Jackson v. Hedgpeth

• Decision Date: 29 April 2014
• Docket Number: No. 2:12-cv-0691 TLN CKD P,2:12-cv-0691 TLN CKD P
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of California
• Parties: ISSIAH W. JACKSON, Petitioner, v. ANTHONY HEDGPETH, Respondent.

ISSIAH W. JACKSON, Petitioner, v. ANTHONY HEDGPETH, Respondent.

No. 2:12-cv-0691 TLN CKD P

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

Dated: April 29, 2014

ORDER AND

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Petitioner, a state prisoner, is proceeding pro se with a petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Petitioner was convicted by a jury of second degree murder and related offenses in 2009. He asserts five claims challenging his conviction and sentence as violative of his Constitutional rights. (ECF No. 1 ("Ptn.")) The petition is fully briefed. (ECF Nos. 12, 22.) Upon careful consideration of the record and the applicable law, the undersigned will recommend that the petition be denied.

BACKGROUND

I. Facts

In its affirmation of the judgment on appeal, the California Court of Appeal, Third Appellate District, set forth the relevant factual background as follows:

In late 2006, defendant and January Keene had a turbulent on-again, off-again relationship. They argued a lot and defendant was sometimes violent. Once, defendant pinned Keene to therefrigerator, choked her and threatened to kill her. Defendant told Keene's prior boyfriend that she often upset him and knew how to push his buttons. Defendant became angry and jealous when Keene's male friends visited her. Defendant took a swing at one. Defendant argued with Keene about it and threatened to kill her.

On January 1, 2007, while Keene was visiting Christine Marsh, defendant came over and hit Keene in the face. Defendant had previously asked Marsh about Keene and whether she was a cop or a prostitute. According to Marsh, one minute defendant was ranting and raving; the next he was calm. On that and on another occasion, defendant had a gun.

Later on January 1, Brian Berry visited Keene. Defendant was there and was upset that Berry had come by. Defendant asked Keene, "How do you know I wouldn't peel this dude's cap?" FN2 Defendant told Keene "he wasn't going to do just like her last boyfriend, he was going to do more." Keene's prior boyfriend had shoved her head into a wall. FN3

FN2. To "peel a cap" means to shoot or hurt badly.

FN3. Keene's prior boyfriend, Kiyron Fergerson, was convicted of domestic violence of Keene.

About 1:00 a.m. on January 5, 2007, the police stopped defendant at 30th and L Streets for running a red light. Keene was in the passenger seat. The seat was reclined and Keene's eyes were closed. She had a small amount of blood on her temple and a weak pulse; she was not responsive. When the paramedic moved her head, his hand was covered in blood and a gray substance.

At the time of the stop, defendant was on the phone to 911. Defendant told both the 911 operator and the police who stopped him that Keene was shot at Franklin Boulevard and 21st Avenue; he claimed he was trying to get her to the hospital.

Keene was taken to the UC Davis Medical Center. An autopsy showed she had been shot in the back of her head. She died within minutes of being shot. Burned gunpowder on her skin indicated the gun was close, within six inches of her head. The pathologist removed two small bullet fragments, consistent with a .22-caliber bullet.

The police took defendant to the area of Franklin Boulevard and 21st Avenue in an attempt to confirm his story about the shooting. There was glass in the roadway. A patrol officer had discovered the glass around midnight; three vehicles had been vandalized and their windows broken, but none of the owners wanted to report the vandalism. Officers searched the area but found no bullets, casings or other signs of a shooting. Canvassing the area turned up no information about a shooting that night.

The police searched for evidence defendant was the shooter; they found no weapon in defendant's car. Criminalists analyzed bothdefendant and the car for gunshot residue. The conclusion from the testing of defendant's hands was that defendant had either fired a gun, had been near a gun that had been fired, or had handled something contaminated with gunshot residue. There were particles characteristic of gunshot residue on the inside of defendant's left sleeve, his exterior right sleeve, and on his torso and the rear waistband of his pants. The criminalist opined the gun that killed Keene was inside the car or at least pointed into the car. She admitted the evidence was consistent with a shooter outside the car.

