Jackson v. H.D. Lee Co., Inc., 15742

• Decision Date: 26 April 1989
• Docket Number: No. 15742,15742
• Citation: 772 S.W.2d 742
• Parties: Lowell JACKSON, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. H.D. LEE COMPANY, INC., and Aetna Casualty and Surety Company, Defendants-Respondents.
• Court: Missouri Court of Appeals

Page 742

772 S.W.2d 742

Lowell JACKSON, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. H.D. LEE COMPANY, INC., and Aetna Casualty and Surety Company, Defendants-Respondents.

No. 15742.

Missouri Court of Appeals,

Southern District,

Division Two.

April 26, 1989.

Motion for Rehearing or Transfer Denied

May 18, 1989.

Application to Transfer Denied Aug.1, 1989.

Glenn R. Gulick, Jr., Hershewe & Gullick, Joplin, for plaintiff-appellant.

Kelly Pool, Hendren and Andrae, Jefferson City, for defendants-respondents.

HOGAN, Judge.

This is a Workers' Compensation case. Although the claimant has presented several issues, the dispositive question tendered is whether there is substantial medical evidence that the claimant's condition is not the product of job-related stress and anxiety. The answer is "yes," and we must affirm the award of the Labor and Industrial Relations Commission denying compensation.

Lowell Jackson, the claimant, had some sort of seizure or attack resembling a stroke while he was working for the H.D. Lee Company as an industrial sewing machine mechanic. The Administrative Law Judge decided that the claim should be characterized as a claim under the Occupational Disease section of the Workers' Compensation Act [§ 287.067.1, RSMo 1986] ¹ rather than a claim that the claimant had sustained a compensable "accident" as defined by § 287.020.2. The ALJ concluded that the claimant had not contracted any occupational disease, and also concluded that the opinions of two physicians demonstrated that the claimant's condition was not in any event causally connected to his employment. The ALJ denied compensation. The claimant applied for review of the decision of the ALJ as provided by § 287.480 and 8 CSR 20-3.030. In its final award denying compensation, the Labor and Industrial Relations Commission [hereinafter the Commission] found that inasmuch as the ALJ's award included the finding that the claimant's present condition was not causally connected to his employment and such a finding, in which the Commission concurred, necessarily disposed of the claim, it was unnecessary to decide whether the ALJ had proceeded under the proper theory. We review the award of the Commission, and unless it is not supported by substantial evidence or is clearly contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence, we do not disturb it. Ham v. Sikeston Concrete Products, 735 S.W.2d 427, 428 (Mo.App.1987); Barr v. Vickers, Inc., 648 S.W.2d 577, 579 (Mo.App.1983); Malcom v. La-Z-Boy Midwest Chair Co., 618 S.W.2d 725, 726 (Mo.App.1981).

The following facts are relevant to the points tendered. Lowell Jackson was born April 11, 1936, and so was 49 years of age at the time of the ALJ's first hearing on this matter on November 27, 1985. For most of his working life, the claimant had been a sewing machine mechanic. At one time he worked for Miller Manufacturing Company; beginning in February 1981 he was employed by the H.D. Lee Company. The claimant's testimony concerning the complexity of his work was somewhat contradictory. At one point claimant testified that the machines he worked with "was just common machines, more or less; and like they have breakage or skipping or all sorts of different things." At the same time, claimant's exhibit N demonstrates that the sewing machines the claimant maintained were complex industrial sewing machines, apparently manufactured by Pfaff in Germany. Lee acquired the Pfaff machines after the claimant started working as a mechanic, but he was not sent to a training school. The "day mechanic" assisted the claimant for several days, but thereafter the claimant was "started ... on a shift."

The claimant testified and had documentary evidence which indicated that he worked extremely long hours. He found the conditions of his employment stressful. He "had problems" with the manager who worked the day shift. He believed he received a disproportionate share of the "blame" when the machines were "down." The operators of the machines were piecework operators who became upset when their machines were not operative. Sometimes the employer did not furnish enough parts for the claimant to fix the machines; on other occasions, the claimant could not obtain access to the parts the company had on hand. The claimant described his feeling of anxiety about his employment thus:

"Well, when I come in [to work] in the evening ... when I shut that big door behind me, I just felt like I was locking myself in, and I knew that--I looked over at those machines, and I knew that someone was going to start on me, and they would. They would--they wouldn't exactly just jump on me. I never had no one just jump on me, but they would pick, you know, and make sure that I understood that all the fault of any production thing was mine, you know, or made me feel that way."

