Jackson v. Department of Public Welfare of State of Fla., Civ. No. 68-21.

• Decision Date: 27 July 1970
• Docket Number: Civ. No. 68-21.
• Citation: 317 F. Supp. 1151
• Parties: Francine JACKSON, individually, and on behalf of her minor children and all other parents, relatives or minor children similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. The DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WELFARE OF the STATE OF FLORIDA, Emmett S. Roberts, Director of the Department of Public Welfare for the State of Florida, Earl P. Schoenberger, Chairman of the Florida State Welfare Board, and their employees, agents and successors in office.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Middle District of Florida

317 F. Supp. 1151

Francine JACKSON, individually, and on behalf of her minor children and all other parents, relatives or minor children similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. The DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WELFARE OF the STATE OF FLORIDA, Emmett S. Roberts, Director of the Department of Public Welfare for the State of Florida, Earl P. Schoenberger, Chairman of the Florida State Welfare Board, and their employees, agents and successors in office.

Civ. No. 68-21.

United States District Court, M. D. Florida, Ft. Myers Division.

July 27, 1970.

T. Michael Foster, Gerald S. Joseph Cassidy, Michael Kantor, So. Florida Migrant Legal Service, Ft. Myers, Fla., Alfred Feinberg, Legal Services Program, Inc., Miami, Fla., for plaintiffs.

Earl Faircloth, Atty. Gen., Michael Schwartz, Asst. Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, Fla., S. Strome Maxwell, Dept. Atty., State Dept. of Public Welfare, Jacksonville, Fla., for defendants.

Before SIMPSON, Circuit Judge, LIEB, Chief District Judge and KRENTZMAN, District Judge.

OPINION

KRENTZMAN, District Judge.

JURISDICTION

This is a class action authorized by Rule 23(b) (2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The class which plaintiff represents is all persons similarly situated who are needy parents of dependent children and their needy dependent children who are eligible for Aid to Families with Dependent Children (hereafter referred to as AFDC).

Federal jurisdiction is predicated upon the provisions of 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 1331, 1343(3), and 1343(4). This is an action authorized by 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 2201 and 2202, and 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 1983 and 1988.

The plaintiff seeks injunctive and declaratory relief challenging regulations promulgated and enforced by the defendants and their employees, agents and successors in office.¹ The State action is contested on the basis of alleged violations of both the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States and the Federal Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C.A. § 301 et seq. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C.A. § 2284 this 3-Judge Court has been convened.

The Court has heard the arguments of counsel and considered the memoranda, exhibits, and evidence received in this cause.

PRELIMINARY DETERMINATIONS

I

The State of Florida has been and is currently providing public assistance to needy persons in participation with the Federal Government in programs established under the provisions of the Social Security Act. The State's plan for categorical assistance programs has been approved by the Department of Health, Education and Welfare and federal funds are currently being supplied.

Basically, the Court's attention is called to four public assistance programs; Aid to the Aged, Aid to the Blind, Aid to the Disabled (cumulatively hereinafter referred to as non-AFDC), and Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC). The plaintiff seeks to enjoin and declare unlawful the State's practice of computing grants distributed to AFDC recipients in a manner different from the method employed by the State to compute grants for non-AFDC programs.

In determining the amount of assistance to be distributed to a particular eligible recipient a set procedure is employed in all of the programs. The computations lead to an ultimate determination of budgetary need. The actual amount of payment is then based on this figure.

In all of the programs budgetary need is determined by the sum of the standard allowances for basic requirements taken together with the actual shelter expense of the recipient. (A maximum established shelter expense figure is used which varies according to family size.) The sum of the recipient's total needs is then balanced against the income received from sources other than the grant. The difference between the total budgeted need and this income is referred to as the budgetary deficit or unmet budgetary need.

The payment to non-AFDC recipients is equal to 100% of unmet budgetary need up to and including $75.00, the maximum grant allowed in these programs. The payment distributed in the AFDC program is based on a percentage of unmet budgetary need.

Prior to July 1968 the grant paid to AFDC recipients equalled 10% of unmet budgetary need, up to a maximum of $85.00. On July 1, 1968, the maximum provision with regard to AFDC payments was removed. Between July 1, 1968 and December 31, 1968, AFDC recipients received a grant of 65% of unmet budgetary need, which was decreased to 57% between January 1, 1969 and January 31, 1969, and raised to 60% (the present figure) on February 1, 1969. During this period no change was made in the level of benefits paid to non-AFDC recipients.