In the car with defendant's belongings, police found a letter from Keene to defendant. The letter was dated December 19, 2006. In it, Keene complained about defendant's lack of intimacy and that he treated her like a prostitute. She told him to keep his money and Christmas gifts and not to come around anymore. "This is FINAL." (Original underscoring.)

In defense, defendant offered the testimony of several residents of the Franklin Boulevard and 21st Avenue area who claimed they heard a shooting that night. They did not report it to the police out of fear.

People v. Jackson, 2011 WL 2811221, **1-2 (July 19, 2011) ("Jackson"), also attached as Respondent's Exhibit A at ECF No. 12-1. The facts as set forth by the state court of appeal are presumed correct. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1).

II. Procedural History

Following a jury trial in the Sacramento County Superior Court, petitioner was convicted of second degree murder and two counts of being a felon in possession of a firearm. (Ptn. at 1.) On July 2, 2009, the jury convicted petitioner of the two firearm counts. (3 CT 874, 874.1-874.2) Jury deliberations were suspended until July 16, 2009. On that day, the jury reconvened, deliberated, and reached a verdict convicting petitioner of second degree murder. (3 CT 880-882, 886.) On September 11, 2009, the court sentenced petitioner to a state prison term of 110 years to life. (Ptn. at 1; 4 CT 1051.)

Petitioner appealed the judgment to the California Court of Appeal, Third Appellate District. (Lod. Docs. 1-5.)¹ On July 19, 2011, the court of appeal affirmed the judgment. (Lod. Doc. 6 ("Jackson," supra).) Petitioner filed a petition for review in the California Supreme Court (Lod. Doc. 7), which was summarily denied on October 19, 2011. (Lod. Doc. 8.)

Petitioner filed the instant petition for federal habeas relief on March 19, 2012. (Ptn.)

ANALYSIS

I. AEDPA

The statutory limitations of federal courts' power to issue habeas corpus relief for persons in state custody is provided by 28 U.S.C. § 2254, as amended by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA). The text of § 2254(d) states:

An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim-

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.

As a preliminary matter, the Supreme Court has recently held and reconfirmed "that § 2254(d) does not require a state court to give reasons before its decision can be deemed to have been 'adjudicated on the merits.'" Harrington v. Richter, 131 S. Ct. 770, 785 (2011). Rather, "when a federal claim has been presented to a state court and the state court has denied relief, it may be presumed that the state court adjudicated the claim on the merits in the absence of any indication or state-law procedural principles to the contrary." Id. at 784-785, citing Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. 255, 265 (1989) (presumption of a merits determination when it is unclear whether a decision appearing to rest on federal grounds was decided on another basis). "The presumption may be overcome when there is reason to think some other explanation for the state court's decision is more likely." Id. at 785.

The Supreme Court has set forth the operative standard for federal habeas review of state court decisions under AEDPA as follows: "For purposes of § 2254(d)(1), 'an unreasonable application of federal law is different from an incorrect application of federal law.'" Harrington, supra, 131 S. Ct. at 785, citing Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 410 (2000). "A state court's determination that a claim lacks merit precludes federal habeas relief so long as 'fairminded jurists could disagree' on the correctness of the state court's decision." Id. at 786, citingYarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 664 (2004). Accordingly, "a habeas court must determine what arguments or theories supported or ... could have supported[] the state court's decision; and then it must ask whether it is possible fairminded jurists could disagree that those arguments or theories are inconsistent with the holding in a prior decision of this Court." Id. "Evaluating whether a rule application was unreasonable requires considering the rule's specificity. The more general the rule, the more leeway courts have in reaching outcomes in case-by-case determinations.'" Id. Emphasizing the stringency of this standard, which "stops short of imposing a complete bar of federal court relitigation of claims already rejected in state court proceedings[,]" the Supreme Court has cautioned that "even a strong case for relief does not mean the state court's contrary conclusion was unreasonable." Id., citing Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 75 (2003).

The undersigned also finds that the same deference is paid to the factual determinations of state courts. Under § 2254(d)(2), factual findings of the state courts are presumed to be correct subject only to a review of the record which demonstrates that the factual finding(s) "resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the state court proceeding." It makes no sense to interpret "unreasona...