Jackson v. Astrue

• Decision Date: 09 November 2007
• Docket Number: No. 06-16459.,06-16459.
• Parties: Patricia A. JACKSON, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Michael J. ASTRUE, Defendant-Appellee.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Eleventh Circuit

506 F.3d 1349

Patricia A. JACKSON, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Michael J. ASTRUE, Defendant-Appellee.

No. 06-16459.

United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit.

November 9, 2007.

William H. Webster, Webster, Henry, Lyons & White, PC, Montgomery, AL, for Jackson.

Jennifer Fisher, SSA, Kansas City, MO, James J. DuBois, Montgomery, AL, for Astrue.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Alabama.

Before MARCUS and PRYOR, Circuit Judges, and LAND,^* District Judge.

MARCUS, Circuit Judge:

Patricia A. Jackson appeals the district court's dismissal of her challenge to the administrative denial of her application for Supplemental Security Income ("SSI"), filed under Title XVI of the Social Security Act ("SSA"), 42 U.S.C. § 1383(c). The district court dismissed the complaint as untimely, because it was not filed within the 60-day statute of limitations, enumerated in 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), for federal court review of SSI denials. On appeal, Jackson contends that the district court erred in dismissing her complaint, because the doctrine of equitable tolling applied to excuse her tardy filing. After thorough review, we affirm the judgment of the district court.

I.

The facts relevant to our equitable tolling analysis are these. On August 31, 2004, Jackson sought SSI benefits for injuries she sustained in an automobile accident earlier that month. On February 3, 2006, following a hearing, an Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") denied Jackson's petition on the ground that her injuries did not qualify as "disabilities" under the SSA. On April 21, 2006, the SSA's Appeals Council ("the Appeals Council") denied Jackson's request for review. At this point, the ALJ's decision became final, subject to federal court review under 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g)¹ and 1383(c)(3). In its letter,² the Appeals Council unambiguously "advised Jackson to file her complaint in the United States District Court for the judicial district in which she lives within sixty days from the date of her receipt of the letter." Jackson v. Barnhart, Civil Action No. 2:06cv629-CSC (M.D.Ala.2006). Additionally, the Appeals Council informed Jackson that "[the Council] would assume that Jackson received this letter 5 days after the date on it unless you show us that you did not receive it within the 5-day period." Id. Thus, according to the terms of the April 21, 2006 letter, and consistent with the 60-day statute of limitations, Jackson was required to file her complaint in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Alabama on or before June 26, 2006.

Instead, on June 20, 2006, Jackson filed a pro se complaint challenging the Commissioner's denial of her SSI claim in the state circuit court of Montgomery County, Alabama. Then, on July 13, 2006, that court dismissed Jackson's complaint for lack of jurisdiction. Thereafter, on July 18, 2006, twenty-two days after § 405(g)'s statute of limitations had expired, Jackson filed a complaint in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Alabama.

Appellee, the Commissioner of Social Security ("the Commissioner"), promptly moved to dismiss Jackson's petition under Rules 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, on the ground that the complaint was untimely filed. On December 12, 2006, the district court granted the Commissioner's motion to dismiss. This appeal followed.

II.

We review de novo the district court's dismissal of Jackson's complaint for failure to satisfy the statute of limitations, accepting as true the allegations contained in the complaint. Byrd v. MacPapers, Inc., 961 F.2d 157, 159 (11th Cir.1992). "The question of whether equitable tolling applies is a legal one subject to de novo review." Cabello v. Fernandez-Larios, 402 F.3d 1148, 1153 (11th Cir.2005).

On appeal, Jackson bases her challenge to the district court's dismissal of her § 405(g) complaint on the theory of equitable tolling. Specifically, Jackson says that Congress has made explicit its intention that equitable tolling apply to the SSA's statute of limitations. In addition, Jackson challenges the district court's application of Burnett v. New York Central Railroad Co., 380 U.S. 424, 85 S.Ct. 1050, 13 L.Ed.2d 941 (1965), a case discussing equitable tolling in the context of the Federal Employers' Liability Act ("FELA"), 45 U.S.C. § 56, to the facts of her case, citing the SSA's more permissive approach to equitable tolling.

We consider two threshold questions: first, whether the doctrine of equitable tolling applies to the statute of limitations period embodied in § 405(g), and if so, what showing a claimant must make before the court may toll the SSA's statutory period.

