Jackson v. Goodman

• Decision Date: 27 May 1976
• Docket Number: Docket No. 23669
• Citation: 69 Mich.App. 225,244 N.W.2d 423
• Parties: Robert W. JACKSON, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Albert J. GOODMAN, Sam H. Goodman, Hyman Goodman, f/d/b/a St. Regis Hotel Company, Defendants-Appellees. 69 Mich.App. 225, 244 N.W.2d 423
• Court: Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US

Page 423

244 N.W.2d 423

Robert W. JACKSON, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Albert J. GOODMAN, Sam H. Goodman, Hyman Goodman, f/d/b/a

St. Regis Hotel Company, Defendants-Appellees.

Docket No. 23669.

69 Mich.App. 225, 244 N.W.2d 423

Court of Appeals of Michigan.

May 27, 1976.

Released for Publication Aug. 11, 1976.

[69 MICHAPP 228] Craig & Farber, by Gene A. Farber, Detroit, for plaintiff-appellant.

Henry A. Bornstein, Southfield, for defendants-appellees.

Before D. E. HOLBROOK, Jr., P.J., and McGREGOR and KAUFMAN, JJ.

KAUFMAN, Judge.

The facts are as stated by the dissent. We find that the trial court improperly granted a judgment notwithstanding the verdict because there was sufficient evidence to present jury questions concerning the existence of a reward ¹ and the presence of either inherent authority or ratification.

The law governing rewards and the rules defining implied authority are straightforward. It is difficult, however, to apply the precedent governing both areas to the same, unique set of facts. In general, any individual with the authority to make a contract may offer a reward and be bound by that offer. 67 Am.Jur.2d, Rewards, § 7, p. 6. The authority to contract may be inferred from the authority to manage a business. Such authority is limited to making 'contracts which are incidental to such business, are usually made in it, or are reasonably necessary in conducting it'. Restatement of the Law, Agency 2d, § 73(a), p. 183. One of the factors to be considered in determining the extent of authority is the custom of similar businesses at the same time and place. See 1 Restatement of the Law, Agency 2d, § 34(b), p. 118. See also Leo Austrian & Co. v. Springer, 94 Mich. 343, [69 MICHAPP 229] 54 N.W. 50 (1892), Kopprasch v. New York Indemnity Co., 250 Mich. 491, 230 N.W. 909 (1930).

Other courts have presumed authority in the president of a bank to offer, on behalf of the bank, a reward for information leading to the arrest of a defaulting teller, The Bank of Minneapolis v. Griffin, 168 Ill. 314, 48 N.E. 154 (1897). Similarly the authority to offer a reward for the arrest of persons maliciously destroying railroad tracks has been held to be within the implied authority of the railroad superintendent. Central Railroad and Banking Co. v. Cheatham, 85 Ala. 292, 4 So. 828 (1888).

The conflict resulting from an application of agency principles to the instant case is well illustrated by the divergence between our view and that of the dissent. The basic area of disagreement involves a question of perspective. The dissent views the question of implied authority from the perspective of the business. We view this question from the perspective of the plaintiff, especially that concerning the reasonableness of his reliance on the newspaper article.

Normally, the application of rules concerning usual course of business results in an equitable outcome in line with the parties' expectations, advancement of commercial intercourse and considerations of fundamental fairness. Where the specific business exhibits a general course of behavior relative to the questioned acts, the inquiry generally will give greater focus to the specific concern than to the course of conduct in similar businesses. Where, as here, the transaction is one unusual to the specific business affected, the emphasis must differ. In such a case, significant emphasis must be placed on the course of business conduct in the community at large concerning [69 MICHAPP 230] rewards and on whether the recipient party 'reasonably believes that the agent is authorized to (act) * * * and has no notice that he is not so authorized'. 1 Restatement of the Law, Agency 2d, § 161, p. 378. A jury, as the repository of 'community sense', is in a unique position to decide questions of usual course of conduct and reasonable reliance in such unusual cases.

It has long been the policy of this jurisdiction that

'(w)hen there is a disputed question of agency, if there is any testimony, either direct or inferential, tending to establish it, it becomes a question of fact for the jury to determine.' Miskiewicz v. Smolenski, 249 Mich. 63, 70, 227 N.W. 789, 792 (1929).

See also Kwasny v. Driessen, 42 Mich.App. 442, 202 N.W.2d 443 (1972). We, therefore, find that the question of implied agency liability was properly submitted to the jury and that the jury verdict should not have been disturbed.

We also find that there was sufficient evidence of ratification by inaction to present a jury question. The jury could have reasonably disbelieved the testimony of Albert Goodman, who claimed that he read the Detroit News but that he did not know of the reward. The jury could have reasonably held that the owner of a business would be especially attracted to news about that business in a paper which he read.

