Jackson v. Fedex Corporate Services, Inc.

• Decision Date: 06 March 2008
• Docket Number: No. 06-5844.,06-5844.
• Citation: 518 F.3d 388
• Parties: Willie J. JACKSON, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. FEDEX CORPORATE SERVICES, INC. and Federal Express Corporation, Inc., Defendants-Appellees.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Sixth Circuit

518 F.3d 388

Willie J. JACKSON, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. FEDEX CORPORATE SERVICES, INC. and Federal Express Corporation, Inc., Defendants-Appellees.

No. 06-5844.

United States Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit.

Argued: July 19, 2007.

Decided and Filed: March 6, 2008.

ARGUED:

James Edward King, Jr., Eskins King & Sevier, Memphis, Tennessee, for Appellant. Karen Vaughan McManus, FedEx Corporation, Memphis, Tennessee, for Appellees.

ON BRIEF:

James Edward King, Jr., Bradley W. Eskins, Eskins King & Sevier, Memphis, Tennessee, for Appellant. Karen Vaughan McManus, Fedex Corporation, Memphis, Tennessee, for Appellees.

Before: MARTIN and ROGERS, Circuit Judges; HOOD, District Judge.^*

HOOD, D.J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which MARTIN, J., joined. ROGERS, J. (p. 397), delivered a separate dissenting opinion.

OPINION

DENISE PAGE HOOD, District Judge.

Appellant Willie J. Jackson ("Jackson") filed a complaint against FedEx Corporate Services, Inc. and Federal Express Corporation (collectively "FedEx") alleging he was discriminated against based on his race in violation of The Civil Rights Act of 1991, 42 U.S.C. § 1981 as amended ("Section 1981"), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et. seq. ("Title VII") and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA"), 29 U.S.C. 621 et. seq. The district court dismissed Jackson's ADEA claim and Jackson does not appeal that decision. The district court denied FedEx's Motion for Summary Judgment with respect to Jackson's claims under Section 1981 and Title VII. Following the close of Jackson's evidence, the district court granted FedEx's motion, pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 50, to dismiss Jackson's case. For the reasons set forth below, the district court's order is reversed and the matter remanded for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion.

I. BACKGROUND

Jackson, an African-American, began his employment with FedEx in 1979 as a financial analyst. Prior to his employment at FedEx, Jackson attended Florida A & M University and received a Masters of Business Administration in Finance from the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. Jackson also worked as a computer programmer for IBM Corporation prior to becoming an active duty officer in the Army. Jackson served in the Military Intelligence Branch of the Army Security Agency and obtained the rank of Captain. While working for FedEx, Jackson took computer programming courses, including FORTRAN, C, and COBOL, at a community college in Memphis, Tennessee. Jackson also participated in training courses at FedEx in the following areas: Basic Java Programming; TCP/IP; Basic Administration HP-UX Systems Administration; PVCS Version Manager System; C Programming; and Basic C++ Programming.

Jackson held the title of Technical Advisor in the Information Technology ("IT") Department for fifteen years and in approximately 1995 he began working under the supervision of Miley Ainsworth in the IT Department. As a Technical Advisor, Jackson primarily functioned as a system administrator, installing, upgrading and testing computer programs purchased by FedEx to operate on its computer operating systems and servers.

In 1999, Jackson was transferred to a software application development group under the direction of Charles Sherwood. In 2000, in part resulting from a centralization of departments within FedEx, Jackson accepted FedEx Services' offer of employment and as of June 1, 2000, his job title changed to Senior Technical Analyst. In the summer of 2000, Sherwood's group was assigned the PowerPad project, which involved the design and development of software for a new handheld device for use by FedEx couriers. The six other employees that comprised Sherwood's workgroup, all of whom are Caucasian, were: Virginia White, Mary Brown, Glen Parham, Cathy Story and Steve Morrison. All of the individuals in Sherwood's workgroup held the title of Senior Technical Analyst. White, Brown and Parham did not have a Bachelor's degree and none of the employees other than Jackson held a master's degree. Brown functioned as a business analyst and the other five employees in Jackson's workgroup were programmers.

