15; Compl. ¶ 6. Before the events precipitating this lawsuit, she had incurred only one disciplinary infraction and had not been cited for any kind of unsatisfactory work. Jackson-Pringle Dep. Tr. [ECF No. 20-2] at 51:2-5, 117:10-20, 184:6-15, 212:8-11; Pl.'s Opp'n to Mot. [ECF No. 20] (“Opp'n”) at 4.

In June 2017, a male coworker walked in on Jackson-Pringle while she was in the women's restroom and stared at her while she was exposed. Compl. ¶¶ 8-11; Jackson-Pringle Dep. Tr. [ECF No. 18-7] at 21:18-22:9; see generally Jackson-Pringle Dep. Tr. [ECF No. 20-2] at 155:10-159:1. She submitted an internal Equal Employment Opportunity (“EEO”) complaint in June 2017,^[2]Formal Discrimination Compl. [ECF No. 18-2]; Jackson-Pringle Dep. Tr. [ECF No. 18-7] at 21:18-22:9, and after an internal investigation, WMATA's EEO Office found that Jackson-Pringle had indeed been subjected to a hostile environment, Dec. 2017 EEO Finding [ECF No. 18-3]; Def. WMATA's Statement of Material Facts Not in Dispute [ECF No. 18-1] (“Def.'s Stmt. of Facts”) ¶ 3. The perpetrator of the harassment was suspended. Gilchrist Dep. Tr. [ECF No. 20-6] at 15:19. Soon after, Jackson-Pringle moved to a new office within WMATA and began working under a new supervisor, Jackson-Pringle Dep. Tr. [ECF No. 18-7] at 11:5-21, 23:5-9, 42:9-11, although she remained partially under the supervision of her harasser, Jackson-Pringle Dep. Tr. [ECF No. 20-2] at 54:9-55:17; Compl. ¶ 21; Opp'n at 3.

Jackson-Pringle alleges that she was then subjected to myriad instances of discrimination in retaliation for her 2017 internal complaint. Compl. ¶¶ 22-39; Jackson-Pringle Dep. Tr. [ECF No. 20-2] at 85:4-89:13. She claims that she was written up and suspended for failure to complete “impossible tasks”; that she was passed over for a new position as a result of age, sex, and race discrimination; and that her shifts were unfairly changed to accommodate a younger male coworker with less experience, contrary to the promises of her supervisors that her shifts would remain the same. Compl. ¶¶ 22-39; Jackson-Pringle Dep. Tr. [ECF No. 18-7] at 45:8-11, 219:1114; Jackson-Pringle Dep. Tr. [ECF No. 20-2] at 80:5-13, 85:4-89:13, 206:13-209:13. She alleges that this discrimination continued under several different supervisors and at several different work locations. See Jackson-Pringle Dep. Tr. [ECF No. 20-2] at 75:4-22. During that period, Jackson-Pringle lodged several informal complaints internally, but she did not pursue any of them officially (as she had in 2017). Id. at 23:10-18.

On December 9, 2019, Jackson-Pringle filed a charge of discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”). Charge of Discrimination [ECF No. 18-5]; Def.'s Stmt. of Facts ¶ 5. On the charge sheet, she checked the box indicating that she had suffered discrimination based on “Retaliation.” Charge of Discrimination. In the description box below that section, she wrote,

I began my employment with the above reference[d] employer in April 2012. I filed an internal charge of discrimination against respondent assistant superintendent in June 2017. I was being giv[en] egregious work that respondent knew it was impossible to complete. I was written up for the egregious work. My shift was changed to accommodate younger males with less time in grade. I was denied a position that was offered to a younger male with less experience.

Respondent did not give me any explanation why I was being treated differently.

I believe I have been retaliated against because I filed a sexual harassment internal complaint against respondent in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 as amended, with respect to harassment.

Id. (cleaned up).

By no later than March 12, 2020, Jackson-Pringle's counsel received a Notice of Right to Sue letter from the EEOC. See Email Exchange with EEOC [ECF No. 18-8] at 1 (March 12 email from Jackson-Pringle's counsel indicating they received a right-to-sue letter).^[3] The heading of the letter indicated it was from the EEOC, and the bottom contained a signature line for Rosemarie Rhodes, Director of the Baltimore Field Office of the EEOC, but Rhodes's signature was missing from the document. First Not. Right to Sue at 1. The letter also contained a space for the EEOC to note the date of mailing, and although a date was not typed into this space, a rubber-stamped date of Dec. 17, 2019 was overlaid on top. Id.

Jackson-Pringle's counsel emailed case workers at the EEOC on March 12, 2020 and informed them that the letter “was not signed or date stamp[ed].” Email Exchange with EEOC at 1. Counsel requested a properly signed and dated right-to-sue letter, reporting that he was “unsure if [Jackson-Pringle's] deadline [for filing her complaint] has been reached because no date is on the right to sue” letter. Id. The EEOC re-issued Jackson-Pringle's right-to-sue letter on April 8, 2020. Id. at 3-4; Notice of Right to Sue [ECF No. 18-6] (“Second Not. Right to Sue”).

On July 10, 2020, Jackson-Pringle brought this action for retaliation, sex discrimination, and race discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.^[4] See Compl. ¶¶ 43-65. In her complaint, she also raised a constitutional claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983,^[5] Compl. ¶¶ 58-65, but she has now requested that this Court instead treat that claim as a hostile work environment claim under Title VII, Opp'n at 18-20.^[6]

With discovery complete, WMATA now moves for summary judgment. Mot. at 1. Jackson-Pringle has filed her memorandum in opposition, and WMATA has filed its reply. WMATA's motion is ripe for resolution.

Legal Standard

A court must grant a motion for summary judgment when there is “no genuine dispute as to any material fact . . . and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R Civ. P. 56(a); see Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). When looking to the substantive law on which each claim rests, an issue of fact is material if it “might affect the outcome of the suit,” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986), and a dispute is genuine if it could “be resolved only by a finder of fact because [it] may reasonably be resolved in favor of either party,” id. at 250.

When considering a motion for summary judgment, a court may not “make credibility determinations or weigh the evidence,” Lopez v. Council on Am.-Islamic Rels. Action Network, Inc., 826 F.3d 492, 496 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (quoting Holcomb v. Powell, 433 F.3d 889, 895 (D.C. Cir. 2006)), but it must accept the nonmoving party's evidence as true and draw all reasonable inferences in that party's favor, Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255. At the same time, the nonmoving party must rely on more than “the mere existence of a scintilla of evidence” for its assertions, Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252; the party must instead “go beyond the pleadings . . . [to] designate specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial,” Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). “Importantly, while summary judgment must be approached with specific caution in discrimination cases, a plaintiff is not relieved of his obligation to support his allegations by affidavits or other competent evidence showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Pollard v. Quest Diagnostics, 610 F.Supp.2d 1, 17 (D.D.C. 2009) (citation omitted) (cleaned up).

The motion for summary judgment must be granted if the moving party successfully shows that the nonmoving party has “fail[ed] to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.” Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322. That is, “[s]ummary judgment is appropriately granted when, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-movants and drawing all reasonable inferences accordingly, no reasonable jury could reach a verdict in their favor.” Lopez, 826 F.3d at 496. “[A] complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party's case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial.” Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323.

Analysis

A plaintiff must commence a Title VII civil suit “within ninety days after obtaining notice of [the plaintiff's] right to sue from the EEOC.” Dougherty v Barry, 869 F.2d 605, 609 (D.C. Cir 1989); accord 42 U.S.C....