Jackson v. Eddy's Li RV Ctr., Inc.

• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of New York
• Writing for the Court: WEXLER
• Citation: Jackson v. Eddy's Li RV Ctr., Inc., 845 F.Supp.2d 523 (E.D. N.Y. 2012)
• Decision Date: 24 February 2012
• Docket Number: No. CV 11–3998.,CV 11–3998.
• Parties: William D. JACKSON, Plaintiff, v. EDDY'S LI RV CENTER, INC., Winnebago Industries, Inc., Freightliner Custom Chassis Corporation, Caterpillar, Inc., Wachovia Bank, N.A., and Wells Fargo Dealer Services, Inc., Defendants.

845 F.Supp.2d 523

William D. JACKSON, Plaintiff,

v.EDDY'S LI RV CENTER, INC., Winnebago Industries, Inc., Freightliner Custom Chassis Corporation, Caterpillar, Inc., Wachovia Bank, N.A., and Wells Fargo Dealer Services, Inc., Defendants.

No. CV 11–3998.

United States District Court, E.D. New York.

Feb. 24, 2012.

Law Offices of Joseph Falbo, Jr., by: Joseph Falbo, Esq., Mineola, NY, for Plaintiff.

Litchfield Cavo LLP, by: Christopher A. McLaughlin, Esq., Tara E. Smith, Esq., New York, NY, for Defendant Eddy's RV Center, Inc.

The Rose Law Firm, by: Keith Bryan Rose, Esq., Mark W. Skanes, Esq., Albany, NY, for Defendant Winnebago Industries, Inc.

Goldberg Segalla, by: Robert Michael Cook, Esq., Sarah Fang, Esq., Princeton, NJ, for Defendant Freightliner Custom Chassis Corporation.

Hogan Lovells U.S. LLP, by: Allison J. Schoenthal, Esq., Renee Marie Garcia, Esq., New York, NY, for Defendant Wachovia Bank, NA.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

WEXLER, District Judge.

Plaintiff William D. Jackson (“Plaintiff”) commenced this action alleging a claim for breach of contract and a variety of warranty claims arising from his ownership of a motor home. The case was brought in the State Court of the State of New York, County of Suffolk and was thereafter removed here. Named as Defendants are Eddy's LI RV Center, Inc. (“Eddy's”), Winnebago Industries, Inc. (“Winnebago”), Freightliner Custom Chassis Corporation (“Freightliner”), Wachovia Bank, N.A. (“Wachovia”) and Wells Fargo Dealer Services, Inc. (“Wells Fargo”).¹ Presently before the court are Defendants' motions, pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, to dismiss the complaint.

BACKGROUND

I. Factual Background

The facts set forth below are drawn from the allegations of the complaint, as well as documents properly before the court.

A. The Parties and the Purchase of the Motor Home

Plaintiff purchased a 2005 Itasca Meridian Motor Home (the “Motor Home”) on October 27, 2005, from Defendant Eddy's. Plaintiff took delivery of the Motor Home shortly thereafter on November 18, 2005, Defendant Winnebago is the manufacturer of the Motor Home, and Freightliner manufactured the chassis contained therein.

The purchase price of the Motor Home was $162,508.75. Plaintiff made a down payment of $10,000 and the remainder was financed through Defendant Wachovia. The loan was thereafter serviced by Defendant Wells Fargo. The court refers hereinafter to Wachovia and Wells Fargo collectively as the “Banks.” The loan that Plaintiff took out on the Motor Home provided for monthly payments of $1,088 to be paid over a period of twenty-four months. Plaintiff paid all amounts required under the loan until approximately August of 2010, when he ceased making payments.

B. Problems Alleged With the Motor Home

Plaintiff alleges that since delivery, the Motor Home has been “replete with defects, structurally and mechanically.” The defects are alleged to have been “so severe” as to have made it “unsafe for use.” Plaintiff states that the Motor Home was returned to Eddy's over 50 times for repair and that it was out of service for approximately twenty-four months. It is stated that all efforts to repair the Motor Home were unsuccessful.

C. The Written Agreements

Plaintiff asserts that warranties were issued by all Defendants. The court details here the written agreements that have been submitted by the parties and that are properly before the court in the context of this motion. Among those documents are written warranties provided by Winnebago and Freightliner. While there is no evidence of a written warranty issued by Eddy's, there is before the court a service contract that appears to have been provided by a company known as “Star RV” (the “Star RV Contract”). The copy of the Star RV Contract provided to the court is unclear and the court cannot discern the date upon which that contract commenced. To the extent that Plaintiff refers to the Star RV Contract as a service contract issued by Eddy's, the court can only assume that the contract was entered into at the time of delivery of the vehicle. While the date and parties to the Star RV Contract are unclear, it is clear that Star RV is not a party hereto, and the complaint contains no allegations with regard to that entity.

