Jackson v. Capraun
| Decision Date | 17 June 2011 |
| Docket Number | CASE NO. 6:09-cv-1737-Orl-28DAB |
| Parties | DARRELL L. JACKSON, Plaintiff, v. ERICK L. CAPRAUN, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of Florida |
Petitioner initiated this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Doc. No. 1). This case is before the Court on Plaintiff's Third Amended Complaint (Doc. No. 26), Defendant Tapia's Motion to Dismiss (Doc. No. 53), Defendant Vidler's Motion to Dismiss (Doc. No. 60), and Defendant Capraun's Motion to Dismiss (Doc. No. 73). Plaintiff has filed responses in opposition to the motions (Doc. Nos. 62,70, & 81).
Plaintiff Darrell L. Jackson ("Plaintiff"), proceeding pro se, filed this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Defendants Orange County Deputy Sheriff Erick L. Capraun ("Capraun"), Deputy Sheriff Keith Vidler (" Vidler), Sheriff Kevin Beary ("Beary"), Officer John Doe, and Assistant State Attorney Antonio Tapia ("Tapia"). See Doc. No. 26. Plaintiff alleges that Sheriff Beary and several deputies designed and implemented an illegal bicycle sting operation "targeting poor, homeless, and transit people to deprive them of theirconstitutional rights." Id. at 8. Specifically, Plaintiff contends that on January 28, 2008, at approximately 2:30 p.m., he was walking on the corner of John Young Parkway and Washington Street in Orlando, Florida, when he noticed a bicycle lying "abandoned" in the middle of the sidewalk. Id. at 8-9. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Vidler placed the bicycle on the street "to lure someone into their trap." Id. at 9. Plaintiff states that upon looking around and seeking no one in the vicinity of the bicycle, he assumed it had been abandoned. Id. Plaintiff noticed that the tires were flat, but he got on the bicycle and proceeded to ride it northbound on John Young Parkway. Id. at 10.
Plaintiff alleges that as he neared Colonial Drive, an Orange County Sheriff vehicle stopped and blocked the sidewalk. Id. at 10. The officer, Defendant Doe, exited the vehicle, and ran toward him while yelling, "get on the ground." Id. Plaintiff slowed the bicycle down, preparing to stop, but before he could stop, the officer used unnecessary and excessive force by pushing him backward, which resulted in Plaintiff's fall to the ground, causing injury and pain to his back. Id. at 10-11. Plaintiff contends that the officer then "dove" on top of him and "roughed him up." Id. at 11. After Plaintiff was handcuffed, the officer allegedly found drug paraphernalia. Id. Plaintiff asserts that the paraphernalia was never field tested for drugs. Id.
Plaintiff states that he was falsely arrested without probable cause, falsely imprisoned, and maliciously prosecuted. Id. at 9-11. Moreover, Plaintiff alleges that because of the officers actions, he suffered a loss of liberty and property. Id. at 11. Plaintiff states he was booked for grand theft and possession of drug paraphernalia. Id. at 13.Plaintiff contends that the grand theft charges were later dismissed and the drug paraphernalia case, a misdemeanor, was assigned to Defendant Tapia. Id. Plaintiff argues that instead of dismissing the charge because it was "baseless and without probable cause" Tapia proceeded on the charges. Id. Eventually Tapia entered a nolle prosequi. Id. at 14. Plaintiff asserts that Tapia initiated the prosecution so that Plaintiff's probation would be violated and he would be sent back to prison. Id. at 14.
Plaintiff alleges claims of Fourth Amendment false arrest, false imprisonment, and malicious prosecution and a claim of supervisory and municipal liability against Defendant Beary.
When considering a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), the complaint is construed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and its allegations are taken as true. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93-94 (2007); Quality Foods de Centro America, S.A. v. Latin American Agribusiness Development Corporation S.A., 711 F.2d 989,994-95 (11th Cir. 1983). A complaint must contain a short and plain statement demonstrating an entitlement to relief, and the statement must "give the defendant 'fair notice of what the plaintiff's claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.'" Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308,319 (2007) (quoting Dura Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336,346 (2005)). Once a claim has been stated adequately, it may be supported by showing any set of facts consistent with the allegations of the complaint. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 563 (2007).
