Jackson v. Camilla Trading Post, Inc.

Decision Date14 July 1995
Docket NumberNo. A95A0827,A95A0827
Citation218 Ga.App. 164,460 S.E.2d 849
CourtGeorgia Court of Appeals

Geer & Rentz, Donald D. Rentz, Jack F. Varner, for appellant.

Moore, Clarke, Duvall & Rodgers, Luanne Clarke, for appellee.

McMURRAY, Presiding Judge.

Mary Ann Jackson filed an action against Camilla Trading Post, Inc. (defendant) for injuries she allegedly sustained when she slipped and fell while shopping at defendant's retail appliance store. Specifically, Jackson alleged that she "fell on a concrete floor because a foreign substance was located thereon which caused the floor to be slick and slippery [and that defendant] breached its duty to keep and maintain its premises in a safe condition...." Defendant denied the material allegations of the complaint and filed a motion for summary judgment along with the supporting affidavit of Treavor Pollock, the salesperson who was assisting Jackson when she fell. Defendant also filed the affidavit of Hilda Cason, a patron who came to Jackson's aid after the fall. Mary Ann Jackson responded by filing her own affidavit and the affidavit of another eyewitness, Sammy Lee Gilbert.

Jackson deposed that Sammy Lee Gilbert drove her to defendant's store on November 2, 1992, and waited in the car while she went inside to shop for a refrigerator. Defendant's salesperson, Treavor Pollock, greeted Jackson when she entered the store and showed her a new refrigerator. After calculating the cost, however, Jackson determined that she could not afford the new appliance so she asked about purchasing a used model. Pollock responded by guiding Jackson from the carpeted showroom through "a door marked 'personnel only' [and] across a concrete floor into a carpeted showroom [where a used refrigerator was located]." Jackson examined the appliance and found it acceptable. A bargain was reached, and Pollock directed Jackson back to the main showroom to complete the deal. Plaintiff turned and headed back across the concrete floor. Pollock followed, but before Jackson took "no more than three steps from the refrigerator," she slipped on the concrete floor and fell. Pollock tried to catch his customer, but her bulk was too much for him to handle. Jackson hit the concrete slab and "sustained a severe fracture of her thigh which necessitated surgery and the installation of steel pins."

Sammy Lee Gilbert remained in the car until he noticed an ambulance arrive at defendant's store. He went inside to investigate and discovered "Ms. Jackson on the floor in the back section of the store." Gilbert deposed that "[w]hen [he] went to Ms. Jackson, [he] observed on the concrete floor a slick, oily substance where Ms. Jackson had fallen[; that the] substance on the floor appeared to be oil and [that] it was located directly underneath and around Ms. Jackson." Gilbert further deposed that "[i]mmediately after Ms. Jackson was removed from the floor by ambulance attendants, [he] observed one of the employees of the Defendant move a chain saw from the immediate area where Ms. Jackson fell [and that he] concluded that the oily substance on the floor where Ms. Jackson fell probably leaked from the chainsaw." Gilbert deposed that "[t]he oily substance [he] observed ... was visible to [him], and should have been visible to any employee of Defendant who was in the immediate area at the time Ms. Jackson fell." Treavor Pollock and Hilda Cason disputed Gilbert's observations, deposing (in identical fashion) that they examined "the floor [immediately after the fall] and there were no liquids, oils, or anything on the floor that would cause [Jackson] to fall."

Mary Ann Jackson deposed that she later discovered "an oily substance on her skirt and slip ...," and Gilbert corroborated this observation, deposing that "[a]fter Ms. Jackson was taken to the hospital, [I] observed the same oily substance on Ms. Jackson's skirt and slip."

The trial court granted defendant's motion for summary judgment, finding (in pertinent part) as follows: "In this case, the Plaintiff and the Defendant's employee were walking closely together when the Plaintiff fell. The Plaintiff did not know that a substance was present on the floor before the fall, nor did the employee, walking only a split second in front of the Plaintiff, realize that a substance was on the floor. There is no evidence in the record of the length of time the substance was on the floor, nor is there any evidence that an employee was in the vicinity before the fall other than the one escorting the Plaintiff. This Court finds no indication that if a foreign substance existed Defendant's employee had any more opportunity to observe and avoid the substance than did Plaintiff. Consequently, this Court will not impute constructive knowledge of the substance to the Defendant under these circumstances." This appeal followed. Held:

"An owner/occupier of premises has a duty to keep those premises safe for its invitees. OCGA § 51-3-1; Thompson v. Regency Mall Assoc., 209 Ga.App. 1 (432 SE2d 230) (1993). 'An invitee enters upon the premises under an implied representation, or assurance, that the land has been prepared and made ready and safe for his reception. The invitee is entitled to expect the possessor will exercise reasonable care to make the land safe for his entry. (Cit.) It is this implied representation that is made to the public, by holding the land open to them, that it has been prepared for their reception, that it is safe, that is the basis for the possessor's liability. (Cit.)' Begin v. Ga. Championship Wrestling, 172 Ga.App. 293, 294 (322 SE2d 737) (1984).

