Jackson v. Anderson

• Decision Date: 20 May 1997
• Docket Number: No. 95-60789,95-60789
• Parties: Frank JACKSON, Petitioner-Appellant, v. James V. ANDERSON, Superintendent, Mississippi State Penitentiary, Respondent-Appellee.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit

Page 823

112 F.3d 823

Frank JACKSON, Petitioner-Appellant, v. James V. ANDERSON, Superintendent, Mississippi State Penitentiary, Respondent-Appellee.

No. 95-60789.

United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit.

May 20, 1997.

Frank Jackson, Parchman, MS, pro se.

Jo Anne McFarland McLeod, Michael Cameron Moore, Attorney General, Jackson, MS, for Respondent-Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi.

Before BARKSDALE, EMILIO M. GARZA and BENAVIDES, Circuit Judges.

BENAVIDES, Circuit Judge:

Frank Jackson, a Mississippi state prisoner, appeals the denial of federal habeas corpus relief. He argues that he was illegally sentenced to life imprisonment as an habitual offender because the prosecution failed to prove that he had served separate terms of at least one year on each of his two prior felony convictions as required by Miss.Code Ann. § 99-19-83. ¹ We affirm.

In 1972, Jackson was convicted of mayhem and received a three-year suspended sentence with five years of probation. In 1976, while still on probation, Jackson pleaded guilty to manslaughter and was sentenced to 20 years imprisonment. ² Subsequently, during his incarceration for manslaughter, Jackson's probation (for mayhem) was revoked. He was sentenced to three years to run consecutively to his 20-year manslaughter sentence. After serving a total of six years, nine months, and twenty-eight days for the manslaughter and mayhem convictions, Jackson was released on parole in 1981. In 1983, he was convicted of the instant offense of burglary of a dwelling and sentenced to life imprisonment without parole as an habitual offender.

On Jackson's direct criminal appeal he argued that the prison records "showed the time he served covered one period of confinement" and therefore he had been illegally sentenced as a violent habitual offender under § 99-19-83. The Mississippi Supreme Court opined:

that § 99-19-83 was not violated [because Jackson] was convicted twice previously of felonies which were brought and arose out of separate incidents at different times and was sentenced to and did serve one or more years on each offense, one of which (in this instance both crimes) was a crime of violence.

Jackson v. State, 483 So.2d 1353, 1356-57 (Miss.1986) (emphasis added). To make this determination, the Mississippi Supreme Court relied on the testimony of Christine Houston, the Director of Records for the Department of Corrections. Houston testified that Jackson served five years of his twenty-year sentence for manslaughter and one year, nine months, and twenty-eight days for his three-year sentence for mayhem. Id. at 1356. The newly amended federal habeas statute "retain[s] the traditional presumption of correctness afforded to state court factual determinations." Childress v. Johnson, 103 F.3d 1221, 1225 (5th Cir.1997) (28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1)). The amended statute apparently places a more onerous burden on the petitioner in that the petitioner must now rebut the presumption of correctness by clear and convincing evidence. 28 U.S.C § 2254(e)(1). ³ Further, section 2254(d)(2) prohibits granting the writ in regard to any claim adjudicated on the merits in state court unless the adjudication of that claim "resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding."

Jackson challenges the conclusion that he became eligible for parole after he had served five years or one-fourth of his 20-year manslaughter sentence, arguing that under the version of the parole statute in effect at the time of his parole, ⁴ a prisoner was required to serve at least one-third of his sentence before becoming eligible for parole. Jackson contends that he was required to serve one-third (six years and eight months) of the 20-year sentence, which left only one month and twenty-eight days to be attributed to the consecutive mayhem sentence. He therefore argues that he could not have served one year on the mayhem conviction. ⁵

It is undisputed that Jackson served a total of six years, nine months, and twenty-eight days before he was paroled from his imprisonment for the manslaughter and mayhem convictions. The obvious flaw in Jackson's analysis is that if he served six years and eight months on the manslaughter conviction, then he would have served only one month and twenty-eight days on his mayhem conviction at the time he was actually paroled. If Jackson's analysis is applied to the mayhem sentence, then he would have had to serve one year (one-third) of his three-year manslaughter sentence before being eligible for parole. In other words, Jackson's calculations would have required him to serve a total of seven years and eight months ⁶ before being eligible for parole. Because he was paroled prior to serving that amount of time, Jackson's argument is unavailing. Indeed, his argument highlights the fact that the question is not how much time he should have served under the applicable parole statute, but rather, how much time he actually served. ⁷

