Jackson v. Berlin Const. Co.

• Decision Date: 17 December 1918
• Citation: 93 Conn. 155,105 A. 326
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: JACKSON v. BERLIN CONST. CO. et al.

105 A. 326

93 Conn. 155

JACKSON v. BERLIN CONST. CO. et al.

Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut.

December 17, 1918

Appeal from Superior Court, New London County; Gardiner Greene Judge.

Proceedings under Workmen's Compensation Act by Antonia Jackson, for compensation for death of her husband, opposed by the Berlin Construction Company, employer, and another. Award of compensation commission modified by superior court, and claimant appeals. Judgment set aside, and cause remanded with direction.

Wilson H. Pierce, of Waterbury, for appellant.

Christopher L. Avery, of New London, for appellees.

WHEELER, J.

Jackson an employé of respondent Berlin Construction Company, received an injury on March 26, 1914, consisting of a fracture of his right leg, which arose in the course of and out of his employment. A wound was produced by this injury; it did not heal, and it became necessary to amputate the leg. As a result of these injuries he died on March 18, 1916.

Jackson and the Construction Company entered into a voluntary agreement in accordance with the Compensation Act, and duly approved by the commissioner under which Jackson receive weekly payments, together with the medical, surgical, and hospital services, in all amounting to $1,010.

The commissioner awarded to the claimant dependent $750, being compensation at the rate of $10 per week for 65 weeks from March 17, 1916, to June 14, 1917, plus $100 for funeral expenses, and a further compensation of $10 per week for a period of 247 weeks.

The superior court sustained the appeal from the commissioner, and modified the award by crediting the respondents, upon the judgment, with said sum of $1,010, being the amount paid to Jackson under the voluntary agreement. The sole question raised upon the appeal is as to the ruling of the court modifying the award by crediting the amount paid to Jackson in his lifetime.

The legality of such a credit depends upon whether under our act the compensation paid to this employé was an indivisible part of the compensation awarded after death to the dependent. If so, the statute must be so construed as to give this credit. But if the compensation is separable and that paid to the employé is independent of that paid to the dependent, a construction compelling this credit could not be made unless the language of the statute were imperative. The General Statutes, § § 5351, 5352, provide that compensation for either total or partial incapacity " shall be paid to the injured employé ." It is paid to him because the statute intends to provide support for him during his period of incapacity. Whatever is paid him belongs to him. Whatever of compensation accrues in his lifetime and is unpaid becomes upon his decease an asset of his estate.

The voluntary agreement was made under General Statute, § 5361, between the employer and the employé . The dependent had no privity with this contract, and no right to its payments in the lifetime of the employé or to any which remained unpaid at his decease.

Compensation for death General Statutes, § 5349, provides shall be paid (a) for burial expenses $100; (b) to those wholly dependent upon the deceased employé a certain weekly compensation; (c) in case there is no one wholly dependent upon the deceased a certain weekly compensation to those partially dependent.

This compensation does not arise until the decease of the employé . He has no interest in it. His estate has no interest in it except as to the compensation for burial expense. Only those who are wholly or partially dependent are entitled to the weekly compensation.

The statute (General Statutes, § 5350) defines who are dependents, and none other can claim this compensation.

The compensation awarded the dependent is made to take the place of the wages which the employé can no longer earn, and in which those who were dependent upon him for support had an interest. The purpose of the statute is benefit to the dependent, not to the estate of the deceased employé .

Only the dependent or his assignee can discharge the liability arising out of this compensation. The right of the dependents to compensation upon the death of their decedent comes from the statute, not from the deceased.

The credit of compensation paid to the employé against the compensation awarded the dependent assumes, of necessity that the dependent had an interest in the compensation paid the...