Jackson v. City of Killeen

• Decision Date: 04 September 1981
• Docket Number: No. 80-2114,80-2114
• Citation: 654 F.2d 1181
• Parties: 26 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. 1515, 26 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 32,085 Patricia A. JACKSON, Plaintiff-Appellee Cross-Appellant, v. CITY OF KILLEEN (Killeen Public Library), Defendant-Appellant Cross-Appellee. . Unit A
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit

Page 1181

654 F.2d 1181

26 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. 1515,

26 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 32,085

Patricia A. JACKSON, Plaintiff-Appellee Cross-Appellant, v. CITY OF KILLEEN (Killeen Public Library) Defendant-Appellant Cross-Appellee.

No. 80-2114.

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

Unit A

Sept. 4, 1981.

Naman, Howell, Smith, Lee & Muldrow, P.C., Jerry P. Campbell, Waco, Tex., for defendant-appellant cross-appellee.

Kenneth M. Hoyt, Houston, Tex., for plaintiff-appellee cross-appellant.

Appeals from the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas.

Before WISDOM, GEE and POLITZ, Circuit Judges.

GEE, Circuit Judge:

This appeal concerns a case of alleged employment discrimination brought under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. and 42 U.S.C. § 1981.

Patricia Jackson, a black female with a bachelor's degree in library science and two years of library experience in a junior high school, was hired by the Killeen Public Library in February 1975. While she was assigned initially to the circulation desk as a clerk, it was understood that she would perform a variety of tasks. Problems arose with respect to her employment almost immediately. On March 31, the other library employees had a meeting with Mrs. Hinkel, the head librarian, to discuss their dissatisfaction with Mrs. Jackson. Shortly thereafter, Mrs. Hinkel told Mrs. Jackson that she was being discharged due to her apparent dissatisfaction with her work assignments, failure to follow orders, and the dissatisfaction of other employees. After some discussion, however, Mrs. Jackson was During this two-week probation period, Mrs. Jackson contacted the NAACP, expressing a variety of complaints. That organization sent a representative, Mr. Nesbit, to the library to investigate the situation. Mr. Nesbit was apparently told that Mrs. Jackson had been doing a fine job; he concluded that personality conflicts were present in the library but that there was no sign of racial discrimination. Mrs. Jackson continued working at the library for some three additional months, during which dissatisfaction with her work grew. In early July she was notified that she was being discharged effective two weeks from the date of the letter. While the termination listed as grounds "(a) incompatibility, (b) questioning of assignments, and (c) lack of amenability of counseling," the testimony at trial was that she was fired for a number of deficiencies, both specific and general. Mrs. Jackson filed a complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), received a right to sue letter, and filed suit. The trial judge, in extremely general findings of fact and conclusions of law, found that Mrs. Jackson had made a prima facie case that the city failed to rebut and that the reasons given by the city for firing her were a pretext for discrimination. The judgment ordered Mrs. Jackson reinstated and awarded her $1,389 in back pay and $1,500 in attorneys' fees. The city appeals from this judgment, while Mrs. Jackson appeals from the specific award of back pay and attorneys' fees. Throughout this opinion the city will be referred to as defendant, and Mrs. Jackson will be referred to as the plaintiff.

given two weeks to improve her performance.

Because we find that the defendant articulated legitimate reasons for the discharge that the plaintiff failed to demonstrate were merely pretextual, we reverse.

McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973), as clarified in Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine, --- U.S. ----, 101 S.Ct. 1089, 67 L.Ed.2d 207 (1981), established the basic allocation of burdens and order of presentation of proof in Title VII cases alleging discriminatory treatment. ¹ First, the plaintiff has the burden of proving, by a preponderance of the evidence, a prima facie case of discrimination. The prima facie case "in effect creates a presumption that the employer unlawfully discriminated against the employee." Burdine, 101 S.Ct. at 1094. Second, if the plaintiff successfully proves the prima facie case, the evidentiary burden shifts to the defendant "to articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the employee's rejection." McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802, 93 S.Ct. at 1824. Third, should the defendant carry this burden, the plaintiff must then establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the reasons offered by the defendant were a mere pretext for discrimination. This is merely a division of intermediate evidentiary burdens. "The ultimate burden of persuading the trier of fact that a defendant intentionally discriminated against the plaintiff remains at all time (sic) with the plaintiff." Burdine, 101 S.Ct. at 1093.