Barbara Gail Bermel, Human Resources manager of FedEx Services, testified that beginning in August of 2000, FedEx Services conducted a workforce adjustment of its IT Department under the FedEx Services IT Resource Management Plan. As part of the adjustment, Sherwood was asked to complete Employee Contribution Assessment ("ECA") packets to assess employees under his supervision. The ECA is a tool to evaluate the performance and contribution of each employee toward the short — and long-term goals of the workgroup.¹ The four general categories in the ECA are: (1) contribution to short-term tasks and objectives; (2) contribution to long-term goals and strategies; (3) contribution to leadership, cooperation and teamwork; and (4) performance review.

Jackson received a one, which is the lowest possible score, in each of the first three categories of the ECA, and all the other employees in Sherwood's workgroup received a four, the highest possible score, in each of the first three categories.² At trial, Sherwood testified that he gave Jackson a one in each category because his skills as a Systems Administrator were no longer needed for the PowerPad project, which Sherwood described as the short — and long-term goals of the workgroup.

In September of 2000, FedEx employees with the lowest ECA scores were selected for termination, effective November 30, 2000, if the employee did not secure another position within FedEx or accept the offer of severance pay and outplacement assistance. Jackson did not accept the severance offer, nor did he apply for any open positions at FedEx. Jackson's employment with FedEx terminated on November 30, 2000.

Following the close of Jackson's case-in-chief, FedEx brought a motion to dismiss Jackson's case pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 50, which the district court granted, finding that there were no similarly situated individuals with whom Jackson could be compared for purposes of establishing a prima facie case of race discrimination. Ruling from the bench, the district court judge stated,

to be similarly situated ... with whom the Plaintiff seeks to compare treatment must have the same supervisor, be subject to the same standards, having engaged in similar conduct without differentials or mitigation ... It means these individuals have to have similar background, education, experience, job responsibilities, and performance. It means that the job responsibilities must require the same skills and abilities. And the job responsibilities are equal and interchangeable. That's my understanding of the state of the law in this Circuit. That's a high standard as to these individuals.

And I want to focus because the mandate is that there be general similarities. I want to focus on experience and job experience ... There are differences in education of these individuals. Some were trained more specifically for computer work. Some weren't. But, let's look past their individual situations, and focus on the experience and job responsibilities.

(J.A. 926-27).

The district court concluded that Story, White, Griffin and Morrison were not similarly situated to Jackson, as they all functioned as programmers and their job responsibilities did not require the same skills or abilities as Jackson's. The district judge found that Brown was the only employee in Jackson's workgroup with whom he could possibly be similarly situated. Brown functioned as a business analyst and her principal duty was acting as a liaison between the business side of the operations and the employees who developed programming codes. Brown never graduated from college, but took some college courses. The district judge stated that Brown had substantial familiarity with business at FedEx, as she had worked in accounting, sales revenue, shipping and "architectural". (J.A. 931). Jackson had no experience as a business analyst and had not been a programmer for a number of years. The district court then found that "a reasonable jury would not or could not find that there was a legally, sufficient, evidentiary basis to conclude that Ms. Brown and Mr. Jackson were similarly situated for purposes of this case." (J.A. 931). Judgment in favor of FedEx was entered as a matter of law.

II. ANALYSIS

A. Standard of Review

The court reviews de novo the district court's grant of judgment as a matter of law under Fed.R.Civ.P. 50(a). Scotts Co. v. Central Garden & Pet Co., 403 F.3d 781, 788 (6th Cir.2005) (citing Monette v. AM-7-7 Baking Co., 929 F.2d 276, 280 (6th Cir.1991)). In entertaining a motion for judgment as a matter of law, the court is to review all evidence and draw all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, without making credibility determinations or weighing the evidence. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 150-51, 120 S.Ct. 2097, 147 L.Ed.2d 105 (2000).

Judgment as a matter of law pursuant to Rule 50(a) is appropriate when "a party has been fully heard on an issue and there is no legally sufficient evidentiary basis for a reasonable jury to find for that party on that issue." Fed.R.Civ.P. 50(a)(1). "In other words, the decision to grant judgment as a matter of law or to take the case away from the jury is appropriate `whenever there is a complete absence of pleading or proof on an issue material to the cause of action or when no disputed issues of fact exist such that reasonable minds would not differ.'" Jackson v. Quanex Corp., 191 F.3d 647, 657 (6th Cir.1999) (quoting Sawchik v. E.I. DuPont Denemours & Co., 783 F.2d 635, 636 (6th Cir. 1986)).

B. "Similarly Situated" Standard

Jackson asserts that in ruling on FedEx's Rule 50 Motion, the district court applied an overly narrow construction of the similarly situated standard. Jackson argues that the district court applied an...