Jackson v. Brook Ledge, Inc.
| Decision Date | 17 December 1997 |
| Docket Number | No. Civ.A. 96-384.,Civ.A. 96-384. |
| Citation | 991 F.Supp. 640 |
| Parties | Kenneth A. JACKSON d/b/a Kentuckiana Racing Stable, Plaintiff, v. BROOK LEDGE, INC., Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Kentucky |
Phillip D. Scott, Margaret A. Miller, David A. French, Greenebaum, Doll & McDonald, P.L.L.C., Lexington, KY, for Kenneth A. Jackson dba Kentuckiana Racing Stable, plaintiff.
Timothy H. Napier, Weber & Rose, P.S.C., Louisville, KY, Robert D. Kinsey, Jr., Richard L. Rice, Kinsey, Ridenour, Becker & Kistler, Lincoln, NE, for Brook Ledge, Inc., defendant.
This matter is before the court upon the motion of defendant for summary judgment [docket entry #37]. The plaintiff filed a response in opposition to said motion [docket entry #50], to which defendant has replied [docket entry #53]. Accordingly, this matter is ripe for review.
This action arises from the transportation of a standardbred filly named "Dream Fulfilled," which resulted in the horse's demise.1 The events which lead up to the death of the filly are as follows.
Plaintiff, Kenneth A. Jackson d/b/a Kentuckiana Racing Stable ("Jackson"), at all relevant times to this litigation, was the owner of Dream Fulfilled. Germane to this litigation is the fact that Jackson is a practicing attorney as well as a horseman. He has been a member of the U.S. Trotting Association since 1988. In 1993, Jackson became a 50% shareholder in an S corporation that acquired one-third of the shares of Kentuckiana Farms General Partnership ("Kentuckiana Farms"), a newly formed entity that bought the assets of former Kentuckiana Farms. Thereafter, he became a member of the management team of Kentuckiana Farms. In 1995, Jackson formed Kentuckiana Racing Stables, a business of racing standardbred and thoroughbred horses of which he is the sole owner. Through these two entities, Jackson owns approximately 100 horses. As a lawyer, he has specialized training and knowledge in the area of commercial litigation and equine law as well as being educated in the Uniform Commercial Code and contracts. Despite his intertwined experience with the law and horses, Jackson attests that before November 1995, he had never been involved with arranging horse transportation by a commercial company and had never seen a bill of lading from a horse shipping company or a trucking company.2 Moreover, he submits that he had never heard of the Carmack Amendment of the Interstate Commerce Act ("Carmack Amendment").
Beginning in October 1994, Jackson employed Gene Daisey ("Daisey") as the trainer of Dream Fulfilled.3 Daisey has been a trainer since 1955. For the past fifteen (15) years Daisey has been the owner of Daisey Stables at the South Florida Trotting Center located near Palm Beach, Florida. Pertinent to this action is the fact that Daisey has shipped horses both commercially and personally, signed bills of lading, and has used Brook Ledge as many as 100 times to commercially ship horses. Nevertheless, Daisey submits that previously he "[n]ever read the thing[s]," and never had any discussion about the liability limitation therein. With respect to the transportation of Dream Fulfilled prior to November 1995, it appears that Daisey used his own horse transportation trailers or those of Kentuckiana Farms.
Daisey brought Dream Fulfilled to the Florida training center. While in Florida, Daisey, in his capacity as trainer, employed Roderick Watson ("Watson") to assist in the care of Dream Fulfilled as the standardbred's groom. Watson has been employed in the horse industry since 1981.
In early November, 1995, Daisey contacted a Brook Ledge, Inc. ("Brook Ledge") agent to arrange for the transportation of Dream Fulfilled from Palm Beach, Florida, to Lexington, Kentucky, for a routine rest period. The transfer was to occur on or about November 8, 1995. Jackson was not involved in arranging the transfer of Dream Fulfilled.