For the above reasons, we reverse the trial court and circuit court and remand this cause to the trial court for entry of judgment in conformance with the jury verdict. Costs to plaintiff. ²

[69 MICHAPP 231] McGREGOR, Judge (dissenting).

On December 27, 1966, a night clerk at the St. Regis Hotel was killed during a robbery. On December 30, in a newspaper article about the investigation, the Detroit News printed the information that the St. Regis management had posted a $1,000 reward for any information leading to the arrest and conviction of the killer. On January 1, 1967, plaintiff Jackson proceeded to the Detroit Police Department and informed them that David Gauthier had killed the night clerk. The plaintiff then testified against Gauthier at both the preliminary examination and at the trial, and Gauthier was subsequently convicted of first-degree murder. Plaintiff then attempted to recover the reward. The owners of the hotel, the defendants, declined to pay the reward and this suit ensued.

In a district court trial, held in January, 1974, the jury returned a verdict in favor of the plaintiff and awarded him $1,000. However, the trial court entered a judgment notwithstanding the verdict and dismissed the suit against the defendants. The circuit court affirmed, and plaintiff appeals to this court and is here by leave granted.

At trial, certain facts were uncontroverted. The defendants acknowledged that the plaintiff's actions had led to the arrest and conviction of the killer. Also, the defendants conceded that the plaintiff would not have acted as he did in the [69 MICHAPP 232] betrayal of Gauthier but for the notice of the reward in the Detroit News. Rather, the dispute at trial was whether the reward was actually offered, and, if such a reward was in fact offered, whether the person who made the offer had the authority to do so. It was the plaintiff's theory that the reward was offered by Frank C. Bromber, a manager of the hotel, and that the offering of the reward was within Bromber's authority. The district court, in granting the judgment notwithstanding the verdict, found that the plaintiff failed to present sufficient evidence in support of his theory to justify the jury's verdict. Plaintiff, on appeal, disputes this finding.

At the outset, we note the standard of review to be applied to a case such as the present one 'In Michigan a court reviewing a motion for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict must view all the evidence and testimony adduced at the trial in the light most favorable to the person against whom the motion was made. Savage v. Peterson Distributing Co., Inc., 379 Mich. 197, 150 N.W.2d 804 (1967); Prentkiewicz v. Karp, 375 Mich. 367, 134 N.W.2d 717 (1965); Kroll v. Katz, 374 Mich. 364, 132 N.W.2d 27 (1965); Wamser v. N. J. Westra & Sons, Inc., 9 Mich.App. 89, 155 N.W.2d 871 (1967); Brusslan v. Larsen, 6 Mich.App. 680, 150 N.W.2d 525 (1967); Johnson v. Chesapeake & O.R. Co., 6 Mich.App. 611, 150 N.W.2d 178 (1967). If, when so viewed, there is Any evidence which was competent and sufficient to support the jury's determination, said determination should not be disturbed. See Wamser, supra; Killen v. Benton, 1 Mich.App. 294, 136 N.W.2d 29 (1965).' (Emphasis added.) Taft v. J. L. Hudson Co., 37 Mich.App. 692, 698, 195 N.W.2d 296, 298 (1972).

Thus, it must be determined whether there was any evidence presented at trial which would support plaintiff's theory and thereby justify the jury's verdict.

[69 MICHAPP 233] Addressing ourselves first to the issue of whether a reward was in fact offered, we find that there was sufficient evidence presented which would justify a jury in concluding that Bromber did make such an offer.

William J. Hathaway, an assistant prosecuting attorney, testified in part as follows:

'Q. (by defense counsel) Did Mr. Bromer ever tell you that he specifically was offering a reward on behalf of the Hotel?

'A. I would have to answer that question, yes. But, I don't remember the words, or anything, because I had lots of conversations with Mr. Bromber of a passing nature when I would be in the Hotel; and, it's possible that he even said something to me down in the Prosecutor's Office--you know--about the reward, or over the telephone. * * *

'Q. How is it that you specifically came in contact with him?

'A. With Bromber?

'Q. Yes.

'A. We met at the Hotel concerning the reward.

'Q. How did you have contact with him?

'A. The only thing I know is that he mentioned it to me.

'Q. He just mentioned the reward to you?

'A. As I remember it; the more I think about it, because I don't have any notes. The more I think about it is that I remember discussing the case when he would come down to the Police Headquarters at the Prosecutor's Office. In those days, the Wayne County Prosecutor's Office was on the fifth floor of Police Headquarters.' (Emphasis added.)

Although Hathaway's entire answer was somewhat vague and contradictory, he nevertheless did state that Bromber told him that he was offering a reward on behalf of the Hotel. Consequently, there was some evidence that Bromber offered the reward[69 MICHAPP 234] and, therefore, the trial...