Jackson v. Hodges

Decision Date05 September 1940
Docket NumberRecord No. 2307.
CourtVirginia Supreme Court
PartiesRAYMOND L. JACKSON v. LEROY HODGES, COMPTROLLER OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA.

1. GOVERNOR — Powers — To Increase Salary of Secretary of the Commonwealth — Power to Make Increase because of Imposition of Additional Duties — Case at Bar. The instant case was an application for mandamus to compel the Comptroller of Virginia to issue warrants in favor of the Secretary of the Commonwealth for compensation claimed to be due. By executive order the Governor authorized an increase in the salary of petitioner, such increase to be paid out of and charged against funds appropriated to the Governor "for executive control of the State." Section 83 of the Constitution provides that the salaries of each of the officers of the executive department (which includes the Secretary of the Commonwealth) shall be fixed by law, and shall not be increased or diminished during his term of office. Petitioner contended that the increase of salary was granted to him because of additional duties, unrelated to those of Secretary of the Commonwealth, imposed upon him by both the General Assembly and the Governor, but the General Assembly had fixed petitioner's salary for the two bienniums which covered petitioner's term of office and in none of the statutes which placed additional duties on the Secretary of the Commonwealth did the General Assembly provide for additional compensation to the office.

Held: That the Governor had no power and authority, by reason of the imposition of additional duties on petitioner, to increase his salary.

2. GOVERNOR — Powers — To Increase Salary of Secretary of the Commonwealth — Power to Make Increase from Appropriation Item for "Additional Employees, Wages and Special Payments"Case at Bar. The instant case was an application for mandamus to compel the Comptroller of Virginia to issue warrants in favor of the Secretary of the Commonwealth for compensation claimed to be due. By executive order the Governor authorized an increase in the salary of petitioner, such increase to be paid out of and charged against funds appropriated to the Governor "for executive control of the State." Section 83 of the Constitution provides that the salaries of each of the officers of the executive department (which includes the Secretary of the Commonwealth) shall be fixed by law, and shall not be increased or diminished during his term of office. Petitioner contended that the increase of salary was granted to him because of additional duties, unrelated to those of Secretary of the Commonwealth, imposed upon him by both the General Assembly and the Governor, and that since the Legislature, after providing for the payment of the salary of the Governor and the salary of the Secretary of the Commonwealth, and ex-officio secretary to the Governor, appropriated a further sum for "additional employees, wages and special payments," it thereby gave the Governor implied authority to increase petitioner's salary out of this item.

Held: That the argument of petitioner overlooked the fact that the appropriation act fixed his salary by express language, and that in the face of that express language it could not be argued that there was an implied authority to increase his salary out of the item fixed for "additional employees," etc.

3. STATE — Appropriations — Appropriation to Governor for Payment of Additional Employees, Wages and Special Payments — Does Not Refer to Constitutional Officer. — An item of an appropriation act appropriating to the Governor a sum for additional employees, wages and special payments, referred to the payment of subordinate employees in the Governor's office and not to a constitutional officer whose salary cannot be increased during his term of office because of the provision of section 83 of the Constitution of 1902.

4. PUBLIC OFFICERS — Compensation — Increase during Officer's Term — Secretary of the Commonwealth — Increase as Secretary to the Governor — Case at Bar. The instant case was an application for mandamus to compel the Comptroller of Virginia to issue warrants in favor of the Secretary of the Commonwealth for compensation claimed to be due. By executive order the Governor authorized an increase in the salary of petitioner, such increase to be paid out of and charged against funds appropriated to the Governor "for executive control of the State." Section 83 of the Constitution provides that the salaries of each of the officers of the executive department (which includes the Secretary of the Commonwealth) shall be fixed by law, and shall not be increased or diminished during his term of office. Petitioner contended that he held two separate offices, the constitutional office of Secretary of the Commonwealth and the statutory office of secretary to the Governor, and that the salary increase as secretary to the Governor was not within the constitutional restriction of section 83 of the Constitution.

Held: That there was no merit in the contention of petitioner since section 80 of the Constitution provides that the duties of the Secretary of the Commonwealth shall be prescribed by law, and the statute placing upon the Secretary of the Commonwealth additional duties, as secretary to the Governor, did not define any specific duties to be performed, but obviously contemplated that the secretary to the Governor should discharge such duties in that capacity as the Governor might assign to him, and they were consequently imposed upon him by virtue of his office of Secretary of the Commonwealth.

