Jackson v. Cnty. of Suffolk

• Decision Date: 15 July 2014
• Docket Number: No 12-CV-1455 (JFB)(AKT),12-CV-1455 (JFB)(AKT)
• Parties: IN THE MATTER OF THE CLAIM OF THE ESTATE OF WILLIE JACKSON, BY HIS ADMINISTRATRIX SHANTA JACKSON, Plaintiff, v. COUNTY OF SUFFOLK ET AL., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of New York

IN THE MATTER OF THE CLAIM OF THE ESTATE OF WILLIE JACKSON,BY HIS ADMINISTRATRIX SHANTA JACKSON, Plaintiff, v. COUNTY OF SUFFOLK ET AL., Defendants.

No 12-CV-1455 (JFB)(AKT)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

Dated: July 15, 2014

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

JOSEPH F. BIANCO, District Judge:

Plaintiff the Estate of Willie Jackson ("plaintiff' or the "Estate") brings this action against numerous defendants associated with Suffolk County (the "County Defendants") based on an incident on April 2, 2011, between Willie Jackson ("decedent") and Suffolk County Police Department ("SCPD") officers, which ultimately led to decedent's death. Pending before the Court is plaintiff's timely motion, pursuant to Rule 72(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, appealing Magistrate Judge A. Kathleen Tomlinson's March 31, 2014 Order denying plaintiff's request for spoliation sanctions, including the entry of a default judgment (the "Spoliation Order," Docket No. 65).¹ (Appeal, Docket No. 66.) For the following reasons, the Court adopts the thorough and well-reasoned Spoliation Order in its entirety and denies plaintiff's motion for spoliation sanctions.

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff alleges, inter alia, that, around midnight on April 2, 2011, defendants SCPD Officers Ronald Breuer and Eugene Cipriano were "reckless, careless and negligent in their actions in beating [decedent] with flashlights, batons and, upon information and belief, other weapons." (Am. Compl. ¶ 33.) After this alleged use of excessive, deadly force, decedent was transported to the Good Samaritan Hospital Emergency Department for treatment, where he was pronounced dead at 2 a.m. (Id. ¶¶ 35-36, 38.) Later that day, Maura DeJoseph, from the Suffolk County Officeof the Medical Examiner, conducted an autopsy. (Id. ¶ 39.) According to plaintiff, "the Autopsy Report illustrates the unnecessary and excessive use of physical and deadly force" upon decedent, who "received multiple contusions (bruises) in and around his body." (Id. ¶ 40.) Plaintiff claims the Autopsy Report states the cause of death as "ACUTE CONCUSSIVE HEAD INJURY DUE TO BLUNT IMPACT," and the manner of death as "HOMICIDE." (Id. ¶¶ 43-44.)

On August 20, 2013, plaintiff moved for sanctions against the County Defendants for their alleged failure to preserve the batons and flashlights that were in the possession of Breuer and Cipriano on April 2, 2011. Plaintiff's theory is that one of these officers struck decedent with a baton or flashlight, causing his head injury and death. As Magistrate Judge Tomlinson noted, plaintiff's argument principally rests on the statement of decedent's widow, Ms. Laura Jackson ("Ms. Jackson"), that one of the SCPD officers hit her husband with a "stick." In light of that statement, SCPD Detective Ronald Bottari initially transferred the officers' batons and flashlights to the SCPD Property Section to preserve them as evidence from the scene. A little over a year later, on May 24, 2012, Bottari released the items to the officers upon their request and without notice to plaintiff's counsel. No litigation hold had been placed on these items, and no forensic testing had been done, either. Plaintiff argued that these items were "key pieces of evidence to allow Plaintiff the chance to support their case" and have "been destroyed" due to the County Defendants' actions.² She requested that Magistrate Judge Tomlinson strike defendants' pleadings, enter a default judgment, award plaintiff costs and attorney's fees, and provide any further appropriate relief. Plaintiff did not request an adverse inference alone.

By Order dated March 31, 2014, Magistrate Judge Tomlinson denied plaintiff's motion for spoliation sanctions. After an extensive recitation of the facts, Magistrate Judge Tomlinson found no spoliation in the first instance. She noted that plaintiff had deposed Bottari, had offered no evidence that would indicate the items were tainted simply by their return to the officers, and has refused the County Defendants' offers to inspect and test the items at issue. Magistrate Judge Tomlinson also emphasized that (1) Bottari testified that he reviewed the evidence before returning the items to the officers and found no blood or hair on them at all; (2) no other witnesses corroborated, through credible evidence, Ms. Jackson's account that decedent was hit with a "stick" (on an unspecified part of his body); and (3) the independent medical examiner, DeJoseph, concluded that decedent died because he was pushed by another and fell backward and, despite being informed of Ms. Jackson's statement, did not mention any injuries consistent with blows to the body from a flashlight or baton. Thus, Magistrate Judge Tomlinson concluded that plaintiff had provided "no good faith factual basis concerning by whom, in what way, or at what point thesepieces of evidence were 'significantly altered' as a result of the County Defendants' actions." She found the evidence had not been "destroyed" by virtue of its return to the officers and dismissed as speculation the assumption that there must have been hair and/or fibers that were destroyed sometime between Bottari taking possession and the items' return.³