On April 21, 1982, the claimant reported for work. He felt "pretty good." A machine needed repairs, and as the claimant put it, "... I seen that I was going to have to have some stuff to fix it with, or I was going to have to take off a bunch of stuff and try to raise it and heat it and straighten it up; and I just thought, oh darn...." The claimant went to the office of one of his superiors to talk about parts for the repair of the machine. The claimant told his supervisor, Prine, that he had "slight" diarrhea and was told to "take a tampax and stick it up [his] ass" and get back to work. The claimant was humiliated and angered.

Shortly thereafter, the claimant lost his memory. It is apparent and not disputed that on April 21, 1982, the claimant sustained some sort of seizure which caused him to lose his memory. The claimant was hospitalized and treated at a hospital in Lebanon. Dr. Gary M. Courter, claimant's physician, testified that the claimant suffered a cerebrovascular accident (CVA), or as the condition is commonly described, a stroke. Dr. Courter testified that the claimant was totally and permanently disabled. Such is the general background of the appeal. Other facts, as germane, will be noted in the course of the opinion.

The claimant has briefed and argued four assignments of error in this court. Points I and II tender the same issue. As stated, Points I and II are:

"Point I

The award of the Labor and Industrial Relations Commission was not supported by the favor found by the Commission, and there was insufficient competent evidence in the record to warrant the making of the award in favor of the employer, because the Commission found a lack of causal connection between the condition at claimant's employment and claimant's stroke without the Commission having first determined whether claimant's disability resulted from an accident or an occupational disease, in that the definition of causation under Chapter 287, Mo.Rev.Stat., is dependent upon whether claimant suffered an accident or an occupational disease and the evidence established the requisite causal connection if the stroke is an accident instead of an occupational disease.

Point II

The award made by the Labor and Industrial Relations Commission was not supported by the facts found by the Commission, and there was insufficient competent evidence in the record to warrant the making of the award, because the Commission erred in failing to find that claimant had suffered an injury by accident because claimant's stroke, sustained by accident, was sufficiently job related to be compensable in that the stress caused by the conditions of employment, including the lengthy hours, the change of shift, the frustration from not being properly trained on the machines he was to repair, the pressures placed on him to keep the machines in good working order under adverse working conditions, and the command by his supervisor to 'take a tampax and stick it up your ass,' was a contributing cause of the elevated blood pressure which resulted in claimant's stroke."

In the "argument" part of Point I, the claimant contends that the ALJ erred in considering the claimant's injury as an occupational disease, as defined by § 287.067.1, rather than an accident as defined by § 287.020.2. The ALJ found, among other things, that the "evidence fails to establish an accident occurred on the date of April 21, 1982, within the meaning of the Workers' Compensation definition of accident" and further found that the claimant's present condition was not causally connected to his employment as required by § 287.067.1.

Thereafter, as we have noted, the claimant sought review of the ALJ's award. In its final award denying compensation, the Commission applied the "job related" standard set out in Wolfgeher v. Wagner Cartage Service, Inc., 646 S.W.2d 781 (Mo. banc 1983), and concluded it was of no consequence whether the claimant's condition or injury was regarded as an occupational disease or accident. The Commission found, among other things, that:

"The award of the administrative law judge includes the finding that Mr. Jackson's 'present condition was not causally connected to his employment.' That finding, if supported by competent and substantial evidence, mandates a denial of compensation under either the accident or the occupational disease theory. Because we concur in this finding, it is unnecessary to decide for purposes of this award whether the administrative law judge proceeded on the proper theory."

In disposing of the contention that the claimant's injury must be considered as an "accident" rather than an "occupational disease" it is sufficient to say that we review the Commission's decision, not that of the administrative law judge, Richardson v. Falcon Products, Inc., 739 S.W.2d 596, 597 (Mo.App.1987); Swillum v. Empire Gas Transport, Inc., 698 S.W.2d 921, 923 (Mo.App.1985), and therefore we disregard any assignments of error concerning the findings of the administrative law judge. Swillum v. Empire Gas Transport, Inc., 698 S.W.2d at 923. The Commission followed the law the claimant would have this court apply, and whether the...