Jackson v. Heath

• Court: Texas Civil Court of Appeals
• Writing for the Court: BARROW
• Citation: Jackson v. Heath, 325 S.W.2d 453 (Tex. Ct. App. 1959)
• Decision Date: 27 May 1959
• Docket Number: No. 13493,13493
• Parties: G. Curtis JACKSON, Appellant, v. W. B. HEATH et al., Appellees.

Page 453

325 S.W.2d 453

G. Curtis JACKSON, Appellant, v. W. B. HEATH et al., Appellees.

No. 13493.

Court of Civil Appeals of Texas, San Antonio.

May 27, 1959.

Rehearing Denied June 24, 1959.

G. Curtis Jackson, pro se.

Crawford & Crawford, Crystal City, for appellees.

BARROW, Justice.

This is a trespass to try title suit brought by G. Curtis Jackson, plaintiff in the court below, against Donna Butler Heath and husband, W. B. Heath, and B. H. Holsomback defendants in the court below, to recover the title and possession of ten acres of land situated in Zavala County, Texas, described as Farm Tract No. 62, Section No. 81 of the Cross S. Ranch Subdivision.

Defendants answered, claiming title under the five-year statute of limitations based upon the quitclaim title from Seaton McCutcheon to Earle E. Butler and B. H. Holsomback, dated March 3, 1937, and recorded in Vol. 41, page 162, Deed Records of Zavala County.

The trial was to the court without the aid of a jury. Judgment was rendered in favor of the defendants, and plaintiff, G. Curtis Jackson, has duly appealed to this Court.

Appellant has assigned some seventeen points of error, but from the view we take of the case we need only consider one of said points. In his second point, appellant contends that the instrument relied on by appellees is not sufficient to sustain a plea under the five-year statute of limitations. We are of the opinion that this point must be sustained. In order to ripen title to land under the five-year statute of limitations, three things are essential: 1. Adverse possession; 2. payment of taxes; and 3. claiming under a deed or deeds duly registered. Article 5509, Vernon's Ann.Civ.Stats.

The instrument under which appellees claim, insofar as is pertinent to this case, reads as follows:

'* * * I, Seaton McCutcheon, * * * have quitclaimed, and by these presents do quitclaim, unto the said Earle E. Butler, all my right, title, interest, claim and demand in and to certain tracts of land situated in said County of Zavala, State of Texas, described as follows, to-wit: * * *

'With all and singular all my right, title, interest, estate, claim and demand in and to the hereditaments and appurtenances thereto belonging or in any wise pertaining; to have and to hold the above released rights, titles, interests, claims and demands, to the said Earle E. Butler and B. H. Holsomback, their heirs and assigns, forever.'

The rules with reference to the sufficiency of a deed to sustain a plea under the five-year statute of limitations have been well stated in 2 Tex.Jur. 253-255, Adverse Possession, Sec. 138, as follows:

'Quitclaim Deed--What is or is Not Quitclaim.--There is authority to the effect that a claim of title is not supported by a deed which purports to convey, not the land, but only such interest as the grantor may have therein. On the other hand it is said that a quitclaim deed will support a claim under the five years' statute. However this may be, if the deed purports merely to quitclaim such right, title and interest as the grantor may have in the land, the claimant cannot acquire any title beyond that which the instrument conveys. If the grantor owned only an undivided fractional interest, the grantee can acquire by virtue of the statute no greater quantum of estate or interest; and if the grantor did not have title, none can be acquired by the grantee. Accordingly, if the grantor's interest was only that of a tenant, the deed will not support a claim of title by limitation. On the other hand, if the deed, although in form a quitclaim, purports to convey the land, title by limitation may be perfected thereunder. The presence of the terms 'all my right, title and interest' do not prevent the maturing of title, the instrument containing...