Jackson v. City of Jamestown
| Decision Date | 30 March 1916 |
| Citation | 157 N.W. 475,33 N.D. 596 |
| Court | North Dakota Supreme Court |
Action to recover damages for personal injuries.
Appeal from the District Court of Stutsman County, Coffey, J.
Judgment for plaintiff. Defendant appeals.
Reversed and judgment directed for defendant.
Reversed and remanded, with directions.
O. J Seiler and Thorp & Chase, for appellant.
It is not necessary that a question should be hypothetical in form when the opinion of the witness is based, not upon assumed facts, but upon his personal knowledge and observation. 2 Jones, Bluebook on Ev. § 375, and cases cited; Kinney v. Brotherhood of American Yeoman, 15 N.D 21, 106 N.W. 44; Pyke v. Jamestown, 15 N.D. 157, 107 N.W 359.
Evidence as to the tubercular condition of the plaintiff resulting from the injury was inadmissible because no foundation laid. Whart. & S. Med. Jur. §§ 546, 547; Briggs v New York C. & H. R. R. Co. 177 N.Y. 59, 10 Am. St. Rep. 718, 69 N.E. 223, 15 Am. Neg. Rep. 396; Paty v. Martin, 15 La.Ann. 620; 17 Cyc. 212b, 226; Warsaw v. Fisher, 24 Ind.App. 46, 55 N.E. 42; Kelly v. Perrault, 5 Idaho 221, 48 P. 45.
Where an answer to a proper question is conjectural and speculative, it should be stricken out. Swenson v. Brooklyn Heights R. Co. 15 Misc. 69, 36 N.Y.S. 445; Tozer v. New York C. & H. R. R. Co. 105 N.Y. 617, 11 N.E. 369; Fuller v. Jackson, 92 Mich. 197, 52 N.W. 1075; Kinney v. Brotherhood of American Yeoman, 15 N.D. 21, 106 N.W. 44.
The rule must be followed, for otherwise there is no basis upon which the jury can measure the value of the opinion. Pyke v. Jamestown, 15 N.D. 157, 107 N.W. 359; Bucher v. Wisconsin C. R. Co. 139 Wis. 597, 120 N.W. 518; Spear v. Hiles, 67 Wis. 361, 30 N.W. 511; Baxter v. Chicago & N.W. R. Co. 104 Wis. 307, 80 N.W. 644, 6 Am. Neg. Rep. 746; Jones v. Portland, 16 L.R.A. 437, note; Shaughnessy v. Holt, 236 Ill. 485, 21 L.R.A.(N.S.) 826, 86 N.E. 256; Gillett, Indirect & Collateral Ev. § 265; Fuhry v. Chicago City R. Co. 239 Ill. 548, 88 N.E. 221; West Chicago Street R. Co. v. Carr, 170 Ill. 478, 48 N.E. 992; Kath v. Wisconsin C. R. Co. 121 Wis. 503, 99 N.W. 217; Greinke v. Chicago City R. Co. 234 Ill. 564, 85 N.E. 327.
An opinion that an injury resulted from a certain designated act which is the one upon which the action is based, as distinguished from an opinion that certain causes would produce certain results, is improper as usurping the province of the jury. Wharton & S. Med. Jur. 3d ed. § 550, p. 580; 17 Cyc. 234-236; 2 Jones, Bluebook on Ev. § 372; Jones v. Portland, 88 Mich. 598, 16 L.R.A. 437, 50 N.W. 731; Woodbury v. Obear, 7 Gray, 467; Hayes v. Smith, 62 Ohio St. 161, 56 N.E. 879, 7 Am. Neg. Rep. 493; Central City v. Marquis, 75 Neb. 233, 106 N.W. 221; Denver & R. G. R. Co. v. Vitello, 34 Cal. 50, 81 P. 766; State v. Stevens, 16 S.D. 309, 92 N.W. 421; Prentis v. Bates, 88 Mich. 567, 50 N.W. 637; Chicago v. Didier, 227 Ill. 571, 81 N.E. 698.