The formulation for the establishment of a prima facie case, set forth in McDonnell Douglas, has been applied to discharge cases in this circuit since Marks v. Pratt Co., 607 F.2d 1153, 1155 (5th Cir.1979). Essentially, plaintiffs must show that they are members of a protected class who, while qualified for their jobs, were discharged and replaced with nonminorities. Cf. Thompson v. Leland Police Department, 633 F.2d 1111, 1114 (5th Cir.1980) (as part of his prima facie case, plaintiff must establish a negative that the discharge was not for a valid reason). The trial court below properly found that the plaintiff had established a prima facie case of discriminatory discharge. As the Supreme Court recently pointed out in Burdine, 101 S.Ct. at 1094 The trial court, however, no doubt misled by our misdirection in Burdine v. Texas Department of Community Affairs, 608 F.2d 563 (5th Cir.1979), and without the benefit of the Supreme Court's guidance in Burdine, 101 S.Ct. 1083, erred when it found that the reasons given by the defendant for the termination of employment were insufficient to refute the prima facie case established by the plaintiff. As elucidated in Burdine, id. at 1093-95, the burden cast on an employer after the establishment of a prima facie case is one of production only, not of persuasion.

"the burden of establishing a prima facie case of disparate treatment is not onerous." All that the plaintiff need do is prove by a preponderance of the evidence that he was discharged from a position for which he was qualified "under circumstances which give rise to an inference of unlawful discrimination." Id. Although defendant argues that plaintiff failed to prove that she was replaced by a nonminority, the plaintiff testified at trial to this effect, ² and this is sufficient to cast on the defendant the burden of producing admissible evidence that would allow "the trier of fact rationally to conclude that the employment decision had not been motivated by discriminatory animus." Id. at 1096. ³

The defendant need not persuade the court that it was actually motivated by the proffered reasons. It is sufficient if the defendant's evidence raises a genuine issue of fact as to whether it discriminated against the plaintiff. To accomplish this, the defendant must clearly set forth, through the introduction of admissible evidence, the reasons for the plaintiff's rejection. The explanation provided must be legally sufficient to justify a judgment for the defendant. If the defendant carries this burden of production, the presumption raised by the prima facie case is rebutted ....

Id. at 1094-95 (citation and footnotes omitted). The employer need not disprove the plaintiff's allegation of discriminatory motive by a preponderance of the evidence; articulation of legitimate reasons for its employment decision is enough. ⁴

In reviewing a district court's determination that the plaintiff proved her allegations of racial discrimination, the reviewing court must make an independent determination of the ultimate fact issue of discrimination, although it is bound by the district court's findings of subsidiary fact that are not themselves clearly erroneous. Danner v. United States Civil Service Commission, 635 F.2d 427 at 430 (5th Cir.1981). This case does not present us with the difficult task of distinguishing subsidiary from ultimate factfindings, as the trial judge Plaintiff proved only that she is a member of a protected class, that in her own estimation she did her job well, and that she was discharged. As evidence of competency on the job, plaintiff offered proof of a bachelor's degree in library science, two years' experience in a school library, and her own testimony that she was qualified. No other witnesses, with the exception of Mr. Nesbit from the NAACP, who testified that sometime prior to dismissal he had been told that the plaintiff was doing a good job, corroborated her belief. On the other hand, three witnesses plaintiff's job supervisor, Mrs. Hinkel, and two of her fellow employees testified that plaintiff was unable to type, file, shelve, or alphabetize accurately, that she expressed dislike for her work assignments, that other employees had to redo her work, and that she appeared to be untrainable. ⁶ Defendant, by means of the testimony of other library Plaintiff failed to show that the defendant's reasons for her discharge were pretextual, i. e., that her race was a "but for" cause or determining factor for her discharge. Compare McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transportation Co., 427 U.S. 273, 282, 96 S.Ct. 2574, 2579, 49 L.Ed.2d 493, 502 (1976). As we have seen, plaintiff called no witnesses to rebut the very damaging testimony presented concerning her competence. Instead, plaintiff testified on her own behalf as to her library skills. Evidence of paper credentials, while sufficient to prove discrimination in hiring, does not demonstrate competence once hired. Once an employee's skill on the job is successfully challenged by an employer, the employee needs to be able to show more than the undeniable fact that she was initially qualified to be hired. Plaintiff here attempted to rebut the defendant's articulated reasons for...