Jackson v. Hill
| Decision Date | 01 June 2016 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 3:12-cv-280-J-39MCR |
| Parties | IRA C. JACKSON, Plaintiff, v. LYNN HILL, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of Florida |
IRA C. JACKSON, Plaintiff,
v.
LYNN HILL, et al., Defendants.
Case No. 3:12-cv-280-J-39MCR
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA JACKSONVILLE DIVISION
June 1, 2016
ORDER
Plaintiff Ira C. Jackson, an inmate of the Florida penal system, is proceeding in this action on a pro se Second Amended Complaint (Second Amended Complaint) (Doc. 33) filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.1 The Court will construe the pro se Second Amended Complaint liberally.2 Plaintiff alleges that the Defendants violation of his civil rights occurred at Putnam Correctional Institution (PCI).
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The remaining Defendants are Lynn Hill, Assistant Warden; L. Crews, Warden's Secretary and Grievance Coordinator; Sgt. Hale; and Lieutenant Pendleton. The remaining claim is Plaintiff's claim about being disciplined in retaliation for filing grievances. See Opinion, Eleventh Circuit, June 16, 2014 (Opinion) (Doc. 43 at 3-5). More specifically, "Jackson alleged that officials disciplined him for filing grievances by 'search[ing] [his] person and locker,' placing him in solitary confinement, and subjecting him to unnecessary psychological testing." Id. at 4-5. The question remains whether Plaintiff can recover nominal damages for the claim that he was disciplined in retaliation for filing grievances.3 Id. at 5.
Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment (Defendants' Motion) (Doc. 88) is before the Court. Plaintiff was advised of the provisions of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56, notified that the granting of a motion to dismiss or a motion for summary judgment would represent a final adjudication of this case which may foreclose subsequent litigation on the matter, and given an opportunity to respond. See Summary Judgment Notice (Doc. 89) & Order (Doc. 46). Plaintiff responded. See Plaintiff's Response to Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment (Response) (Doc. 99).
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In his verified Second Amended Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that the Defendants disciplined him for filing grievances. He initiated the grievances process at Glades Correctional Institution (GCI), and he continued to grieve after he was transferred to PCI. Plaintiff states that on December 18, 2009, Sgt. Hale retaliated against Plaintiff for utilizing the grievance process by sending Officers T. Pinkston, B. R. Davis, and Officer Hopkins to Plaintiff's cell. Second Amended Complaint at 11. The officers harassed, intimidated and searched Plaintiff and searched his locker. Id. Plaintiff submitted a grievance of reprisal against Sgt. Hale for retaliation, claiming she sent her subordinates to harass Plaintiff. Id.; Exhibit E. Plaintiff submitted a document entitled Formal Complaint to the Regional Director of Region 3 against Sgt. Hale claiming she retaliated against Plaintiff through her subordinates. Second Amended Complaint at 11; Exhibit F. Plaintiff also filed an informal grievance against Defendant Hale on January 2, 2010, which was denied. Second Amended Complaint at 12-13; Exhibit H.
With regard to Defendants Hill and Pendleton, Plaintiff states that on December 30, 2009, they threatened Plaintiff with solitary confinement if he continued to file grievances. Second Amended Complaint at 12. Defendant Hill showed Plaintiff several of his
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previously submitted grievances, and Defendant Pendleton said that Plaintiff had now involved other officers. Id.
Plaintiff states that on February 5, 2010, he was placed in administrative confinement without just cause. Id. at 14. He started a hunger strike to protest his treatment. Id. On February 10, 2010, Plaintiff was told that he was being transferred from PCI to an "S.O.S. psych cell" at Tomoka Correctional Institution (TCI) for a psychological evaluation because he was on a hunger strike. Id. at 15. On February 16, 2010, Plaintiff ceased his hunger strike. Id. He was placed in administrative confinement at TCI pending further investigation. Id. at 16; Exhibit J. On February 25, 2010, Plaintiff was transferred to Central Florida Reception Center (CFRC) and placed in open population. Second Amended Complaint at 16. Finally, as a result of a mental health evaluation, Plaintiff was transferred to Hardee Correctional Institution (HCI) on March 2, 2010. Id.
