Jackson v. Concord Co.
| Decision Date | 20 May 1968 |
| Docket Number | A--446,Nos. A--447,s. A--447 |
| Citation | 243 A.2d 289,101 N.J.Super. 126 |
| Parties | Charles P. JACKSON, Complainant-Respondent, v. CONCORD COMPANY, a corporation of New Jersey, t/a Hartford Arms, Joseph Samost, 'Jane' Samost, (first name being fictitious) Jane Adams, Evelyn O'Donnel, Respondents-Appellants. |
| Court | New Jersey Superior Court — Appellate Division |
Peter P. Green, Camden, for respondents-appellants (Robert T. Healey, Camden, attorney).
Stephen Skillman, Deputy Atty. Gen., for Division on Civil Rights (Arthur J. Sills, Atty. Gen., attorney).
Before Judges SULLIVAN, FOLEY and LEONARD.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
SULLIVAN, S.J.A.D.
Here involved are consolidated appeals, pursuant to R.R. 4:88--8(a), from the findings, determination, order, and supplemental order of the Director of the Division on Civil Rights, Department of Law and Public Safety.
The matter grows out of the efforts of Charles P. Jackson, complainant, to secure an apartment in a large apartment development owned by the corporate respondent. The complainant filed an application for an apartment and paid a deposit. Unable to have his application processed or acted on, complainant filed a complaint with the Division charging that respondents had delayed considering his application for tenancy because he is a Negro. After a determination that probable cause existed for crediting the allegations of the complaint, and after conciliation was unsuccessful, a hearing was scheduled and testimony taken before a hearing examiner. As a result of the hearing, and acting on the recommendations of the hearing examiner, the Director issued his findings and determination that respondents were guilty of discrimination in violation of the Law Against Discrimination, N.J.S.A. 18:25--1 et seq.
The Director's Order and Supplemental Order mandated that
(1) Respondents forthwith cease and desist from discriminating against complainant and all other persons with respect to the rental or lease of apartments;
(2) Respondents, within 20 days of the Order, issue notice of the Order and written instructions for compliance therewith to all their officers, agents, and employees;
(3) Respondents cause to be posted on the premises, for a period of one year from the date of the entry of the Order, a true copy of the official housing poster of the Division on Civil Rights, a true copy of the written instructions to its officers, agents, and employees, and true copies of the Order and Supplemental Order issued by the Director;
(4) Respondents forthwith lease an apartment to complainant on specified terms;
(5) Respondents, for a period of one year following the date of the entry of the Order, make available to the Division on Civil Rights, during business hours, all records and applications concerning any and all vacancies occurring during that period for any and all apartments located in the development, the disposition of each such apartment, and copies of the rental or lease arrangement made for each vacancy;
(6) Respondents pay complainant 'compensatory damages,' as determined by the Director, for losses suffered as a result of the discrimination.
Respondents took separate appeals from the order and supplemental order of the Director, which appeals have been consolidated. After the notices of appeal had been filed, an apartment was made available to complainant and a lease dated December 18, 1967 entered into with him on terms which differ somewhat from those specified by the Director. Pending the outcome of the appeals, this court stayed enforcement of the Director's orders, subject to the terms of the aforesaid lease.
Defendants contend that the finding of discrimination is not supported by substantial credible evidence (see Clover Hill Swimming Club v. Goldsboro, 47 N.J. 25, 36, 219 A.2d 161 (1966), and that in any event the proofs are insufficient to implicate the individual respondents in the alleged discrimination.
We conclude that the finding of discrimination is fully supported by the record. Complainant was subjected to all kinds of evasion and delay on his application. This treatment, together with the testimony of respondent's former rental agent as to the instructions given her, adds up to substantial credible evidence of a policy of discrimination in which complainant found himself enmeshed after he filed his application.
Operation of the development in corporate form does not shield the individuals owning and acting for the corporation from responsibility. Joseph Samost is the principal owner and president of respondent corporation, June Adams a stockholder and secretary, and Evelyn O'Donnel the present rental agent. Effective implementation of the Division's orders required that the individuals concerned be included in the findings and orders. Otherwise a new corporate shield could be formed to evade the Division's ruling. Jones v. Haridor Realty Corp., 37 N.J. 384, 181 A.2d 481 (1962).
Respondents also argue that the posting requirements, and the provisions for inspection of the business records, exceed the powers given the Division under this act and also constitute, as to respondents, an unreasonable, arbitrary and invidious classification in violation of the State and Federal Constitutions.
This argument lacks merit. The act, in addition to authorizing a cease and desist order, empowers the Director to take such affirmative action, including but not limited to extending full and equal accommodations, as in the judgment of the Director will effectuate the purpose of this act, including a requirement for report of the manner of compliance.
We have recently decided that requirements of posting are within the powers granted the Director. Robinson v. Branch Brook Manor Apartments, 100 N.J.Super. 117, 43 A.2d 284 (App.Div.1968). Our reasoning in that case applies equally here.
The provision in the order that respondents, for a period of one year, make available for inspection by the Division its...
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