Jackson v. Bd. of Election Comm'rs of Chi.

Decision Date07 September 2012
Docket NumberNo. 111928.,111928.
Citation975 N.E.2d 583,2012 IL 111928
PartiesEileen JACKSON, Appellee, v. The BOARD OF ELECTION COMMISSIONERS OF the CITY OF CHICAGO et al. (Carmelita Earls, Appellant).
CourtIllinois Supreme Court

2012 IL 111928
975 N.E.2d 583

Eileen JACKSON, Appellee,
v.
The BOARD OF ELECTION COMMISSIONERS OF the CITY OF CHICAGO et al. (Carmelita Earls, Appellant).

No. 111928.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

Sept. 7, 2012.


[975 N.E.2d 585]


Randy Crumpton, of Chicago, for appellant.

James P. Nally, P.C., of Chicago, for appellee.


OPINION

Justice KARMEIER delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.

Section 3.1–10–5(b) of the Illinois Municipal Code (65 ILCS 5/3.1–10–5(b) (West 2010)) provides that a person “is not eligible for an elective municipal office if that person is in arrears in the payment of a tax or other indebtedness due to the municipality.” The issue presented by this case is whether section 3.1–10–5(b) should have disqualified a candidate named Carmelita Earls from seeking election to the Chicago city council from the 28th Ward in the 2011 municipal election where homestead exemptions on property owned by Earls and her husband were challenged and the couple subsequently elected to waive the exemptions on all but one of the parcels and to pay the Cook County treasurer the additional property tax that would have been due on the parcels had the exemptions not been claimed.

¶ 2 The board of election commissioners of the City of Chicago (the Election Board) ruled that Earls was not disqualified and denied an objection to her nomination papers filed by Eileen Jackson. The circuit court of Cook County upheld the Election Board's decision, but the appellate court reversed, set aside the Election Board's decision, and ordered that if Earls' name could not be removed from the ballot, any votes cast for her would not be counted. 407 Ill.App.3d 837, 348 Ill.Dec. 486, 944 N.E.2d 439. We allowed Earls' petition for leave to appeal. Ill. S.Ct. R. 315 (eff. Feb. 26, 2010).

¶ 3 For the reasons that follow, we hold that property tax payable to the Cook County treasurer does not constitute “a tax or other indebtedness due a municipality” within the meaning of section 3.1–10–5(b) and that the additional property tax Earls and her husband paid after the homestead exemptions were challenged did not render Earls ineligible to hold municipal office in Chicago. The Election Board was therefore correct when it rejected Jackson's objection to Earls' nomination papers. The Election Board's decision was properly upheld by the circuit court, and the appellate court should not have overturned the Board's decision on review. The judgment of the appellate court is therefore reversed.

¶ 4 BACKGROUND

¶ 5 Carmelita Earls and her husband, Aubry, own, as joint tenants, a home located at 37 N. Long Avenue in the City of Chicago. Aubry applied to the Cook

[975 N.E.2d 586]

County assessor for a homeowner's exemption for that property for the 2008 tax year. In the application, Aubry specifically averred that he and Earls occupied that property as their “principal residence.”

¶ 6 Earls and Aubry also own two additional properties in the City of Chicago, 552 and 555 N. Lawler Avenue. Just as he had with the property at 37 N. Long Avenue, Aubry applied to the Cook County assessor for a homeowner's exemption for both of those properties for the 2008 tax year. These exemptions were not identical. Whereas the application for 555 N. Lawler Avenue sought the same general homestead exemption as the application for the exemption on 37 N. Long Avenue, the application for 552 N. Lawler Avenue requested a “long-time occupant” homestead exemption (see 35 ILCS 200/15–177 (West 2008)) and stated that Earls and Aubry had owned and occupied the property during the period between January 1, 1998, and January 1, 2008, and met certain other qualifications related to their income.

¶ 7 The Cook County assessor allowed the homestead exemptions on all three properties, thereby reducing the amount of property tax Earls and her husband were required to pay on those properties. The exemptions were subsequently carried forward, reducing the couple's real estate tax bills for the 2009 tax year, which were payable in 2010.

¶ 8 In 2010, Earls decided to run for the office of alderman for the 28th Ward of the City of Chicago in the next general municipal election, which was scheduled to take place on February 22, 2011. Under section 3.1–10–5(b) of the Illinois Municipal Code, a person “is not eligible for an elective municipal office if that person is in arrears in the payment of a tax or other indebtedness due to the municipality.” 65 ILCS 5/3.1–10–5(b) (West 2010). Because the position of alderman is an “elective municipal office” within the meaning of this statute, Earls wanted to insure that she was in compliance with the law. She therefore checked with the City to see if she owed it any money.

