Jackson v. Barden
| Decision Date | 08 January 2018 |
| Docket Number | 12 Civ. 1069 (KPF) |
| Parties | GREGORY JACKSON, Plaintiff, v. MITCHELL BARDEN, M.D., personally, SUKHMINDER SINGH, M.D., personally, RAVINDER SIDHU, M.D., personally, MICHAEL SUSCO, M.D., personally, and SAINT FRANCIS HOSPITAL, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of New York |
REDACTED OPINION AND ORDER
Cognizant of the gravity of such an event, New York law establishes detailed procedures for hospitalizing an individual against his or her will. One such procedure, codified in New York Mental Hygiene Law ("MHL") § 9.37, allows a hospital to "receive and care for" any person who, "in the opinion of the director of community services or the director's designee, has a mental illness for which immediate inpatient care and treatment" is appropriate and that is "likely to result in serious harm to" him or herself or others.
On October 22, 2009, Plaintiff Gregory Jackson was involuntarily hospitalized pursuant to MHL § 9.37 after he displayed alarming behavior to, among many others, numerous medical professionals from whom he received treatment. In 2012, Plaintiff brought this action against several physicians involved in his hospitalization and the receiving hospital, seeking damages for alleged violations of (i) the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, (ii) the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 794, and (iii) New York's common-law tort of medical malpractice.
After extensive discovery, as well as a lengthy delay occasioned by the bankruptcy filing of the receiving hospital, Defendants have moved for summary judgment on all of Plaintiff's claims. Plaintiff opposes the motions except as they pertain to his Rehabilitation Act claim, which he now abandons. As set forth in the remainder of this Opinion, all but one of the Defendants were not acting on behalf of the State when making decisions about Plaintiff's condition and treatment, and the remaining Defendant is subject to qualified immunity for his conduct. Accordingly, Plaintiff's federal claims fail, and the Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff's state-law claims.1
The parties quibble over many of the factual details underlying Plaintiff's background and hospitalization. While none rises to the level of a genuine dispute of material fact, the Court discusses both parties' accounts when and to the extent they diverge.
The most significant source of information concerning Plaintiff comes not from his sworn statements, but from his "Core History," a document assembled by the New York State Office of Mental Health ("OMH") and available to certain healthcare professionals. As discussed below, this document contains highly relevant information regarding Plaintiff's psychiatric, criminal, and personal histories.
Plaintiff, now 55 years old, has an extensive history of psychiatric illness [redacted]. (See Pl. 56.1 Opp. ¶¶ 1, 15-16). [Redacted]. Despite these serious diagnoses, Plaintiff has a history of failing to comply with medical treatment directives, including the taking of medication, leading to numerous inpatient hospitalizations. (Id. at ¶ 2).
Although his medical history precludes him from contesting the fact of these psychiatric hospitalizations, Plaintiff vigorously disputes certain ancillary details. For example, Plaintiff's medical records state that in 1987, Plaintiff assaulted a coworker, consequently lost his job, and was hospitalized at Prince George Hospital in Maryland for two weeks. (See Pl. 56.1 Opp. ¶ 17). Plaintiff acknowledges that he was involved in a shoving match at work, but insists that he neither lost his job nor was hospitalized after the incident. (See id.).
From April to May of 1989, Plaintiff was hospitalized for approximately two weeks at the Hudson River Psychiatric Center ("HRPC") "for [redacted] behavior." (Pl. 56.1 Opp. ¶ 19). In June 1990, Plaintiff was readmitted to HRPC for a similar length of time, in this instance for assaulting his wife and threatening his neighbors. (See id. at ¶ 20). Plaintiff admits that he kicked his wife but denies threatening his neighbors, stating that he "never threatened to cause harm," but only played music loudly over his neighbors' objections. (Pl. Aff. ¶ 57; see id. at ¶ 55). Plaintiff's records indicate that upon admission, "he was [redacted]," and when asked about his interactions with his wife stated, "I tried to instill a little fear in her, that's all." (Pl. 56.1 Opp. ¶¶ 21-22). In connection with the instant motions, Plaintiff contends that this quote was taken out of context, and that he made this statement in relation to a "feigned suicide attempt" purported to invoke pity in his wife so that she would financially support him. (Id. at ¶ 22).
In February 1991, Plaintiff was again admitted at HRPC, this time for approximately three weeks. (See Pl. 56.1 Opp. ¶ 23). Plaintiff's medical historystates that this hospitalization resulted after he assaulted his wife, but he denies this incident. (Id.).2 Upon admission, Plaintiff was [redacted], but Plaintiff contests that he displayed any behavior warranting such treatment. (See id. at ¶ 24).
