Jackson v. Cupples, 389
| Decision Date | 02 August 1965 |
| Docket Number | No. 389,389 |
| Parties | Thomas S. JACKSON et al. v. Regis C. CUPPLES et al. |
| Court | Maryland Court of Appeals |
Thomas S. Jackson, Washington, D. C. (Vivian V. Simpson and Joseph B. Simpson, Jr., Rockville, on the brief), for appellants.
E. Austin Carlin, Bethesda, for Orville W. Whitmer and Margaret M. Whitmer, part of appellees.
Irving A. Levine, Bethesda, for Regis C. Cupples and Eleasia B. Cupples, other appellees.
Before HORNEY, MARBURY, SYBERT, OPPENIMER and BARNES, JJ.
Old Virginia City, Inc., on May 24, 1961, executed and delivered a promissory note to the National Bank of Fairfax by which it promised to pay $75,000, with interest at six per cent per annum. This sum was to be paid in semi-annual installments of $8,793. The note further provided that in even of default of any payment, the entire unpaid balance would become due. Prior to the delivery of the note all of the parties to this action, except Thomas S. Jackson, as well as other individuals became joint endorsers on the note. No payments were made after July 30, 1962, and, the note being in default, the bank brought actions in Virginia and Maryland against the maker and the endorsers who lived in those respective states. The several actions in Virginia and one in Maryland resulted in the entry of judgments against the endorsers who were residents of those states. They, and several of the Maryland endorsers who recognized their responsibilities in this matter, succeeded in accumulating enough money to pay the amount due the bank, including principal, interest, costs and attorney's fee, amounting to $70,500. After the full amount due the bank was paid, it assigned the note to its attorney, Thomas S. Jackson, who accepted it as trustee for all the endorsers.
At the time of payment, there was pending in the Circuit Court for Montgomery County a law action brought by the bank against the Maryland endorsers. Jackson, in his capacity as trustee, made efforts to obtain contributions from all of the joint endorsers in order to distribute the burden of the loss among all the parties who had been under a joint obligation to pay. Being unsuccessful, a bill of complaint was filed on May 5, 1964, in the Circuit Court for Montgomery County, sitting in equity, requesting the court to take jurisdiction of the trust, to compel those who had not met their pro rata obligations to contribute their share of the total liability, and to supervise an accounting between the endorsers who were residents of Maryland. The defendant-appellees who were alleged to have not contributed their pro rata shares, filed demurrers to the bill of complaint. After a hearing on the demurrers Judge Shure, on October 21, 1964, ordered that the demurrers be sustained without leave to amend, but without prejudice to the plaintiff-appellants to seek determination of the issues in the law action. As grounds for sustaining the demurrers the order stated: (1) that suit was prematurely filed, and (2) the amounts alleged to be due in the bill of complaint are inconsistent with exhibit 'B', which was a tabulation of contributions and balances due from non-cooperating endorsers of the note, and thus would not warrant any decree as prayed in this contribution action. It is from this order that the appellants, who were the endorsers seeking contribution and the trustee, Jackson, have appealed.
The appellants first argue that their bill of complaint states the proper basis for relief in equity by contribution by co-endorsers. We agree, and appellees themselves concede in their brief that this is a proper remedy. We have many times held that one joint obligor may claim contribution from another such obligor for having discharged their mutual obligation. Mallis v. Faraclas, 235 Md. 109, 200 A.2d 676; Cunningham v. Cunningham, 158 Md. 372, 148 A. 444, 67 A.L.R. 1176; Brady v. Brady, 110 Md. 656, 73 A. 567. The present equity suit is the result of the failure of some of the twenty-four endorsers to...
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