Jackson v. Hart

• Decision Date: 29 May 1939
• Docket Number: 35297.
• Citation: 190 So. 220,192 La. 1068
• Court: Louisiana Supreme Court
• Parties: JACKSON v. HART et al.

190 So. 220

192 La. 1068

JACKSON v. HART et al.

No. 35297.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

May 29, 1939

Rehearing Denied June 26, 1939.

Certiorari or Writ of Review, to Court of Appeal, Parish of Orleans.

Suit by Rhoda Jackson in forma pauperis against Joseph Hart and London & Lancashire Indemnity Company of America, wherein a compromise settlement was effected, and wherein Anthony Herrle, Clerk, and James Dempsey, Constable of the First City Court of New Orleans, filed rules praying that plaintiff and defendants be condemned solidarily to pay the usual fees of the clerk and the constable, and wherein judgment for the movants was entered, which judgment was on appeal to the Court of Appeal for the Parish of Orleans reversed and the rules were dismissed, 186 So. 747, whereupon movants applied for certiorari or writ of review to the Court of Appeal Parish of Orleans.

Judgment of the Court of Appeal annulled, and judgment of the First City Court of New Orleans reinstated and made the final judgment of the Supreme Court

Lewis R. Graham and Daniel Wendling, both of New Orleans, for applicant.

Miller, Bloch & Martin, of New Orleans, for respondent.

Arthur Landry, of New Orleans, for amicus curiae.

ROGERS, Justice.

Rhoda Jackson, as tenant, brought suit in the First City Court of New Orleans against Juseph Hart, as landlord, and the London & Lancashire Indemnity Company of America, his insurance carrier, to recover $298.50 as damages for personal injuries resulting from falling plaster in the leased premises. Plaintiff's suit was brought in forma pauperis, and after issue joined but before trial, it was compromised for $75.00, which amount was paid to plaintiff. As plaintiff availed herself of the provisions of Act 156 of 1912 (commonly referred to as the Pauper Act), the usual fees of the Clerk and of the Constable of the First City Court were not paid when due, nor were they paid at the time the compromise settlement was effected.

Anthony Herrle, Clerk, and James Dempsey, Constable of the First City Court of New Orleans, therefore, filed rules in that court against Rhoda Jackson, Joseph Hart, and the London & Lancashire Indemnity Company, praying that respondents be condemned solidarily to pay movers' costs. Herrle, the Clerk, claimed $16.30 as his costs, and Dempsey, the Constable, claimed $5.00 as his costs. Movers' claims were predicated on the provision in section 3 of Act 156 of 1912, providing that ‘ should any compromise be entered into contrary to this provision [the provision that no compromise shall be effected without the prior payment of costs], each party thereto shall be liable to said officers for the amount of said costs accrued at the time of said compromise.’ (Brackets ours.)

Rhoda Jackson made no appearance in answer to the rules, but Joseph Hart and the London & Lancashire Indemnity Company appeared and challenged the constitutionality of the statutory provision on which the claims of the movers are based.

The judgment of the First City Court was in favor of the plaintiffs in rule as prayed for. From this judgment Joseph Hart and his insurance carrier appealed to the Court of Appeal for the Parish of Orleans, which court maintained that plea of unconstitutionality, annulled the judgment, and dismissed the rules. 186 So. 747. The case is now before us on a writ of review.

Defendants in rule pleaded that the part of section 3 of Act 156 of 1912, which makes litigants compromising with pauper litigants liable for the accrued costs, is unconstitutional in that the body of the act is broader than its title. Defendants in rule contend that the title of the act is insufficient to convey notice of the legislative intention to make a party litigant liable for the costs incurred by another party litigant whose claim is compromised. The title of the act reads as follows:

‘An Act To authorize litigants who are unable to pay costs to litigate as plaintiff, defendant, or intervenor, in the courts of this State without the previous or current payment of costs and without giving a bond for costs, and fixing the extent, terms, conditions and manner of exercising the right herein granted.’

The provision of the act under attack has already been set forth herein.

Section 16, Article 3 of the Constitution of 1921 provides that: ‘ Every law enacted by the Legislature shall embrace but one object, and shall have a title indicative of such object.’ Under corresponding sections in preceding constitutions, it was required that the object of the law be ‘ expressed’ in its title. The effect of the changing of the wording of the constitutional provision was to relax the previous requirement that the statute must ‘ express' its object, so now all that is required is that the title of the statute should be ‘ indicative’ of its object. The constitutional provision must be construed broadly rather than narrowly with a view of effectuating, not of frustrating, the legislative purpose. This is the rule prevailing everywhere for the construction of such a constitutional provision. In State v. Martin, La.Sup., 189 So. 109, 110, recently decided, this Court quoted and approved the statement of the prevailing rule announced in Corpus Juris, volume 59, page 809, viz.: ‘ In determining the sufficiency of the title of a statute, under a constitutional provision requiring the subject of an act to be expressed in its title, its language should be reasonably and liberally interpreted, in the light of the general legislative purpose * * * and should not be technically or critically construed, nor should it be held insufficient unless the question is free from doubt.’ In the Martin case, the Court also referred to and reaffirmed the well settled rule of this State that, whatever is germane and incidental to the purpose may be set out in the title, but if the body of the act embraces cognate matter not strictly within the text of the title, such matter will, nevertheless, be covered by the title. Since the means adopted to carry out a law is not an object of the law, such means need not be mentioned in the title. Marr's Crim.Juris., vol. I, pp. 11, 12.

In the Martin case, this Court reversed a ruling of the district court sustaining a motion in arrest of judgment and ordered the discharge of the defendant who was prosecuted for the unlawful possession of a narcotic drug. The motion in arrest was based on the alleged unconstitutionality of that part of section 2 of Act 14 of the Second Extra Session of 1934, making it unlawful to possess a narcotic drug except as authorized in the act, on the ground that the possession of narcotics is not included nor referred to in the title of the statute. After reviewing the law governing the question, the Court reached the conclusion that the alleged unconstitutional portion of the statute was embraced and by encessary implication was indicated in the title of the act, and for that reason the Court overruled the motion in arrest.

Another case recently decided by this Court, upholding the rule of liberal construction in a case such as this, is W. M. Barret, Inc., v. First National Bank, 191 La. 945, 186 So. 741. In that case the Court maintained the constitutionality of Act 163 of 1934 limiting the time within which actions may be brought to enforce the liability of a bank for the payment of forged or raised checks, holding that the title of the statute sufficiently complied with the constitutional requirement as to the titles of legislative acts. In so holding, the Court declared: ‘ The title of an act is not required to be a complete index to every section, but it is sufficient if the title in general terms directs attention to the purposes of the law.’

It was successfully argued in the Court of Appeal that there was no word or hint in the title of Act 156 of 1912 that the body of the Act imposed any obligation on the party opposing the pauper litigant; that there is no suggestion that the act contains any limitation upon the right of any such opposing party to compromise the suit, which is a well recognized right under Article 3071 of the...