"Speculative" means the formation of an opinion on defective or presumptive evidence; probable inference or surmise. Michaud v. Grace Harbor Lumber Co. 122 Mich. 305, 81 N.W. 93; State v. Hanley, 34 Minn. 430, 26 N.W. 397; Hamilton v. Michigan C. R. Co. 135 Mich. 95, 97 N.W. 392; Davis v. Travelers' Ins. Co. 59 Kan. 74, 52 P. 67; Nichols v. Brabazon, 94 Wis. 549, 69 N.W. 342.
"It is a well-settled principle of law that no evidence be permitted to go to the jury unless under oath, without expressed or implied consent." Hawks v. Baker, 6 Me. 72, 19 Am. Dec. 191; 40 Cyc. 2410; Comp. Laws 1913, § 7882; 1 Thomp. Trials, p. 365.
"A nurse may or may not be qualified to state an inference as to a medical matter, according to her training and experience and the subject of the inference." 17 Cyc. 205, also note 32 on same page.
"One who is not an expert may testify to the acts and appearance of another which indicate disease or inability, or to the contrary, but may not give an opinion on the subject." Ashland v. Marlborough, 99 Mass. 47; Fallon v. Rapid City, 17 S.D. 570, 97 N.W. 1009.
A cross-examination is proper though it calls for particular facts not called for on the direct examination, if they relate to the same subject-matter. Campau v. Dewey, 9 Mich. 381; Ah Doon v. Smith, 25 Ore. 89, 34 P. 1093; Sayres v. Allen, 25 Ore. 211, 35 P. 254; 3 Enc. Ev. 832; Abbott, Civil Jury Trials, pp. 220, 221; Hogen v. Klabo, 13 N.D. 319, 100 N.W. 847; 1 Thomp. Trials, 2d ed. § 408.
Where a subject is opened up on direct examination, on cross-examination such subject may be gone into fully and exhausted. Schnase v. Goetz, 18 N.D. 594, 120 N.W. 553.
"On cross-examination of a physician and surgeon as a witness, opposing counsel has the right to impeach his skill and test his competency." Schrandt v. Young, 62 Neb. 254, 86 N.W. 1085; 40 Cyc. 2480, subdiv. 2; Rodgers, Expert Testimony, p. 42, § 37, p. 83; State v. Kent, 5 N.D. 541, 35 L.R.A. 518, 67 N.W. 1052; Hogen v. Klabo, 13 N.D. 319, 100 N.W. 847; Abbott, Civil Jury Trials, pp. 220, 221; 1 Thomp. Trials, 2d ed. §§ 406, 408.
A penal ordinance requiring a citizen to do certain things in a certain manner does not create any liability in the event of its violation, unless the same state of facts created a liability at common law, and such ordinance is not evidence of negligence, and not admissible. Holwerson v. St. Louis & S. R. Co. 157 Mo. 216, 50 L.R.A. 850, 57 S.W. 770; Sanders v. Southern Electric R. Co. 147 Mo. 411, 48 S.W. 855; Byington v. St. Louis R. Co. 147 Mo. 673, 49 S.W. 876; note to Sullivan v. Huidekoper, 5 L.R.A.(N.S.) 266; Dolfinger v. Fishback, 12 Bush, 474; Gibson v. Leonard, 143 Ill. 182, 17 L.R.A. 589, 36 Am. St. Rep. 376, 32 N.E. 182; Stacy v. Knickerbocker Ice Co. 84 Wis. 614, 54 N.W. 1091, 1 Am. Neg. Cas. 738; Sowles v. Moore, 65 Vt. 322, 21 L.R.A. 723, 26 A. 629; Illinois C. R. Co. v. Phelps, 29 Ill. 447; Titcomb v. Fitchburg R. Co. 12 Allen, 254; Cook v. Johnston, 58 Mich. 437, 55 Am. Rep. 703, 25 N.W. 388; Inland Steel Co. v. Yedinak, 172 Ind. 423, 139 Am. St. Rep. 389, 87 N.E. 229; Gay v. Essex Electric Street R. Co. 159 Mass. 238, 21 L.R.A. 448, 38 Am. St. Rep. 415, 34 N.E. 186; Southern R. Co. v. Wood, 21 Ky. L. Rep. 575, 52 S.W. 796.
