Jackson v. Chater, 95-8784

• Citation: 99 F.3d 1086
• Decision Date: 20 November 1996
• Docket Number: No. 95-8784,95-8784
• Parties: , 52 Soc.Sec.Rep.Ser. 80, Unempl.Ins.Rep. (CCH) P 15622B, 97 FCDR 60, 10 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. C 535 Donald B. JACKSON, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Shirley CHATER, Commissioner of Social Security, Defendant-Appellee.
• Court: United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (11th Circuit)

Page 1086

99 F.3d 1086

65 USLW 2365, 52 Soc.Sec.Rep.Ser. 80,

Unempl.Ins.Rep. (CCH) P 15622B, 97 FCDR 60,

10 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. C 535

Donald B. JACKSON, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Shirley CHATER, Commissioner of Social Security, Defendant-Appellee.

No. 95-8784.

United States Court of Appeals Eleventh Circuit.

Nov. 20, 1996.

Charles J. Durrance, Atlanta, GA, for Plaintiff-Appellant.

J. Patrick Powers, Haila N. Kleinman, Mary Ann Sloan, Mack A. Davis, Office of the General Counsel, Atlanta, GA, for Defendant-Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia.

Before BIRCH and CARNES, Circuit Judges, and MICHAEL ^*, Senior District Judge.

CARNES, Circuit Judge:

This appeal by the claimant in a social security disability benefits case is not about the claim itself; the claimant has already prevailed on his claim. This appeal concerns the claimant's attempt to have the district court enter judgment in his favor after the completion of an administrative remand ordered by the district court. The district court refused to reopen the case and enter judgment for the claimant following the remand. Although that refusal did not affect the claimant's entitlement to benefits, it did prevent the claimant from filing a timely application for attorney's fees pursuant to the Equal Access to Justice Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2412 ("EAJA").

As will be explained in more detail later, there are two types of social security case remands under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). In a remand pursuant to the fourth sentence of that provision, called a "sentence-four remand," the district court enters judgment immediately, and an EAJA application should be filed then, because the court loses jurisdiction over the case after entry of a sentence-four remand judgment. The other type of § 405(g) remand is pursuant to the sixth sentence of that provision. With a "sentence-six remand" the district court retains jurisdiction and enters judgment after the remand proceedings are completed. The time for filing an EAJA application, in a sentence-six remand, runs from that postremand judgment entry date in the district court.

Donald Jackson, the disability benefits claimant in this case, appeals the district court's denial of his motion to reopen his case in the district court following a remand to the Commissioner. He contends that the district court erred in holding that its remand had been only a sentence-four remand.

For the reasons that follow, we agree with Jackson that the district court's remand was both a sentence-four and sentence-six remand, and we hold that such a dual basis remand is permissible. We also hold that where the remand is pursuant to both provisions and the claimant prevails at least in part for sentence-six reasons, he is entitled to reopen the case in the district court and have judgment entered there in his favor. The time for filing an EAJA application runs from that later date, instead of from the date on which the judgment remanding the matter was entered.

I. BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Jackson filed his first application for disability benefits with the Commissioner of Social Security in 1990. ¹ The Commissioner denied his application in 1991. Upon receiving the adverse decision, Jackson requested and was granted a hearing before an administrative law judge ("ALJ"). Jackson appeared pro se before the ALJ, who agreed with the Commissioner's decision to deny benefits. Thereafter, Jackson filed a civil action in the district court, seeking judicial review of the Commissioner's denial of benefits.

Jackson's case was heard initially by a magistrate judge. The magistrate judge issued a report and recommendation to the district court, suggesting that Jackson's case be remanded to the Commissioner for reconsideration. The magistrate judge identified two statutory grounds for a remand. First, the ALJ had failed to perform his legal duty to develop a full and fair record at Jackson's hearing. The magistrate judge stated that the ALJ's failure to develop a full and fair record was exemplified by his finding that Jackson possessed residual functional capacity, despite evidence to the contrary. The failure to develop a full and fair record was a sentence-four basis for remand. Second, the magistrate judge recommended that Jackson's case also should be remanded because Jackson had new and noncumulative material evidence of deterioration of his back condition, which is a § 405(g) sentence-six reason for remanding a case. The magistrate judge found Jackson had shown good cause for not submitting this evidence in the administrative proceedings, because the evidence of further deterioration did not exist at the time of Jackson's hearing.