Under the Relief Requested, Plaintiff claims he was subjected to undue emotional and physical stress by the Defendants. Id. at 20. As a result, he states that he went on a hunger strike and suffered from sleepless nights and anxiety. Id. He further claims that he was restrained and confined in solitary confinement as a result of the Defendants "exposing" him "to an undue psychological screening and evaluation[.]" Id. at 20-21.
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The Eleventh Circuit set forth the summary judgment standard.
Summary judgment is proper when "there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The substantive law controls which facts are material and which are irrelevant. Raney v. Vinson Guard Service, Inc., 120 F.3d 1192, 1196 (11th Cir. 1997). Typically, the nonmoving party may not rest upon only the allegations of his pleadings, but must set forth specific facts showing there is a genuine issue for trial. Eberhardt v. Waters, 901 F.2d 1578, 1580 (11th Cir. 1990). A pro se plaintiff's complaint, however, if verified under 28 U.S.C. § 1746, is equivalent to an affidavit, and thus may be viewed as evidence. See Murrell v. Bennett, 615 F.2d 306, 310 n.5 (5th Cir. 1980). Nevertheless, "[a]n affidavit or declaration used to support or oppose a motion must be made on personal knowledge." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(4). "[A]ffidavits based, in part, upon information and belief, rather than personal knowledge, are insufficient to withstand a motion for summary judgment." Ellis v. England, 432 F.3d 1321, 1327 (11th Cir. 2005).
As we've emphasized, "[w]hen the moving party has carried its burden under Rule 56[], its opponent must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts . . . Where the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party, there is no 'genuine issue for trial.'" Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586-87, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986). "[T]he mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment; the requirement is that there be no genuine issue of material fact." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91
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L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). Unsupported, conclusory allegations that a plaintiff suffered a constitutionally cognizant injury are insufficient to withstand a motion for summary judgment. See Bennett v. Parker, 898 F.2d 1530, 1532-34 (11th Cir. 1990) (discounting inmate's claim as a conclusory allegation of serious injury that was unsupported by any physical evidence, medical records, or the corroborating testimony of witnesses). Moreover, "[w]hen opposing parties tell two different stories, one of which is blatantly contradicted by the record, so that no reasonable jury could believe it, a court should not adopt that version of the facts for purposes of ruling on a motion for summary judgment." Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380, 127 S.Ct. 1769, 167 L.Ed.2d 686 (2007).
Howard v. Memnon, 572 F. App'x 692, 694-95 (11th Cir. 2014) (per curiam) (footnote omitted). In an action involving the alleged violation of a plaintiff's federal constitutional rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, "assuming all facts in the light most favorable to [plaintiff, as the non-moving party]," summary judgment is properly entered in favor of a defendant where "no genuine issue of material fact exist[s] as to whether [plaintiff]'s constitutional rights were violated." McKinney v. Sheriff, 520 F. App'x 903, 905 (11th Cir. 2013) (per curiam).
Defendants move for the dismissal of Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint based upon failure to state a claim and qualified immunity. Defendants' Motion at 1.4 They contend that they are
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entitled to summary judgment because: (1) they were not responsible for Plaintiff's person or cell being searched, (2) they were not responsible for Plaintiff's placement in administrative confinement, and (3) they were not responsible for Plaintiff receiving psychological testing. Id. at 1-2. They address Plaintiff's claim of retaliation and submit that Plaintiff cannot establish a causal connection between a protected activity, the grievance process, and the actions of the Defendants. Id. at 10-14. They also claim qualified immunity. Id. at 14-15. Alternatively, Defendants assert that Plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative remedies and his Second Amended Complaint is due to be dismissed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). Id. at 6-10. Exhibits are appended to Defendants' Motion, including the Declarations of the Defendants; some relevant grievance procedures; excerpts from Plaintiff's deposition; the grievance appeal log and related declaration; grievance logs; and documents concerning Plaintiff's placement in administrative confinement and his transfer to TCI.
The Declaration of Defendant Crews, the Secretary to the Assistant Warden at PCI, states that she collects grievances and routes them to the appropriate parties for response. Ex. A. She attests that it is not her duty to investigate grievances or to deny the requested relief. Id. Finally, she states that she did
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not threaten Plaintiff or retaliate against him for filing grievances, and she is not aware of anyone else doing so. Id.
The Declaration of Defendant Hale, the property room sergeant, states that she was responsible for inmate property. Ex. B. She states that she was not responsible for requesting cell searches, and she did not send anyone to Plaintiff's cell to have it searched. Id. She...
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