Brook Ledge was at the time, and currently is, an interstate motor carrier in the business of transporting horses in interstate commerce, and transports approximately 20,000 horses annually. Antecedent to the date of the fatal accident, Brook Ledge had transported horses for Kentuckiana Farms General Partnership on occasion and consequently bills of lading had previously been executed by the shipper or the shipper's agent. All of these said bills of lading contained a limitation of liability provision and a line on which the shipper could declare a value in excess of the stated value.4
On November 8, 1995, Brook Ledge dispatched Anthony Mariano ("Mariano") with tractor No. 79 and trailer No. 266, to pick up Dream Fulfilled. Mariano arrived at the South Florida Trotting Center as scheduled. Upon hearing the Brook Ledge truck arrive, Watson retrieved Brook Ledge to meet Mariano. Watson assisted Mariano in loading Dream Fulfilled into the trailer. Mariano filled out the bill of lading and presented the same to Watson, who Mariano thought was the trainer.5 He instructed Watson to sign where the "X" was. Watson signed the bill of lading as the shipper but did not insert an excess declared value in the column on the bill of lading entitled "Declared Value of Each Animal ($1,000) (unless declared otherwise)".6 Watson submits that he has never read a bill of lading, although he has signed them before. Watson attests that he simply followed Mariano's instructions to sign the document. He states that there was no discussion regarding the bill of lading.
On November 9, 1995, with Dream Fulfilled in tow, Mariano, a relief driver, and an attendant traveled from South Florida to Ocala, Florida, where other horses were loaded into the trailer. The group proceeded on to Kentucky, where in Rockcastle County, Kentucky, the trailer in which the horses were riding caught fire. The relief driver, Jim Kerrigan ("Kerrigan"), stopped when he saw sparks coming out of the trailer.7
There were two fire extinguishers on board. Kerrigan emptied the fire extinguisher which was in the tractor, but no one could reach the fire extinguisher in the trailer due to the flames which engulfed it. The drivers' and attendant's efforts were for naught; all but one horse burned to death and sadly the horse that escaped was killed when it ran into traffic.
On August 19, 1996, Jackson filed suit in the Fayette County Circuit Court against Brook Ledge. In his complaint Jackson alleges that the death of Dream Fulfilled was caused by Brook Ledge's negligence, recklessness, and gross negligence. In his original complaint, Jackson sought damages for the aforementioned state torts as well as for breach of contract. On September 6, 1996, Brook Ledge removed plaintiff's action to this Court based upon federal question jurisdiction over the Carmack Amendment, 49 U.S.C. § 11707, et seq. Thereafter, plaintiff filed an amended complaint to include a cause of action under the Carmack Amendment.
Defendant moves the court for summary judgment. In sum, Brook Ledge argues that plaintiff's state law claims should be dismissed, as they are preempted by the Carmack Amendment. Furthermore, under federal law, Brook Ledge concedes liability for the loss incurred by Jackson but challenges the extent of recovery sought, which defendant claims is not consistent with the Carmack Amendment or the bill of lading which defendant contends limits the liability of Brook Ledge to $1,000. In short, plaintiff does not dispute that the Carmack Amendment preempts plaintiff's state law claims but does argue that Brook Ledge's bill of lading does not operate to limit Brook Ledge's liability for several reasons and thus said motion should be denied.
Under Rule 56(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, summary judgment is proper "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). In reviewing a motion for summary judgment, "this Court must determine whether `the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law.'" Patton v. Bearden, 8 F.3d 343, 346 (6th Cir.1993) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 251-52, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986)). The evidence, all facts, and any inferences that may permissibly be drawn from the facts must be viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986).
Once the moving party shows that there is an absence of evidence to support the non-moving party's case, the nonmoving party must present "significant probative evidence" to demonstrate that "there is [more than] some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts." Moore v. Philip Morris Companies, 8 F.3d 335, 340 (6th Cir.1993). Conclusory allegations are not enough to allow a nonmoving party to withstand a motion for summary judgment. Id. at 343. "The mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the [nonmoving party's] position will be insufficient; there must be evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for the [nonmoving party]." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252. "If the evidence is merely colorable, or is not significantly probative, summary judgment may be granted." Id. at 249-50 (citations omitted).
There are several issues for the Court to address in deciding whether summary judgment should be granted in favor of the defendant, to wit, (1) whether plaintiff's common law claims for negligence, recklessness, and gross negligence, and for breach of agreement are...
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