Jackson v. Host Int'l Inc
| Decision Date | 01 February 2011 |
| Docket Number | No. 09-51137,No. 10-50026,09-51137,10-50026 |
| Parties | FRED J. JACKSON,Plaintiff-Appellee v. HOST INTERNATIONAL, INC.,Defendant-Appellant |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit |
Before REAVLEY, BENAVIDES, and CLEMENT, Circuit Judges.
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Defendant-Appellant Host International Inc. ("Host") appeals the final judgment entered against it and damages awarded to Plaintiff-Appellee Fred J. Jackson ("Jackson") after a jury trial on Jackson's claims that Host violated the Texas Commission on Human Rights Act (the "Human Rights Act"), Tex. Lab. Code §21.001 et seq. Host also appeals the attorney's fees awarded by the district court. We affirm.
Jackson was employed with Delaware North, the contractor for concessions at the El Paso International Airport.1 Jackson worked at the airport since 1990, most recently in the position of general manager. In 2006, Delaware North lost the contract with the airport, and Host took over concessions. Host decided to continue employing Jackson as general manager for 180 days on a trial basis. When Host extended its offer to Jackson, the Host district manager, Bob Boorom ("Boorom"), commented to Jackson thathissalary, $70,000 per year, was good "for a person your age." Jackson was then 57 years old.
During the trial period of employment, Jackson discovered a discrepancy in salaries—apparently, older managers were paid less than younger managers with less seniority and experience. On February 21, 2007, Jackson reported this discrepancy to Boorom, who responded that the company needed to pay more to younger workers in order to attract "younger, talented people." Host did not generate a written report of Jackson's complaint or investigate further.
On March 7, less than two weeks after Jackson reported the pay discrepancy to Boorom, Jackson's employment was terminated. Host had not documented any disciplinary action or warnings prior to terminating Jackson's employment, and Jackson received no written documentation of complaints about his performance. During the meeting when Jackson was informed that he was being fired, Boorom told Jackson, "At your age, I think you would rather be doing things here in El Paso for the community thanyourjob here." Boorom also told Jackson that he was being fired for his lack of a good relationship with a local brand partner and for missing two conference calls. Jackson disputed at trial that he missed more than one conference call; he also averred that he had been instructed that he did not need to interact with the local brand partner, as Boorom would handle that responsibility. No termination form was ever completed to document the termination; Jackson's employment was verbally terminated. Host's internal emails, offered at trial, were inconsistent regarding itsjustifications for terminating Jackson's employment.
Jackson sued Host in state court for age discrimination and retaliation under §§ 21.051 and 21.055 of the Texas Labor Code. Following removal on diversity grounds, ajury trial was held. Host moved forjudgment as a matter of law at the close of Jackson's case in chief, which the district court denied. The jury found in Jackson's favor on both claims and awarded a total of around $982,500 in damages. The damages award included $227,500 in back pay, $455,000 in front pay, $200,000 in past compensatory damages, and $100,000 in future compensatory damages. The district court also denied Host's motion for new trial. The district court awarded $175,000 in trial attorney's fees to Jackson. Host filed a timely notice of appeal, and we havejurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
On appeal, Host argues that the district court erred when it denied Host's motions for judgment as a matter of law and new trial because there was insufficient evidence to support the jury's findings that (1) Host terminated Jackson's employment based on his age; and (2) Host terminated Jackson's employment in retaliation for Jackson's report of perceived pay discrepancies of Host employees based on age. We review the district court's denial of Host's motion forjudgment as a matter of law de novo. Evans v. Ford Motor Co., 484 F.3d 329, 334 (5th Cir. 2007). "Although our review is de novo,... our standard of review with respect to ajury verdict is especially deferential." \d. (internal quotation marks omitted). A motion forjudgment as a matter of law should be granted only "[i]f the facts and inferences point so strongly and overwhelminglyin favor of one party that the Court believes that reasonable men could not arrive at a contrary verdict." Id. (internal quotation omitted). In reviewing a motion forjudgment as a matter of law, we "review all of the evidence in the record, draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party, and may not make credibility determinations or weigh the evidence." SMI Owen Steel Co. v. Marsh USA, Inc., 520 F.3d 432, 437 (5th Cir. 2008)(internal quotation omitted). The ruling must be supported by more than a scintilla of evidence. Laxton v. Gap Inc., 333 F.3d 572, 577 (5th Cir. 2003).