¶ 9 The City maintains a special office to field such inquiries. That office, officially known as the “Indebtedness Check Unit” of the City of Chicago department of revenue's accounts receivable division, responded to Earls' request in writing. By letter dated November, 17, 2010, it advised her as follows:

“The Department of Revenue performed a thorough indebtedness investigation at the request of the individual referenced above[, Carmelita Earls,] on the date indicated for outstanding debt owed to the City of Chicago.

Please accept this as confirmation that no outstanding debt was found across any of the debt types, Parking, Water, Administrative Hearings, Inspection Fees, Cost Recovery and Tax/Licensing.”

¶ 10 Five days after this statement was issued, Earls filed nomination papers for her aldermanic bid with the Election Board. Eileen Jackson promptly filed a petition objecting to Earls' candidacy. See 10 ILCS 5/10–8 (West 2010). Jackson asserted numerous grounds in support of her petition. Chief among these were that Earls had failed to submit a sufficient number of valid signatures to entitle her to be placed on the ballot for alderman, that Earls' nomination papers were not securely fastened as required by law, that Earls was not a resident of the ward in which she was seeking to run, and that Earls was not eligible for elective municipal office under section 3.1–10–5(b) of the Illinois Municipal Code (65 ILCS 5/3.1–10–5(b) (West 2010)) because she was in arrears in payment of taxes or other indebtedness to the City.

[975 N.E.2d 587]

¶ 11 Although the Chicago department of revenue had declared that Earls owed no outstanding debt to the City for the various items identified in the statement of indebtedness, Jackson's petition asserted that Earls was nevertheless ineligible because she was in arrears on her property tax. Though records showed no overdue balance on Earls' property tax obligations, Jackson asserted that Earls and her husband had paid less than they should have by fraudulently obtaining homeowner exemptions to which they were not entitled.

¶ 12 Jackson's objection petition was first taken up by the Election Board on December 6, 2010. Following various procedural developments not relevant here, an evidentiary hearing on Jackson's petition was held before an Election Board hearing officer on December 22, 2010. At that hearing Jackson elected not to contest that Earls' nomination papers were, in fact, supported by a sufficient number of valid signatures. She withdrew any challenge to Earls' residency, and she produced no evidence that Earls' petitions had not been properly bound. The only matter in dispute was whether Earls was in arrears in payment of taxes or other indebtedness and therefore ineligible for municipal office under section 3.1–10–5(b) of the Illinois Municipal Code (65 ILCS 5/3.1–10–5(b) (West 2010)) at the time she filed her nomination papers.

¶ 13 In support of her tax/debt arrearage claim, Jackson relied on a letter dated December 6, 2010, from the Cook County assessor's office informing Earls of a problem with the homestead exemptions on the three properties she owned with her husband. The letter explained that homestead-exempted property must be the “ ‘principal dwelling place of members of the household on January 1 of the taxable year’ [ (see 35 ILCS 200/15–175, 15–177 (West 2008)) and that a] taxpayer is only entitled to one homeowner exemption on one residence.” The letter went on to inform Earls and her husband that an investigation had disclosed that they had received homeowner exemptions for all three properties they owned in the City.

¶ 14 According to the letter, application of the homeowner's exemption to the 555 N. Lawler Avenue property had reduced the Earls' real estate tax liability for that parcel by $963.20 in 2008 and by $669.16 in 2009. For the property at 552 N. Lawler Avenue, the homestead exemption saved Earls and her husband $1,624.29 in 2008 and $1,220.60 in 2009. The assessor's letter notified Earls and her husband that they were required to provide proof of residency for one of the three properties if they wished to avail themselves of the homestead exemption and that with respect to the other two properties, they would be required to “refund” the amount of tax they had saved through the exemptions unless they could show that the properties had been rented, that the tenants were required to pay the property tax and that the tax had actually been paid by the tenants. The assessor's letter did not indicate how much the potential tax payment “refund” Earls might owe related to tax levies made by the City of Chicago or any other taxing bodies for the years in question. It merely gave lump sum amounts and indicated that “refund” checks should be made payable to the Cook County treasurer's office.

¶ 15 Earls and her husband received the assessor's letter on December 13, 2010. Evidence adduced at the Election Board hearing showed that Earls' husband promptly executed documents waiving the homeowners exemption on the two properties located on Lawler Avenue and immediately made additional payments to the Cook County treasurer to make up for the reduction in taxes he and Earls had enjoyed

[975 N.E.2d 588]

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