In order to survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint "does not need detailed factual allegations," but must plead "enough facts to state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555,570; Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. 1937,1949-50 (2009); Randall v. Scott, 610 F.3d 701,708 (11th Cir. 2010). Thus, "[w]hile a complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss does not need detailed factual allegations, ... a plaintiff's obligation to provide the 'grounds' of his 'entitlement to relief requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (citations omitted). "Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level on the assumption that all of the complaint's allegations are true." Id.
Dismissal is also warranted under Rule 12(b)(6) if, assuming the truth of the factual allegations of the plaintiff's complaint, there remains a dispositive legal issue which precludes relief. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319,326 (1989); Brown v. Crawford County, Ga., 960 F.2d 1002,1009-10 (11th Cir. 1992). Moreover, in the case of a pro se action, the Court should construe the complaint more liberally than it would pleadings drafted by lawyers. Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S. 5,9 (1980). III. Discussion
A. Defendant Tapia's Motion to Dismiss
Defendant Tapia is an Assistant State Attorney for the Ninth Judicial Circuit Court, in and for Orange County (Doc. No. 53 at 1). Tapia moves to dismiss Plaintiff's complaint because (1) Plaintiff failed to state a cause of action; (2) he is entitled to EleventhAmendment immunity in his official capacity; and (3) he is entitled to prosecutorial immunity. Id.
Plaintiff alleges that as a prosecutor, Tapia was involved in maliciously prosecuting him for possession of drug paraphernalia. Prosecutors are immune from suit under section 1983 for acts taken during the course of their duty as a prosecutor. Kalina v. Fletcher, 522 U.S. 118 (1997); Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409 (1976); Jones v. Cannon, 174 F.3d 1271,1281 (11th Cir. 1999) (). "The decision to file or not file criminal charges is protected by prosecutorial immunity." Quinn v. Roach, 326 F.App'x 280,292 (5th Cir. 2009) (citing Oliver v. Collins, 904 F.2d 278,281 (5th Cir. 1990)); Bryant v. Mostert, 636 F.Supp.2d 1303,1311 (M.D. Fla. 2009). In the instant case, the alleged wrongful act concerns the decision of initiating and pursuing a criminal action, which clearly falls within the scope of Tapia's prosecutorial duties. As such, Tapia is cloaked with absolute immunity and he is entitled to dismissal from this action. Because Plaintiff's suit against him is barred, the Court thus declines to address Tapia's other grounds for dismissal. Accordingly, Defendant Tapia's motion to dismiss is granted.
B. Defendants Vidler and Capraun's Motions to Dismiss
Defendant Vidler, Orange County Deputy Sheriff, moves to dismiss the Third Amended Complaint because Plaintiff has failed to allege sufficient Fourth Amendment claims of false arrest, false imprisonment or malicious prosecution because DefendantVidler did not arrest, detain, or prosecute the Plaintiff in this case (Doc. No. 63 at 3-4). Moreover, Defendant Vidler asserts that he is entitled to qualified immunity because there was sufficient probable cause for Plaintiff's arrest. Id. at 6-8. Defendant Capraun moves to dismiss Plaintiff's complaint because (1) there was sufficient probable cause for Plaintiff's arrest and detention and (2) Plaintiff has failed to prove the required elements of malicious prosecution (Doc. No. 73 at 1). Defendant Capraun also argues that he is entitled to qualified immunity. Id. at 2.
"To establish § 1983 liability, a plaintiff must show 'proof of an affirmative causal connection' between a government actor's acts or omissions and the alleged constitutional violation, which 'may be established by proving that the official was personally involved in the acts that resulted in the constitutional deprivation.'" Brown v. City of Huntsville, 608 F.3d 724, 737 (11th Cir. 2010) (quoting Zatler v. Wainwright, 802 F.2d 397, 401 (11th Cir. 1986)). In Brown, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the federal district court's grant of qualified immunity to officers where the facts did not show personal participation in the plaintiff's arrest. Id. The court noted that "[m]erely being present with the arresting officers at the scene is not enough, unless the plaintiff can show that the defendant officer was part of the chain of command authorizing the arrest action." Id.
"The doctrine of qualified immunity protects government officials from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known." Pearson v. Callahan, 129 S.Ct. 808, 815 (2009) (citing Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)) (quotationomitted). "The purpose of qualified immunity is to allow officials to carry out discretionary duties without the chilling fear of personal liability or harrassive litigation, protecting from suit all...
To continue reading
Request your trial