Jackson v. City of N.Y.

• Decision Date: 16 April 2013
• Docket Number: No. 11–CV–2925 WFK SMG.,11–CV–2925 WFK SMG.
• Citation: 939 F.Supp.2d 219
• Parties: Nancy JACKSON, Plaintiff, v. The CITY OF NEW YORK, P.O. John Dammacco, Sgt. Alex Montesquieu and P.O. John Doe # 1, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of New York

939 F.Supp.2d 219

Nancy JACKSON, Plaintiff,

v.The CITY OF NEW YORK, P.O. John Dammacco, Sgt. Alex Montesquieu and P.O. John Doe # 1, Defendants.

No. 11–CV–2925 WFK SMG.

United States District Court,

E.D. New York.

April 16, 2013.

Robert Milton Rambadadt, The Rambadadt Law Firm, P.C., New York, NY, for Plaintiff.

Max Oliver McCann, New York City Law Department, New York, NY, for Defendants.

WILLIAM F. KUNTZ II, District Judge.

Nancy Jackson (“Plaintiff”) commenced this action against the City of New York, Police Officers John Dammacco and John Doe, and Sergeant Alex Montesquieu (collectively, “Defendants”) in connection with an incident where Plaintiff was pulled over while driving and arrested for obstructing governmental administration in the second degree, resisting arrest, reckless driving, harassment in the second degree, and running a red traffic signal light. Plaintiff seeks recovery under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985, and 1986 for violation of her rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. Plaintiff also asserts pendent state law claims for assault, false arrest, intentional infliction of emotional distress, negligent infliction of emotional distress, and negligent hiring, retention, training, and supervision. This is Plaintiff's second § 1983 action against these Defendants. As they did in Plaintiff's first action, Defendants move for summary judgment pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. For the reasons stated below, Defendants' motion is granted in part and denied in part.

I. Factual Background

The parties agree that the causes of action arise from an incident that took place on March 26, 2010 at approximately 4:00 P.M. in Queens, New York. See Defs.' 56.1 St., at ¶ 1; Pl.'s 56.1 St., at ¶ 1.¹ At or near the intersection of North Conduit Avenue and 225th Street, Defendant Sergeant Alex Montesquieu (“Sergeant Montequieu”) stopped Plaintiff's vehicle. Id. at ¶ 6. Sergeant Montesquieu, later joined by Defendant Police Officer John Dammacco (“Officer Dammacco”), ordered Plaintiff to exit her vehicle, but she refused to comply with his order. Id. at ¶ 8; Dammacco Dep. Tr. at 84:13–19. Shortly thereafter, additional police officers arrived at the location and arrested Plaintiff. Id. at ¶¶ 9–10. Following the incident, Officer Dammacco requested that the New York City Police Department Threat Assessment Unit conduct an investigation to determine whether Plaintiff posed a risk to him or his family. Id. at ¶ 11. Plaintiff asserts the investigation established that Plaintiff was not a threat and that Officer Dammacco's suspicions were unfounded, although no evidence in the record reflects the outcome of this investigation one way or another. See Pl.'s 56.1 St., at ¶ 11.

While the parties do not dispute the aforementioned facts, they sharply disagree on the circumstances giving rise to Plaintiff's traffic stop:

Defendants assert Officer Dammacco first identified Plaintiff from his vehicle, as he was driving near his home. Id. at ¶¶ 2–3. According to Defendants, Plaintiff was driving a grey Infinity vehicle, following closely behind Officer Dammacco and switching lanes when he did (i.e., tailgating). Id.; McCann Decl., Ex. C (“Criminal Charge”). Recalling an earlier incident in which he engaged in a physical struggle with Plaintiff,² and conscious of Plaintiffs proximity to his home, Officer Dammacco grew concerned for his safety and reported Plaintiffs tailgating to Sergeant Montesquieu, who left the precinct in pursuit of Plaintiffs vehicle. Id. at ¶¶ 3–6. Sergeant Montesquieu stated at his deposition that he observed Plaintiff drive straight through a steady red light, at which point he directed her to stop and she complied. See Montesquieu Dep. Tr. at 41:22–25, 45:7–46:10.

Plaintiff disputes that she was following Officer Dammacco in a dangerous manner. In support of her position, Plaintiff notes that Officer Dammacco admits Plaintiff did not threaten him while driving and that Officer Dammacco eventually managed to get behind and follow Plaintiffs vehicle. See Pl.'s 56.1 St., at ¶ 5 (citing Dammacco Dep. Tr. at 76:25–78:4). Plaintiff also notes that Sergeant Montesquieu was guided to Plaintiff's location by Officer Dammacco, who had been following her. See id. at ¶ 6; Dammacco Dep. Tr. at 78:3–4, 81:13–82:25; Montesquieu Dep. Tr. at 41:14–22. Plaintiff asserts that she drove through a red light at Sergeant Montesquieu's direction. See Compl. at ¶ 16.