In any event, we need not determine exactly how the Mississippi Corrections Department computed the time attributed to each of Jackson's sentences because "[w]e will take the word of the highest court on criminal matters of [Mississippi] as to the interpretation of its law." Seaton v. Procunier, 750 F.2d 366, 368 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 836, 106 S.Ct. 110, 88 L.Ed.2d 90 (1985). "[W]e do not sit to review that state's interpretation of its own law." Id. Because the state court's finding that Jackson served "one or more years on each offense" was not based on an unreasonable determination of the facts presented at the state court proceeding, we are prohibited from granting relief.

Jackson also argues that he was denied effective assistance of counsel because counsel allowed Houston to erroneously testify regarding the time he served on the manslaughter and mayhem sentences. Trial counsel was not responsible for the testimony of Houston and was not unprofessional with respect thereto. Moreover, Jackson failed to establish that Houston's testimony was erroneous. Because we have rejected Jackson's claim on the merits, we likewise reject Jackson's claim of ineffective assistance that is based on the same argument. ⁸

AFFIRMED.

EMILIO M. GARZA, Circuit Judge, dissenting:

In this case, a Mississippi circuit court relied on an unambiguous legal error by a prison system official to make an incorrect factual finding, and thus sentenced Jackson under the wrong penal statute. Because Jackson's illegal sentence violates his rights under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, he is entitled to habeas relief unless the state court resentences him under the correct provision of the Mississippi Code. Accordingly, I dissent.

I

Jackson could only have been sentenced to life without possibility of parole under § 99-19-83 for his burglary conviction if he had previously been "sentenced to and served separate terms of one (1) year or more" for two different felonies. MISS.CODE ANN. § 99-19-83 (1983) (emphasis added).

Before his burglary conviction, Jackson had been convicted of manslaughter and mayhem, both felonies, and was sentenced to twenty years for the first conviction and three years for the second. The three-year mayhem sentence was to run consecutively to the manslaughter sentence. At the time the state released Jackson on parole from these two convictions, Mississippi law required any prisoner who was sentenced "for a definite term or terms of one (1) year or over" to "serve[ ] not less than one-third (1/3) of the total of such term or terms." MISS.CODE ANN. § 47-7-3 (1981). ¹

Upon his release, Jackson had served a total of six years, nine months, and twenty-eight days for the two convictions. Christine Houston, the Director of Records for the Department of Corrections ("DOC"), testified at the sentencing hearing after Jackson's August 1983 burglary conviction as to the allocation of this time between the convictions. The following colloquy occurred between Houston and the district attorney:

Q: And how long did [Jackson] actually serve in the custody of the State Department of Corrections?

A: He served six years, 9 months and 28 days prior to being released on parole on September 24, 1981.

Q: And what credit on each one of these charges, the manslaughter and the mayhem, did he obtain?

A: He was required to serve five years on the 20 year sentence of manslaughter prior to parole eligibility. He served one year, nine months and 28 days on the three year sentence.

Q: That would be on the mayhem?

A: On the mayhem charge.

Q: So, is it your testimony that he served more than one year in the Department of Corrections on each of these charges, manslaughter and mayhem?

A: Yes, sir.

Houston's testimony that Jackson "was required to serve five years on the 20 year sentence" was an unambiguous legal error. Houston (or perhaps the person at the DOC who had prepared the records from which she was reading) had confused the current version of § 47-7-3 with the one that had been in effect at the time Jackson was released on parole. At the time of Houston's testimony, § 47-7-3 mandated that prisoners who had been sentenced for fewer than thirty years "serve[ ] not less than one-fourth (1/4) of the total of such term or terms." MISS.CODE ANN. § 47-7-3 (1982). ² Under this 1/4 ratio, someone like Jackson would be required to serve at least five years of a twenty-year sentence. When Jackson was released on parole, though, a 1/3 ratio was in effect. Under the 1/3 ratio, Jackson was required to serve at least six years, eight months, and a day for manslaughter and at least one year for mayhem, for a total of seven years, eight months, and a day. However, he served some ten months less than this. Thus, the DOC released Jackson in violation of Mississippi law.

In addition, it is crucial...