The Winnebago warranty (the “Winnebago Warranty”) is entitled “2005 New Vehicle Limited Warranty.” It is a warranty that Plaintiff received upon taking delivery of the Motor Home and is made to “the owner.” The Winnebago Warranty limits Winnebago's duties under its terms to repair or replacement of warranted parts. Specifically excluded from coverage under the Winnebago Warranty is any “undertaking, representation, or warranty” made by any dealer selling Winnebago products. Also excluded from the Winnebago Warranty is any warranty covering the vehicle's chassis. With respect to that part, however, the Winnebago Warranty states that such component may be covered by the manufacturer's separate warranty. As discussed below, that is the case here.

Freightliner, the manufacturer of the chassis contained in the Motor Home extends a written warranty to owners (the “Freightliner Warranty”). Like the Winnebago Warranty, the Freightliner Warranty was delivered to Plaintiff upon taking possession of the Motor Home. The Freightliner Warranty for the basic chassis covers a warranty period of two years or 24,000 miles. Again, like the Winnebago Warranty, the Freightliner Warranty is a limited “repair or replacement” warranty. Further, it is stated to be expressly in lieu of “all other warranties of any kind whether written, oral or implied, including, but not limited to any warranty of merchantability or fitness for a particular purpose.”

There is no “warranty” agreement to which the Banks are parties. The only document before the court that relates to the Banks is the financing agreement entered into between Plaintiff and Wachovia (the “Financing Agreement”). Wells Fargo is not a party to that agreement. The Financing Agreement contains no warranty information with respect to the condition of the Motor Home.

II. The Causes of Action Alleged and Prior Proceedings

Plaintiff's complaint contains four causes of action. Plaintiff makes no attempt to separate the Defendants with respect to their liability on any particular cause of action. Instead, it is alleged that all Defendants are liable on each and every claim alleged.

The first cause of action is for breach of contract and breach of express warranty. Plaintiff's second and third causes of action set forth claims of breach of implied warranties. Those claims assert, respectively: (1) breach of the implied warranty of merchantability and (2) breach of the implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose. The fourth cause of action is alleged to be a claim for rescission. Reading the complaint liberally, the court construes this cause of action as seeking the remedy of rescission of the contract of sale for the Motor Home as well as rescission of the Financing Agreement.

As noted, this action was commenced in New York State Court. The complaint is dated November 15, 2010, but was not filed in state court until January 19, 2011. The case was removed when motion papers filed in opposition to motions to dismiss interposed in state court characterized Plaintiff's claims as being made pursuant not only to state law, but also under the Federal Magnuson Moss Warranty Act. Upon the making of the federal claim, Defendants timely removed the matter to this court. After a conference before this court held shortly after removal, Plaintiff made clear that he did not renounce any federal claim and the matter therefore remained before this court. Thereafter, Defendants interposed the present motions to dismiss, previously made in the state court.

III. The Motions to Dismiss

Defendants seek dismissal of all causes of action. All Defendants argue that each of Plaintiff's causes of action are barred by the statute of limitations, which accrued upon delivery of the Motor Home. Winnebago, Freightliner, and the Banks argue that they cannot be liable for breach of the contract of sale for the Motor Home, or any contract entered into with Eddy's, in any event, since they were not parties thereto. These Defendants argue similarly that lack of contractual privity with respect to the sale from Eddy's to Plaintiff precludes any claims asserting breach of implied warranties.

As to explicit warranties issued by Winnebago and Freightliner, these companies note that their warranties do not extend to future performance and specifically exclude any implied warranties. The Banks, in addition to arguing that the statute of limitations has run, and their lack of privity on the contract of sale, also note that only Wachovia, and not Wells Fargo, is in privity of contract with Plaintiff with respect to the financing agreement. As to that agreement, Wachovia states that it includes no warranties as to performance of the Motor Home. Wachovia further asserts that it performed fully under the financing agreement when it extended the loan to Plaintiff, and that it is Plaintiff who is in breach thereof for failing to make full payment. Wells Fargo notes that it is even more remote in its relationship with Plaintiff since it was responsible only for serving of the loan, and entered into no agreement whatever with Plaintiff. After outlining relevant legal principles, the court will turn to the merits of the motions.

DISCUSSION

I. Standards on Motion to Dismiss

In Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007), the Supreme Court rejected the “oft-quoted” standard set forth in Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 78 S.Ct. 99, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957), that a complaint should not be dismissed, “unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.” Id. at 45–46, 78 S.Ct. 99. The court discarded the “no set of...