The parties also dispute the circumstances giving rise to Plaintiff's ensuing arrest:

Defendants assert, without detail, that Plaintiff refused to comply with the officers' requests to exit her vehicle. See Defs.' 56.1 St., at ¶¶ 7–8. By contrast, Plaintiff asserts that she refused to exit her vehicle out of fear for her safety, after having recognized Officer Dammacco, with whom she had engaged in a prior physical struggle. See supra n. 2; Pl.'s 56.1 St., at ¶¶ 7, 8. She alleges she called first her lawyer and then 911, from inside her vehicle, to request that different officers come to the scene. Id.; Jackson Dep. Tr. at 174:11–16; see also Montesquieu Dep. Tr. at 48:3–25 (testifying that he observed Plaintiff crying and on the phone with the 911 operator when he approached her vehicle). Plaintiff further alleges Sergeant Montesquieu told her she was pulled over, “[b]ecause you're Nancy Jackson,” Jackson Dep. Tr. at 171:1–3, 173:14–174:2, before he began cursing and threatening to “[m]ace this bitch,” through the open sunroof of Plaintiff's vehicle. Pl.'s 56.1 St., at ¶ 8; Jackson Dep. Tr. at 171:8–21, 172:15–21, 174:11–14. A non-party eyewitness, Pastor Doris Johnson, corroborated Plaintiffs account by sworn affidavit in which she states, “I heard a woman screaming for help,” and “I saw a woman in a silver car that was surrounded by three men, two of which were reaching into the vehicle through the sunroof.” Aff. of Pastor Doris Johnson (“Johnson Aff.”), at ¶ 4. Johnson stated further that she called 911 and yelled for the men to stop. Id. at ¶ 5.

The parties agree that Plaintiff eventually exited her vehicle approximately ten minutes after additional officers arrived on the scene, at which point Plaintiff was handcuffed and transported to the hospital. Defs.' 56.1 St., at ¶¶ 9–10; Pl.'s 56.1 St., at ¶ 9; Montesquieu Dep. Tr. at 52:8–14. Plaintiff's criminal charge, prepared by Police Officer James Vogel, includes a statement by Sergeant Montesquieu that Plaintiff “flailed her arms and refused to place her arms behind her back, in order to avoid being handcuffed.” McCann Decl., Ex. C. By contrast, Pastor Doris Johnson witnessed Plaintiff “cooperate with the uniformed officers,” Johnson Aff. at ¶ 8, and took a photograph consistent with this account.

II. Discussion

A. Summary Judgment Standard

A court “shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). “The role of the court is not to resolve disputed issues of fact but to assess whether there are any factual issues to be tried. In determining whether summary judgment is appropriate, this Court will construe the facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and must resolve all ambiguities and draw all reasonable inferences against the movant.” Brod v. Omya, Inc., 653 F.3d 156, 164 (2d Cir.2011) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). No genuine issue of material fact exists “where the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party.” Lovejoy–Wilson v. NOCO Motor Fuel, Inc., 263 F.3d 208, 212 (2d Cir.2001) (citing Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986)).

If the moving party satisfies this burden, the non-moving party must “make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of [each] element to that party's case ... since a complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of the non-moving party's case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322–23, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986); Chandok v. Klessig, 632 F.3d 803, 812 (2d Cir.2011) (“Where the undisputed facts reveal that there is an absence of sufficient proof as to one essential element of a claim, any factual disputes with respect to other elements become immaterial and cannot defeat a motion for summary judgment.”). Importantly, if the evidence produced by the non-moving party “is merely colorable, or is not significantly probative, summary judgment may be granted.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249–50, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986) (internal citations omitted).

B. Unlawful Seizure

An individual is seized for purposes of the Fourth Amendment “when the officer, by means of physical force or show of authority, terminates or restrains [her] freedom of movement.” Brendlin v. California, 551 U.S. 249, 254, 127 S.Ct. 2400, 168 L.Ed.2d 132 (2007) (internal quotation marks omitted). A police officer may stop and briefly detain a person (a “Terry stop”) if the officer has “a reasonable suspicion supported by articulable facts that criminal activity may be afoot, even if the officer lacks probable cause.” United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7, 109 S.Ct. 1581, 104 L.Ed.2d 1 (1989) (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968)) (internal quotation marks omitted). Reasonable suspicion has been defined as something “more than an inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or hunch,” but less than probable cause. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).

To determine whether reasonable suspicion exists, the reviewing court must look at the totality of the circumstances, and “must evaluate those circumstances through the eyes of a reasonable and cautious police officer on the scene, guided by his experience and training.” United States v....