It is by now axiomatic that the United States "is immune from suit save as it consents to be sued," and Congress alone determines how and when the United States may be sued for judicial review of administrative orders and judgments. Lehman v. Nakshian, 453 U.S. 156, 160, 101 S.Ct. 2698, 69 L.Ed.2d 548 (1981) (quoting United States v. Testan, 424 U.S. 392, 399, 96 S.Ct. 948, 47 L.Ed.2d 114 (1976)). In 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), Congress waived sovereign immunity by giving the federal courts jurisdiction to review and modify or reverse the Commissioner's decisions. See Huie v. Bowen, 788 F.2d 698, 705 (11th Cir.1986). As such, the remedies outlined in that statute are the exclusive source of federal court jurisdiction over cases involving SSI. 42 U.S.C. § 405(h) ("No findings of fact or decision of the Commissioner of Social Security shall be reviewed by any person, tribunal, or governmental agency except as herein provided."). Again, in pertinent part, that statute provides that a claimant may obtain review of the Commissioner's decision by filing "a civil action commenced within sixty days after the mailing to him of notice of such decision or within such further time as [the Commissioner] may allow. Such action shall be brought in the district court of the United States for the judicial district in which the plaintiff resides. ..." 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (emphasis added). Owing to the explicit discretion § 405(g) affords, the Supreme Court has held "that application of a traditional equitable tolling principle to the 60-day requirement of § 405(g) is fully consistent with the congressional purpose and is nowhere eschewed by Congress." Bowen v. City of New York, 476 U.S. 467, 480, 106 S.Ct. 2022, 90 L.Ed.2d 462 (1986) (quotation marks omitted).

Thus, as a preliminary matter, it is clear that the doctrine of equitable tolling is available to a claimant whose § 405(g) challenge in the district court was untimely. We must also determine, however, precisely what showing a claimant must make before a court may actually toll the statute. We have not had occasion to address this question in a published opinion.

We do so now and hold that traditional equitable tolling principles require a claimant to justify her untimely filing by a showing of extraordinary circumstances. In an unpublished opinion, Waller v. Comm'r, 168 Fed.Appx. 919 (11th Cir. 2006), we held, in the context of § 405(g), that traditional equitable tolling principles require a claimant to justify her untimely filing by a showing of extraordinary circumstances. Id. at 922. The extraordinary circumstances standard, we explained, may be met "where the defendant misleads the plaintiff, allowing the statutory period to lapse; or when the plaintiff has no reasonable way of discovering the wrong perpetrated against her ...." Id.

The Second Circuit has addressed the applicability of equitable tolling to § 405(g)'s statute of limitations and has defined the claimant's burden this way: "[T]he doctrine of equitable tolling permits courts to deem filings timely where a litigant can show that `he has been pursuing his rights diligently' and that `some extraordinary circumstance stood in his way.'" Torres v. Barnhart, 417 F.3d 276, 279 (2d Cir.2005) (quoting Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 418, 125 S.Ct. 1807, 161 L.Ed.2d 669 (2005)); see also Davila v. Barnhart, 225 F.Supp.2d 337, 339 (S.D.N.Y.2002) (pointing out that, in the context of § 405(g), the "[p]laintiff bears the burden of establishing the exceptional circumstances that warrant equitable tolling.").

We think the law clearly requires that "a finding of extraordinary circumstances" is necessary before a court may equitably toll the SSA's statutory period, and this determination "is reserved for extraordinary facts." Cabello, 402 F.3d at 1148 (quotation marks omitted). This result should not be surprising in view of the deference congressionally mandated periods of limitations demand. Baldwin County Welcome Ctr. v. Brown, 466 U.S. 147, 152, 104 S.Ct. 1723, 80 L.Ed.2d 196 (1984) ("Procedural requirements established by Congress for gaining access to the federal courts are not to be disregarded by courts out of a vague sympathy for particular litigants."); Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 113, 122 S.Ct. 2061, 153 L.Ed.2d 106 (2002) (noting that equitable tolling "is to be applied sparingly."). Moreover, requiring a claimant to justify equitable tolling of the SSA's statute of limitations by establishing extraordinary circumstances is fully consistent with our approach to equitable tolling in other contexts.

Thus, for example, in Cabello, we required plaintiffs suing under both the Alien Tort Claims Act ("ATCA"), 28 U.S.C. § 1350, and the Torture Victim Protection Act ("TVPA"), 28 U.S.C. § 1350, to demonstrate that extraordinary circumstances prevented them from filing their claims within those statutes' 10-year limitations periods. 402 F.3d at 1154 (quotation marks omitted) ("We must ... determine whether the facts of this case demonstrate extraordinary circumstances sufficient for equitable tolling. This is a fact-specific determination because a finding of extraordinary circumstances is reserved for extraordinary facts."). Specifically, we said: "[E]quitable tolling is...