Jackson v. Fitzgerald
| Decision Date | 29 November 1954 |
| Docket Number | 260,Nos. 259,s. 259 |
| Citation | 67 N.W.2d 471,341 Mich. 55 |
| Parties | Nicholas T. JACKSON and Transcontinental Insurance Company, Petitioners, v. Neal E. FITZGERALD, Wayne Circuit Judge, Defendant. Rose JACKSON, Petitioner, v. Neal E. FITZGERALD, Wayne Circuit Judge, Defendant. * Motion |
| Court | Michigan Supreme Court |
Markle, Markle & Eubank, Detroit, for Nicholas Jackson, plaintiff-petitioner.
James S. Shields, A. Albert Bonczak, Detroit, for defendant.
Before the Entire Bench.
On January 12, 1948, Nicholas T. Jackson and his wife Rose Jackson, while in a car owned by Mr. Jackson, met with an accident through the alleged negligence of the city of Detroit Department of Street Railways. The Transcontinental Insurance Company, a New York corporation, paid for the damages to the car, less $25, or $410.34. Two suits were simultaneously brought against the city, one by Mrs. Jackson, and the other by Mr. Jackson in which the insurance company, as assignee pro tanto and subrogee, was joined as a party plaintiff. The declarations in the two cases were very similar. Mrs. Jackson claimed that she was very seriously and permanently injured, while Mr. Jackson claims compensation for injuries to himself, medical expenses, loss of his wife's services, and damage to his car. The same firm of attorneys through Mr. Maples represented all plaintiffs in the respective suits, and the cases were handled as if they were one. The city admitted its liability but questioned the amount of damages. The cases were brought to trial on May 7, 1951, before the Honorable Guy Miller, Wayne County Circuit Judge, and a jury duly impaneled. The cases were tried together. Mr. Jackson did not claim any serious long lasting injuries to himself but Mrs. Jackson asserted that she was seriously and permanently injured. Her testimony was largely subjective, being that she had suffered a brain or nerve injury and that she constantly had violent headaches and pains. On the second day of the trial it developed that Mrs. Jackson's physician, a Doctor Johnson, who had been duly subpoenaed, disregarded the subpoena and left on a hunting trip for a month. Mr. Maples, attorney for the plaintiffs, was in a quandary as he feared that without the testimony of Dr. Johnson he might have considerable difficulty in convincing the jury by competent evidence of the alleged serious condition of Mrs. Jackson. Then he and the attorney for the city discussed settlement and the figure of $2,500 for both cases was agreed upon. This was apparently agreeable to Mr. Jackson who was then in court. Mr. Maples called up Mrs. Jackson, who was unable to be in court that day, and she told him that the amount was inadequate; whereupon Mr. Jackson took the telephone and after a conversation with his wife that lasted about five minutes, stated to Mr. Maples: 'Well, I guess we cannot do anything else but settle.' Thereupon he and Mr. Maples went into the courtroom and announced to Judge Miller that they had settled the cases and the judge thereupon dismissed the jury and the cases were regarded as settled. The calendar entry in each case states:
After a short delay releases were prepared and sent to Mr. Maples who forwarded them to the Jacksons, who have never signed them. On the day after the cases apparently had been settled Mrs. Jackson called Mr. Maples and told him that neither he nor her husband had authority to settle the case for her and that she would not be bound by the settlement. Mr. Maples told her that he did not think the judge would reopen the case; that he was disgusted with her conduct; that he would not act any further for her; and that she should get another attorney immediately; that it was a matter that demanded immediate attention. The foregoing appears in the testimony taken at the hearing of plaintiff's motion to set the case for trial, as heard on September 18, 1953, over two years and four months after the trial proceedings before Judge Miller on May 8, 1951. Mr. Maples further stated that efforts were made by Mrs. Jackson to secure other attorneys and that eventually Mr. Markle became the attorney for plaintiffs.
The motions to set the cases for trial were denied. Thereupon petitions for mandamus were filed in this court and were denied without prejudice. This was done through an abundance of caution in case there was any different proceedings or in case the settlement money was not paid. Months later in February of 1954 another motion to set the case for trial was filed and heard by Judge Neal Fitzgerald who succeeded Judge Miller in office. On May 4, 1954, Judge Fitzgerald denied the motion. Shortly thereafter the instant petition for writ of mandamus, without first obtaining leave, was filed in this court to direct Judge Fitzgerald to set the case for trial. The motion before Judge Fitzgerald was quite similar to the one that had been previously denied by Judge Miller, and the present petition for writ of mandamus is similar to that previously denied without prejudice by this court. Inasmuch as mandamus proceedings were based upon the court records, exemplification of the record together with a transcript of the testimony signed by the official court stenographer were filed for reference with this court.
It should be said at the outset that Mr. Maples conducted the case very ably and it was only after Mr. Jackson authorized the settlement and appeared with him that he stated the cases had been settled. While Mr. Jackson later stated in an affidavit that he did not consent to the settlement, the judge gave no credence to this statement.
The attorney who has the conduct of a law suit is presumed to have authority to act on his client's behalf. See Eggleston v. Boardman, 37 Mich. 14, 20, where the court said:
'And where the client stands by and permits work to be done, or an argument to be made on his behalf * * * we think it may very fairly be assumed from his silence and acquiescence that he consented thereto.'
Therefore the attorney may agree upon a...
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In re Robert Anthony Strozewski & Amy Jean Strozewski
...Debtor. Under these circumstances, the attorney is presumed to be acting on behalf of the Debtor. See generally Jackson v. Fitzgerald, 341 Mich. 55, 67 N.W.2d 471, 472 (1954) (the “attorney who has the conduct of a law suit is presumed to have authority to act on his client's behalf”). If t......
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Rheault v. Lufthansa German Airlines
...the general substantive rule is that an attorney is presumed to have authority to act on his client's behalf. Jackson v. Wayne Circuit Judge, 341 Mich. 55, 67 N.W.2d 471 (1954). However, an attorney must have specific authority from the client to settle a case. Henderson v. Great Atlantic &......
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Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. v. Buckallew, Docket No. 243673.
...agreement on a showing of "mistake, fraud, or unconscionable advantage taken by one party over the other." Jackson v. Wayne Circuit Judge, 341 Mich. 55, 60, 67 N.W.2d 471 (1954). See also Groulx v. Carlson, 176 Mich.App. 484, 489, 440 N.W.2d 644 (1989), citing Pedder v. Kalish, 26 Mich.App.......
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Capital Dredge and Dock Corp. v. City of Detroit, 84-1173
...[an] "attorney who has the conduct of a lawsuit is presumed to have authority to act in his client's behalf." Jackson v. Wayne Circuit Judge, 341 Mich. 55, 59, 67 N.W.2d 471 (1954). This general rule, however, has not been extended to permit an attorney to compromise a client's claim absent......