"Our standard of review of a denial of a motion for new trial is more deferential than our review of the denial of a motion forjudgment as a matter of law." SMI Owen Steel, 520 F.3d at 444 n.18 (internal quotation omitted). "The decision to grant or deny a motion for a new trial is generally within the sound discretion of the trial court, and reversible only for an abuse of that discretion." Shows v. Jamison Bedding, Inc., 671 F.2d 927, 930 (5th Cir. 1982). "When the trialjudge has refused to disturb ajury verdict, all the factors that govern our review of his decision favor affirmance." Foradori v. Harris, 523 F.3d 477, 504 (5th Cir. 2008) (internal quotation omitted). "Deference to the trialjudge, who has had an opportunity to observe the witnesses and to consider the evidence in the context of a living trial rather than upon a cold record, operates in harmony with deference to thejury's determination of the weight of the evidence and the constitutional allocation to thejury of questions of fact." Id. (internal quotation omitted).
Host contends that thejury's findings that (1) age was a motivating factor in Host's decision to terminate Jackson, and (2) Host would not have discharged Jackson when it did absent the consideration of age were not supported bysufficient evidence.2 To recover for age discrimination under the Human Rights Act, relying solely on circumstantial evidence (as Jackson did), an employee must show that (1) the employee is a member of a protected class, i.e., over the age of forty; (2) that the employee was qualified for the position; (3) that an adverse employment action occurred; and (4) that the employee was replaced by someone younger or was discharged because of age. See generally McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802, 93 S. Ct. 1817, 1824 (1973) (); see also Evans v. City of Houston, 246 F.3d 344, 350 (5th Cir. 2001) ().3 Once this prima facie case is made, the burden shifts to the defendant to produce a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse employment action. Evans, 246 F.3d at350. Then, the plaintiff has the opportunity to demonstrate that the defendant's given reasons are merely pretextual. Id.
As the district court noted in its denial of Host's motion forjudgment as a matter of law, Jackson presented more than a scintilla of evidence on each of these elements. Boorom made several remarks about Jackson's age, one at thetime of termination. Jackson's explanation regarding the termination of his employment has remained consistent, beginning with his EEOC charge and continuing through trial. Host's explanation, both in internal emails and in Boorom's testimony is inconsistent, ranging from asserting that Jackson quit to asserting that Jackson was fired for being a dictator, or alternatively for doing nothing at all. Additionally, the termination of Jackson's employment came shortly after he raised the issue of disparate pay based on age to Boorom. And, Host could show no documentary evidence whatsoever—not even internal emails—to support its claim that Jackson was not performing his job to their standards. At the end of the day, thejury was called to determine which story it believed—Jackson's or Host's. It chose Jackson's. Thejury was free to credit or discredit his evidence, and we may not re-evaluate thejury's decisions regarding credibility. See Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 150, 120 S. Ct. 2097, 2110 (2000). Sufficient evidence supports the jury's verdict on Jackson's Human Rights Act age discrimination claim.
Host argues that the evidence was not sufficient to support the jury's finding that Host terminated Jackson's employment "in retaliation against [Jackson] because he opposed alleged differences in pay between older and younger managers." In contrast to the age discrimination claim, here Jackson needed to show "but for" causation in order to recover. See Pineda v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 360 F.3d 483, 487-89 (5th Cir. 2004). The Human Rights Act allows employees to recover for retaliation where the employee demonstrates that: (1) the employee participated in a protected activity; (2) an adverse employment action occurred; and (3) the adverse employment action and the protected activity are causally linked. Id. at 487. Once this showing is made, the burden shifts to the defendant to show a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasonfor the employment action. Id. If the defendant meets this burden, then the plaintiff must prove that the stated reasons are pretextual. id.
Again, Jackson presented more than a scintilla of evidence on each of the elements of the prima...
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