In addition, Magistrate Judge Tomlinson concluded that plaintiff had failed to satisfy the three-part test for imposing spoliation sanctions. She first found that the County Defendants had a duty to preserve the evidence. Plaintiff does not dispute that finding. Second, Magistrate Judge Tomlinson found no "bad faith" or "gross negligence" on the part of the County Defendants in releasing the items, because there was no spoliation and in light of Bottari's actions before he released the items. Instead, she found that the record supported a finding of negligence. Plaintiff disputes that finding, and she argues that the defendant acted in bad faith. Third, Magistrate Judge Tomlinson found, in light of Bottari's testimony that no forensic data was found on these items and the medical examiner knew of Ms. Jackson's statement, that "Plaintiff has not provided any non-speculative basis to show that had Bottari not released these items, there would have been relevant evidence favorable to Plaintiff's claim." Thus, Magistrate Judge Tomlinson saw no basis to impose sanctions, including an adverse inference against the County Defendants. She noted, however, "that there is nothing preventing Plaintiff from making an argument based on negligence to a jury at the trial of this action in the event Plaintiff can establish a proper foundation." Plaintiff also disputes that finding.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

This Court may reverse a magistrate judge's order on a nondispositive pre-trial matter only if the order is "clearly erroneous or contrary to law." 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(a); see Thomas E. Hoar, Inc. v. Sara Lee Corp., 900 F.2d 522, 525 (2d Cir. 1990) ("A magistrate . . . may issue orders regarding nondispositive pretrial matters. The district court reviews such orders under the 'clearly erroneous or contrary to law' standard."). Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Rule 72, de novo review is reserved for "those portions of the report or specified proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made" involving dispositive matters—not to nondispositive pre-trial matters. See, e.g., Thomas E. Hoar, Inc., 900 F.2d at 525 (explaining standard for review of magistrate judge decisions); New York v. Mountain Tobacco Co., 953 F. Supp. 2d 385, 389-90 (E.D.N.Y. 2013) (same).

Plaintiff urges this Court to review Magistrate Judge Tomlinson's decision de novo, while defendant argues that this Court should review the decision for clear error. A court may impose sanctions for spoliation under Rule 37 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure when a party spoliates evidence in violation of a court order, or under its inherent power to control litigation. See West v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 167 F.3d 776, 779 (2d Cir. 1999) ("Even without a discovery order, a district court may impose sanctions for spoliation, exercising its inherent power to control litigation.") In Kiobel v. Milson, 592 F.3d 78, 84-105 (2d Cir. 2010), the Second Circuit issued split concurring opinions on whether a magistrate judge has the authority to impose sanctionsunder Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Courts have expressed concern that the conflicting conclusions in those opinions also potentially could apply to other grounds for sanctions, including under Rule 37 or the Court's inherent power. See, e.g., Gelicity UK Ltd. v. Jell-E-Bath, Inc., No. 10 CV 5677 (ILG)(RLM), 2014 WL 1330938, at *1 n.1 (E.D.N.Y. April 1, 2014) (Report and Recommendation) ("Because the Second Circuit has not resolved the issue of a magistrate judge's authority to sanction under Rule 11, its inherent powers, or 28 U.S.C. § 1927, this Court, out ofan abundance of caution, addresses [plaintiff's] motion in a report and recommendation."); Diversified Control, Inc. v. Corning Cable Sys., LLC, No. 05-CV-0277 (A)(M), 2010 WL 1371662, at *1 n.2 (W.D.N.Y. April 6, 2010) ("The discussion in Kiobel suggests that this uncertainty may now also extend to a Magistrate Judge's authority to impose non-dispositive sanctions under Rule 37."); see also In Re Kessler, No. 05 CV 6056(SJF)(AKT), 2009 WL 2603104, at *3-21 (E.D.N.Y. March 27, 2009) (issuing a Report and Recommendation with respect to spoliation motion that invoked the court's inherent power).⁴

In an abundance of caution, the Court has treated the Spoliation Order as a Report and Recommendation and conducted a de novo review of the entire Spoliation Order. Having considered the issue de novo, the Court reaches the same conclusion as Magistrate Judge Tomlinson for the reasons discussed in her well-reasoned and thorough Spoliation Order. As discussed in detail below, the Court finds plaintiff's arguments and objections to be without merit.

III. DISCUSSION

"Spoliation is the destruction...