In 1992, Plaintiff was admitted to HRPC from May 27 to July 22 "because of [redacted] behavior" after an altercation with his wife when she served him with a separation order. (Pl. 56.1 Opp. ¶ 25). Plaintiff contends such service never occurred, "and hence, [he] could not have been agitated in response to this action." (Id.). Nevertheless, Plaintiff does not dispute that during his admission, he was [redacted]. (See id. at ¶¶ 26-27).
In May 2006, Plaintiff was hospitalized for one week "due to [redacted]. (Pl. 56.1 Opp. ¶ 28). Later that same year, from October 19 to December 29, Plaintiff was admitted to Defendant Saint Francis Hospital ("Saint Francis") in Poughkeepsie, New York [redacted]. (Id. at ¶ 30). Plaintiff was thereafter involuntarily transferred to HRPC for a period of time that the record does not specify. (See id. at ¶ 31).
Plaintiff's criminal history, as presented in his Core History, consists of six arrests and four convictions, spanning from 1984 to 2009. (See Pl. 56.1Opp. ¶ 35).3
Several of Plaintiff's convictions involve forceful or destructive behavior. On January 19, 2008, Plaintiff was charged with burglary but later pled guilty to a lesser offense of criminal trespass. (Pl. 56.1 Opp. ¶¶ 36-37). On February 23, 2009, Plaintiff was charged with criminal mischief with intent to damage property after vandalizing the exterior of a building. (See id. at ¶ 32). The charges were dismissed in March 2009 upon a finding that Plaintiff was incapacitated [redacted]. (See id.; see also N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law § 730.40 ()). On February 23, 2009, Plaintiff was also charged with criminal mischief and damaging another person's property in excess of $250. (See Pl. 56.1 Opp. ¶ 40). These charges were also dismissed in March 2009 after Plaintiff was found incapacitated. (Id. at ¶ 41).
Plaintiff's Core History also evinces, with varying degrees of detail, his participation in a number of crimes involving theft or fraud. In November 2000, Plaintiff was charged with criminal possession of stolen property, a charge to which he later pled guilty. (See Barden Decl., Ex. N, at 3). On December 10 and 19, 2002, Plaintiff was charged with carrying out a scheme to defraud, though his Core History does not provide the details of the scheme or the ultimate resolution of these charges. (See id.). In November 2003, Plaintiffwas charged with criminal impersonation, to which he later pled guilty and for which he was sentenced to three years' probation. (Id.). And in April and October 2008, Plaintiff was charged with issuing bad checks; the Core History does not indicate the resolution of these charges. (Id. at 4).
Plaintiff's Core History recites that in the late 1980s to early '90s, Plaintiff's drug and alcohol abuse, coupled with [redacted], resulted in "numerous admissions to HRPC." (Barden Decl., Ex. N, at 5). Plaintiff has also been [redacted] (Pl. 56.1 Opp. ¶ 33), and his Core History states that he "reports extensive use of crack cocaine and marijuana and has had 2 DWI's in his early 20's as a result of drinking" (Barden Decl., Ex. N, at 6).4 After Plaintiff's week-long hospitalization in May 2006, he began outpatient treatment but did not consistently comply, leading to a relapse of crack cocaine use in August 2006. (See Pl. 56.1 Opp. ¶¶ 29, 34). According to Plaintiff, he last used cocaine in 2008. (Id. at ¶ 33).
[Redacted].
The events leading up to Plaintiff's involuntary hospitalization on October 22, 2009, involve numerous interactions with psychiatric support specialists, healthcare providers, and other professionals. Several of theseindividuals were affiliated with New York State and local governments. Of note, however, the hospital to which Plaintiff was admitted was private, as were its employees.
Defendant Mitchell Barden, M.D., was the initial medical professional who completed an MHL § 9.37 application to have Plaintiff evaluated for hospitalization. (See Barden 56.1 ¶¶ 102-03). In October 2009, Dr. Barden was an OMH psychiatrist employed at HRPC. (See id. at ¶ 3). In this capacity, Dr. Barden was the leader and decision-maker for the Dutchess County Mobile Crisis Team ("MCT"), a state-operated entity of healthcare professionals dispatched to sites within the County to address psychiatric crises. (See id. at ¶¶ 3-6).
More specifically, after receiving a dispatch referral, Dr. Barden was responsible for...
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