Evidence to show that the defect at the point of the accident was open to view; that other citizens in passing had noticed its conspicuous character and that it would necessarily be observed in passing, and to further show that the city would not anticipate an accident for the reason that a great many people had passed there without accident and without getting into the ditch. Butler v. Oxford, 186 N.Y. 444, 79 N.E. 712; Braatz v. Fargo, 19 N.D. 538, 27 L.R.A.(N.S.) 1169, 125 N.W. 1042; Lane v. Hancock, 142 N.Y. 510, 37 N.E. 473; Hubbell v. Yonkers, 104 N.Y. 434, 58 Am. Rep. 522, 10 N.E. 858; Craighead v. Brooklyn City R. Co. 123 N.Y. 391, 25 N.E. 387; Bertelson v. Chicago, M. & St. P. R. Co. 5 Dak. 313, 40 N.W. 531, 11 Am. Neg. Cas. 269; 29 Cyc. 623.
There can be no breach of duty by defendant when, in such a case, plaintiff himself does or omits to do the thing which, though in connection with defendant's misconduct, is likely to produce the harm. Bigelow, Torts, pp. 48, 49, 52, 179; Owen v. Cook, 9 N.D. 134, 47 L.R.A. 646, 81 N.W. 285; AEtna F. Ins. Co. v. Boon, 95 U.S. 117, 24 L.Ed. 395; Scherer v. Schlaberg, 18 N.D. 421, 24 L.R.A.(N.S.) 520, 122 N.W. 1000; Watson, Personal Injuries, § 32, and cases cited; 29 Cyc. 528.
"The negligence of a person is not remote, although its inception was prior to that of defendant, where it is continued up to the time of the accident." 29 Cyc. 510, 511, 529; Cunningham v. Lyness, 22 Wis. 245; 5 Thomp. Neg. § 6237.
"The want of ordinary care on the part of the injured person occurs as a proximate cause in producing the injury; the defendant is not liable, although in fault. 1 Thomp. Neg. §§ 216, 227; Heckman v. Evenson, 7 N.D. 173, 73 N.W. 427.
One who has been about the place of the accident and knows its condition, or by the exercise of his sense and faculties could know and is presumed to know its condition, and by lack of observation or forgetfulness, or inattention to self-preservation from injury, sustains an injury, he cannot recover, unless it is shown that his attention was distracted on some sufficient cause. Covington v. Manwaring, 113 Ky. 592, 68 S.W. 625; Sickels v. Philadelphia, 209 Pa. 113, 58 A. 128; Mitchell v. Tell City, Ind.App. , 81 N.E. 594; 5 Thomp. Neg. §§ 6242, 6244; 28 Cyc. 1426; Moeller v. Rugby, 30 N.D. 438, 153 N.W. 290; Lerner v. Philadelphia, 221 Pa. 294, 21 L.R.A.(N.S.) 614, 70 A. 755; Robb v. Connellsville, 137 Pa. 42, 20 A. 564; Whalen v. Citizens' Gaslight Co. 151 N.W. 70, 45 N.E. 363, 1 Am. Neg. Rep. 120.
The plaintiff should have used due care and caution to have discovered the danger. Munger v. Marshalltown, 56 Iowa 216, 9 N.W. 192; McLaury v. McGregor, 54 Iowa 717, 7 N.W. 91; Casey v. Malden, 163 Mass. 507, 47 Am. St. Rep. 473, 40 N.E. 849; Pierce v. Wilmington, 2 Marv. (Del.) 306, 43 A. 162; Carswell v. Wilmington, 2 Marv. (Del.) 360, 43 A. 169; Wilkins v. Wilmington, 2 Marv. (Del.) 132, 42 A. 419; Fallon v. Boston, 3 Allen, 38; Butterfield v. Forrester, 11 East, 60, 10 Revised Rep. 433, 19 Eng. Rul. Cas. 189; Weinstein v. Terre Haute, 147 Ind. 556, 46 N.E. 1004, 2 Am. Neg. Rep. 331; Plymouth v. Milner, 117 Ind. 324, 20 N.E. 235; Cressy v. Postville, 59 Iowa 62, 12 N.W. 757.
One cannot so act or place himself in danger by lack of due care and attention and then, if injured, recover damages. He must prudently protect himself, and, failing to do so, he is chargeable with negligence which will defeat a recovery. Lautenbacher v. Philadelphia, 217 Pa. 318, 66 A 549...
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