On May 5, 1993 the district court issued an order and opinion adopting the magistrate judge's report and recommendation in its entirety, stating that it was "correct in all respects." The court's order specifically mentioned the two grounds for remand suggested by the magistrate judge: the failure to develop the record, and the existence of new evidence. Based on the magistrate judge's recommendations, the district court remanded Jackson's case to the Commissioner. A judgment was entered on the district court's docket the next day, May 6, 1993, reflecting that the court adopted the report and recommendation of the magistrate judge, and that the action was remanded. ²

On remand, an ALJ reviewed the evidence presented at Jackson's first ALJ hearing, as well as new evidence from medical examinations conducted after the first hearing. Relying upon all the information before him, the ALJ found Jackson did not possess the residual functional capacity to pursue more than sedentary work. Based on this finding and findings regarding Jackson's skills, experience, and education, the ALJ determined Jackson was disabled and awarded Jackson benefits for the entire period requested in his application.

After winning his disability benefits on remand, Jackson filed a motion to reopen his case in the district court. Jackson wanted to reopen his case so that the court could enter a judgment in his favor, paving the way for Jackson to file an application for attorney's fees under the EAJA. The Commissioner objected to Jackson's motion, contending that the May 6, 1993 judgment of remand was a final judgment. As a final judgment, it triggered the start of the filing period for an EAJA fee application, and, the Commissioner contended, Jackson had missed his one opportunity to file a fee application. According to the Commissioner, after entering the remand order, the district court lost jurisdiction over Jackson's case.

Jackson responded by pointing out language in the remand order indicating that the case was remanded on a sentence-six ground as well as a sentence-four ground. Jackson contended that because a remand based upon sentence six of § 405(g) does not terminate district court jurisdiction, he was entitled to have the district court reopen his case and enter final judgment in his favor. Once that judgment was entered, Jackson could file his EAJA fee application.

Jackson's motion to reopen his case in district court was denied in an order dated June 1, 1995. In that order, the district court acknowledged that the 1993 remand order "was arguably made pursuant to both sentence four and sentence six" of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Nevertheless, the court held that in reality the remand order had been issued on a sentence-four ground only. The district court reasoned that the entry of judgment immediately after the remand order indicated "that the Court did not contemplate the parties returning to court." The district court cited Melkonyan v. Sullivan, 501 U.S. 89, 102, 111 S.Ct. 2157, 2165, 115 L.Ed.2d 78 (1991) in support of that proposition. Next, the court stated that the entry of judgment would normally indicate that the remand order was a final, appealable order. The court did not explain how the fact that the order was appealable led to a conclusion that the remand order was pursuant to sentence four only, instead of both sentence four and sentence six. Finally, the court noted that the order was partially based on the incorrectness of the ALJ's determination, and for that reason, should be construed as a sentence-four remand. For this proposition, the district court also cited the "language of Melkonyan."

Once the district court held that the 1993 remand order had been made pursuant to sentence four only, the court was required to hold that it no longer had jurisdiction over Jackson's case. It was also required to reject Jackson's EAJA application for attorney's fees as untimely, which it did.

II. DISCUSSION

Jackson's case is governed by 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), which provides for judicial review of final decisions of the Commissioner. That section also specifies the actions that the district court may take with a claimant's case. One action is to remand the case for reconsideration by the Commissioner, or by an ALJ, if the Commissioner chooses to delegate benefits decisions, as she has. According to subsection (g), the district court can remand a case for only two reasons. See Melkonyan, 501 U.S. at 99-100, 111 S.Ct. at 2164 (holding that a district court may not use inherent power to remand in a disability benefits case). One of those reasons is found in sentence four of § 405(g), which provides:

The court shall have power to enter, upon the pleadings and transcript of the record a judgment affirming, modifying, or reversing the decision of the Commissioner of Social Security, with or without remanding the cause for a rehearing.

42 U.S.C.A. § 405(g) (West Supp.1996). To remand under that provision, sentence four, the district court must either find that the decision is not supported by substantial evidence, or that the Commissioner (or the ALJ) incorrectly applied the law relevant to the disability claim.

The second reason for remanding a case under § 405(g) is found in...