Jackson v. Enola Ginning Co.

• Court: South Carolina Supreme Court
• Writing for the Court: BLEASE, J.
• Citation: Jackson v. Enola Ginning Co., 139 S.C. 513, 138 S.E. 289 (S.C. 1927)
• Decision Date: 26 May 1927
• Docket Number: 12211.
• Parties: JACKSON v. ENOLA GINNING CO.

138 S.E. 289

139 S.C. 513

JACKSON v. ENOLA GINNING CO.

No. 12211.

Supreme Court of South Carolina

May 26, 1927

Appeal from Common Pleas Circuit Court of Spartanburg County; C. C Featherstone, Judge.

Action by R. C. Jackson against the Enola Ginning Company. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendant appeals. Affirmed.

Brown & Boyd, of Spartanburg, for appellant.

Nicholls Wyche & Byrnes, of Spartanburg, for respondent.

BLEASE J.

In the trial of a tort action in the court of common pleas for Spartanburg county before Hon. C. C. Featherstone, circuit judge, the plaintiff respondent recovered against the defendant appellant a verdict of $2,000.

In the appeal to this court, there is but one exception. In the course of his argument to the jury, Mr. Nicholls, one of the attorneys for the plaintiff, used this language:

"How much has this man been damaged by having one of his hands cut off, for that is about what it amounts to? If you would cut off one of my hands, you would no stop me from making a living or interfere materially with my making a living, but it is different with him. He makes his living with his hands. I make mine with my brain. If you should cut off one of my hands I would get pay for it; the insurance company would pay me, because I carry accident insurance. How much are you going to give this man for the loss of these three fingers from his hand?"

There was no objection on the part of the defendant at the time to the language used by the counsel for the plaintiff.

The matter was brought to the attention of the trial judge some days after the trial by motion on the part of the defendant for a new trial. Judge Featherstone refused this motion.

The appellant contends that a new trial should have been granted because of the argument of plaintiff's attorney. It is insisted that the argument advanced by the counsel had respect to accident insurance, and that the same was within the prohibition of the law against inserting into the trial of tort cases and into the jury's consideration the matter of liability or casualty insurance. The cases of Horsford v. Glass Co., 92 S.C. 236, 75 S.E. 533 Burgess v. Germany-Roy-Brown Co., 120 S.C. 285, 113 S.E. 118, Duke v. Parker, 125 S.C. 442, 118 S.E 802, Brown v. Walker Lumber Co., 128 S.C. 161, 122 S.E. 670, Hill v. Southern R. Co., 131 S.C. 159, 126 S.E. 642, and Aldridge v. Watts Mill, 131 S.C. 222, 127 S.E. 215, are relied upon by appellant's attorneys as authority for their position.

In the Horsford case, there was some effort on the part of plaintiff's counsel to show by testimony that the defendant carried indemnity insurance. There was also reference to such insurance in the argument of plaintiff's counsel. There was objection to the testimony and to the argument, all made in proper time. On appeal to this court, it was held that a new trial should be granted because of the conduct of counsel in the matter of calling attention to the jury of the indemnity insurance. The other cases cited by appellant sustain, and we think properly, the principle announced in the Horsford decision.

We do not think, however, any of these cases are controlling here. There was no reference to liability insurance in the testimony in this cause, so far as the record before us shows. There was no objection on...