5. STATE — Officers — Secretary of the Commonwealth — Office Not Abolished by Acts of 1930Case at Bar. The instant case was an application for mandamus to compel the Comptroller of Virginia to issue warrants in favor of the Secretary of the Commonwealth for compensation claimed to be due. By executive order the Governor authorized an increase in the salary of petitioner, such increase to be paid out of and charged against funds appropriated to the Governor "for executive control of the State." Section 83 of the Constitution provides that the salaries of each of the officers of the executive department (which includes the Secretary of the Commonwealth) shall be fixed by law, and shall not be increased or diminished during his term of office. The last paragraph of section 80 of the Constitution, as amended in 1928, provides that on and after the first day of February, 1930, the General Assembly may abolish the office of Secretary of the Commonwealth, and in 1927 the General Assembly passed an act to reorganize the administration of the State government, providing that when the Constitution should be amended to make constitutional and valid the abolition of the office, such office by virtue of the act should be ipso facto abolished. In 1930 this act was amended by eliminating the provision for the abolition of the office and by providing that the Secretary of the Commonwealth should be ex-officio secretary to the Governor and continue to exercise all the powers imposed by the Constitution and by law upon the Secretary of the Commonwealth. Petitioner contended that the effect of the constitutional amendment and the legislative enactments was to abolish the constitutional office of Secretary of the Commonwealth and to create in its stead the statutory office of "Secretary of the Commonwealth, who shall be ex-officio secretary to the Governor."

Held: That there was no merit in the contention of the petitioner, since it was apparent that the provisions of the act of 1930 were absolutely inconsistent with any intent to abolish the office, and the act, which petitioner claimed created the statutory office, provided no term of office and no method of appointment, nor did it provide for confirmation by the General Assembly.

6. STATE — Officers — Secretary of the Commonwealth — Provision of 1927 Act Abolishing Office Invalid. — So much of the act of 1927, chapter 33, page 103, as provided for the abolition of the office of Secretary of the Commonwealth was unconstitutional and invalid, because section 80 of the Constitution expressly provided that "On and after the first day of February, nineteen hundred and thirty, the General Assembly may abolish the office of Secretary of the Commonwealth," and the power did not come into existence until the date set.

7. STATE — Officers — Secretary of the Commonwealth — Office Not Abolished by Providing for Expenses in Appropriation to Governor's Office — Case at Bar. The instant case was an application for mandamus to compel the Comptroller of Virginia to issue warrants in favor of the Secretary of the Commonwealth for compensation claimed to be due. By executive order the Governor authorized an increase in the salary of petitioner, such increase to be paid out of and charged against funds appropriated to the Governor "for executive control of the State." Section 83 of the Constitution provides that the salaries of each of the officers of the executive department (which includes the Secretary of the Commonwealth) shall be fixed by law, and shall not be increased or diminished during his term of office. The last paragraph of section 80 of the Constitution, as amended in 1928, provides that on and after the first day of February, 1930, the General Assembly may abolish the office of Secretary of the Commonwealth, and petitioner contended that since the General Assembly had, from 1930 to the present date, made no appropriation to the office of the Secretary of the Commonwealth, but had provided for the payment of the expenses of the office through the appropriation made for the operation of the Governor's office, this evidenced a legislative intent to abolish by implication the constitutional office.

Held: That there was no merit in this contention.

Original application for mandamus.

The opinion states the case.

Leon M. Bazile and M. A....

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2 cases
  • Howell v. McAuliffe
    • United States
    • Virginia Supreme Court
    • July 22, 2016
    ...well as in the context of mandamus actions involving what were ultimately held to be unlawful executive acts, see Jackson v. Hodges, 176 Va. 89, 101, 10 S.E.2d 566, 570 (1940) ; Fugate v. Weston, 156 Va. 107, 120, 157 S.E. 736, 740 (1931).19 We decline petitioners' request for the issuance ......
  • Shubat v. State
    • United States
    • Montana Supreme Court
    • April 15, 1971
    ...Four Thousand and eight hundred dollars. 'Section 2. All Acts and parts of Acts in conflict herewith are hereby repealed.' The Court in the Jackson case determined that the constitutional restriction was not applicable to a judge who was appointed to fill a vacancy after chapter 176, Sessio......

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