"In order to recover for a slip and fall due to a foreign substance on the floor, the plaintiff must show that the defendant had actual or constructive knowledge of the hazard, and that the plaintiff was without equal knowledge of such. Alterman Foods v. Ligon, 246 Ga. 620 (272 SE2d 327) (1980). 'Liability for injuries resulting from an invitee's slip and fall on a proprietor's premises is determined by the relative knowledge possessed by the proprietor and the invitee of the condition or hazard which resulted in the injury. The basis of the proprietor's liability is his superior knowledge....' Shansab v. Homart Dev. Co., 205 Ga.App. 448, 450 (422 SE2d 305) (1992)." Burke v. Bi-Lo, 212 Ga.App. 115, 116, 441 S.E.2d 429 (1994). And in weighing the parties' relative knowledge of any such hazard on summary judgment, " 'the party opposing the motion ... is entitled to all favorable inferences and the benefit of every doubt, and the evidence is construed most strongly in (her) favor. (Cit.)' Dixieland Truck Brokers v. Intl. Indem. Co., 210 Ga.App. 160, 163(2) (435 SE2d 520) (1993). [Moreover,] '[a]t summary judgment [the] party who will not bear the burden of proof at trial ... must demonstrate by reference to evidence in the record that there is an absence of evidence to support at least one essential element of the non-moving party's case.' Lau's Corp. v. Haskins, 261 Ga. 491, 495(4) (405 SE2d 474) (1991)." Salmon v. Pearson & Assoc., 214 Ga.App. 11, 446 S.E.2d 762 (1994).

Although defendant in the case sub judice presented proof refuting actual knowledge or even the existence of an oil slick in the area where Jackson fell, Gilbert deposed that Jackson was laying in a slick of oil immediately after the fall and that defendant's employee removed a chain saw from this area as soon as Jackson was removed from the scene. These unexplained differences in proof along with a statement in Pollock's affidavit that he guided Jackson into an area of defendant's store reserved for store " 'personnel only' " not only raise genuine issues of material fact as to the existence of a hazard which triggered Jackson's fall, but also as to defendant's constructive knowledge of the oil slick (as imputed by the activities of employees in the restricted area of defendant's store or the employee who stored the chain saw in this restricted area) which allegedly flowed from the chain saw and precipitated plaintiff's fall. Indeed, giving Jackson the benefit of all favorable inferences as non-moving party on summary judgment, the parties' radically opposing proof would authorize a finding that defendant is attempting to cover up the existence of an oil spill which caused Jackson's fall. 1 And, for purposes of weighing the propriety of summary adjudication, the possibility of any such finding along with an absence of proof by defendant regarding inspection of the area allegedly affected by the oil slick before Jackson's fall does not "negate the possibility that [defendant] did not exercise reasonable care in this case, even if the store had a general inspection routine. See Hilsman v. Kroger Co., 187 Ga.App. 570 (370 SE2d 755) (1988); Flood v. Camp Oil Co., 201 Ga.App. 451 (411 SE2d 348) (1991). Further, in the absence of any evidence that [defendant] conducted a reasonable inspection of the premises prior to the fall, [Jackson] was not required to establish how long the spill had remained on the floor. Jackson v. Wal-Mart Stores, 206 Ga.App. 165, 169 (424 SE2d 845) (1992)." Burke v. Bi-Lo, 212 Ga.App. 115, 117, 441 S.E.2d 429, supra.

Finally, we observe that the record reveals no evidence with respect to Jackson's actual knowledge of the alleged hazard. In fact, Jackson's affidavit refutes open visibility of any such hazard, and Pollock deposed that he never saw an oil slick in the affected area of his employer's store. Further, there is no conclusive proof that Jackson even had equal opportunity to detect the alleged hazard. To this extent, it is undisputed that Pollock was walking directly in front of Jackson during their initial excursion over the concrete floor, and defendant presented no proof regarding the conditions of this allegedly affected area. Moreover, while Sammy Lee Gilbert deposed that "[t]he oily substance ... was visible to [him]," a jury...

To continue reading

Request your trial
6 cases
  • Hartley v. Macon Bacon Tune, Inc.
    • United States
    • Georgia Court of Appeals
    • 11 Julio 1997
    ...will exercise reasonable care to make the land safe for his entry." (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Jackson v. Camilla Trading Post, 218 Ga.App. 164, 166, 460 S.E.2d 849 (1995). There is no distinction between the duty owed to an invitee and a licensee by an owner or occupier of land w......
  • Dill's Food City, Inc. v. Johnson
    • United States
    • Georgia Court of Appeals
    • 5 Diciembre 1995
    ...to plaintiff-invitee Avalene Johnson by the rationale employed in such recent whole court decisions as Jackson v. Camilla Trading Post, 218 Ga.App. 164, 167, 460 S.E.2d 849 and Dept. of Human Resources v. Thomas, 217 Ga.App. 174(1)(a), 176, 456 S.E.2d 724, cert. denied. In each of those cas......
  • Moore v. Kroger Co.
    • United States
    • Georgia Court of Appeals
    • 23 Mayo 1996
    ...favorably to plaintiff-invitee ... by the rationale employed in such recent whole court decisions as Jackson v. Camilla Trading Post, 218 Ga.App. 164, 167, 460 S.E.2d 849 [cert. denied] and Dept. of Human Resources v. Thomas, 217 Ga.App. 174(1)(a), 176, 456 S.E.2d 724, cert. denied. In each......
  • Stephens v. Kroger Co.
    • United States
    • Georgia Court of Appeals
    • 22 Febrero 1999
    ...of material fact exist. See, e.g., Hardeman v. Spires, 232 Ga.App. 694, 695-696, 503 S.E.2d 588 (1998); Jackson v. Camilla Trading Post, 218 Ga.App. 164, 168, 460 S.E.2d 849 (1995). And here, such factual questions remain for jury resolution with respect to whether Kroger had knowledge of a......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT