Jackson v. Brown
Citation | 164 S.E.2d 450,118 Ga.App. 558 |
Decision Date | 25 October 1968 |
Docket Number | No. 2,No. 43978,43978,2 |
Parties | L. J. JACKSON v. Elmer BROWN |
Court | United States Court of Appeals (Georgia) |
Syllabus by the Court.
The limitation for an action based on a written acknowledgment of an account is four years from the date of the writing.
The plaintiff appeals from a judgment dismissing his complaint which alleged that the plaintiff was indebted to him on an account, as follows: The complaint was filed October 5, 1967. The defendant filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the claim was barred by the statute of limitation.
Lawson E. Thompson, Washington, for appellant.
Robert E. Knox, Thomson, for appellee.
The issue is whether the period of limitation for bringing the action was four or six years. Code § 3-705 provides: 'All actions upon promissory notes, bills of exchange, or other simple contracts in writing shall be brought within six years after the same shall have become due and payable.' Code § 3-706 provides: 'All actions upon open account, or for the breach of any contract not under the hand of the party sought to be charged, or upon any implied assumpsit or undertaking, shall be brought within four years after the right of action shall have accrued.'
The earliest decision that we have found on the period of limitation for an action based on a written acknowledgment of an account is Hicks & Lord v. Thomas, 1 Dud. (Ga.) 218, which held that an action based on an acknowledgment of an open account by letter 'was not barred as by the Act of 1809' (Code § 3-706) and was not barred until the expiration of six years.
The Georgia Code of 1863 included the statute of limitation contained in § 3-706 of the Code of 1933, supra (the Act of 1809 referred to in Hicks & Lord v. Thomas, supra) and the statute of limitation contained in § 3-705 of the Code of 1933, supra. The Code of 1863 also included the provision contained in § 3-904 of the Code of 1933. 'A new promise shall revive or extend the original liability; it shall not create a new one.'
This legislative enactment superseded the decision in Hicks & Lord v Thomas, supra, as to the limitation for an action on a written acknowledgement of an account. When a new promise is given, the duration of the limitation is not determined by the nature of the new promise,...
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