At the present time an AFDC recipient with less than $125.00 of unmet budgetary need receives less than a non-AFDC recipient in an identical economic situation. For example:

                Unmet                     Non-AFDC payment
                Budgetary  AFDC payment   (100% of need up    Non-AFDC
                Need       (60% of need)  to $75.00)          % of need
                -------------------------------------------------------
                $ 50.00      $30.00           $50.00            100%
                $ 60.00      $36.00           $60.00            100%
                $ 80.00      $48.00           $75.00             94%
                $100.00      $60.00           $75.00             75%
                $125.00      $75.00           $75.00             60%
                

In opposition to the plaintiff's claim of disparity in treatment, defendants contend that certain AFDC recipients are actually benefited by the present 60% method of computing payment. It is submitted that where unmet budgetary need exceeds $125.00 AFDC recipients are eligible for grants greater in amount than the $75.00 maximum payment allowed for non-AFDC claimants. It is argued that in some cases where the need is greater the current percentage method affords larger grants than were allowable prior to its adoption.² The number of cases where the present method results in an increased payment, however, must indeed be slight; the express purpose in the change, i. e., to avoid financial catastrophe in view of increasing caseloads and the failure to receive the full appropriations requested from the State Legislature, would obviously be disastrously frustrated if a substantial portion of the recipients would be entitled to increases.

II

In the interim between final hearing and preparation of the opinion in this cause the Court requested that further information be supplied by the parties touching particularly on whether any material developments have occurred with respect to the issues here. This additional information has been received and after consideration the Court has determined:

1. The State of Florida still maintains the four categorical public assistance programs previously mentioned. The methods employed for computing the grants for recipients in the respective programs has remained unchanged; AFDC recipients continue to receive grants determined by the application of the percentage standard to unmet budgetary need while non-AFDC grants are distributed without regard to percentage computations.

2. While previously there was some fear that the AFDC grants would be further reduced, additional appropriations were obtained from the State Legislature in December 1969. At the present time AFDC grants continue to be determined on the basis of 60% of unmet budgetary need.

3. After July 1, 1969, the State of Florida was advised by HEW that the State's AFDC plan was not in compliance with Section 402(a) (23) of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C.A. § 602 (a) (23), which requires the states to determine needs on an adjusted basis so as to reflect changes in living costs. Florida's plan was subsequently revised, however, and HEW has considered the state to be in compliance since December 17, 1969.

THE ISSUES PRESENTED

The plaintiff contends:

(A) The different methods of computing the AFDC grant and the non-AFDC grant are impermissibly violative of the Federal Social Security Act and the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States in that they do not provide equal protection of the laws to welfare recipients who are similarly situated.

(B) The reduction in AFDC grants without a similar or corresponding reduction in non-AFDC grants is violative of Section 402(a) (23) of the Social Security Act.

(C) The aforementioned reduction in AFDC grants without a similar or corresponding reduction in non-AFDC grants constitutes a violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

Counsel for the parties in this cause have been most diligent in providing the Court with excellent arguments and memoranda for its consideration. In addition to the assistance of counsel, the Court also now has the benefit of several valuable decisions which have been published following the final hearing in this matter.

THE MERITS

I

We deal first with plaintiff's contention that the State of Florida's method of determining AFDC payments in a manner significantly different from that in which non-AFDC payments are determined is violative of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Plaintiff asserts that the AFDC programs and the non-AFDC programs are inseparably interconnected, with a common foundation or primary purpose of supplying public assistance to those in need. On the basis of this proposition plaintiff argues that the methods employed for computing grants must be uniformly applied in each of the four federal categorical assistance programs.

"The very essence of complainants' claims is that Florida has deprived them of the equal protection of the law in that there is no relevant constitutional distinction between the need of the indigent aged, the need of the indigent blind, or the need of the indigent disabled as compared with the need of the indigent child."³

This argument is most persuasive; the Court cannot deny that each of the programs is essentially concerned with the problem of need. Nevertheless, in considering the manner in which each program is to be operated the Court cannot act where reasonable differences...