Jackson v. Hoylman
| Decision Date | 03 December 1993 |
| Docket Number | 92-3607,Nos. 92-3554,s. 92-3554 |
| Citation | 1993 WL 501591,12 F.3d 212 |
| Parties | NOTICE: Sixth Circuit Rule 24(c) states that citation of unpublished dispositions is disfavored except for establishing res judicata, estoppel, or the law of the case and requires service of copies of cited unpublished dispositions of the Sixth Circuit. Ernest JACKSON, Sr., Plaintiff-Appellant, Cross-Appellee, v. Raymond HOYLMAN, Deputy U.S. Marshal; Robert Bidwell, Deputy U.S. Marshal, Defendants-Appellees, Cross-Appellants. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Sixth Circuit |
On appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio, Western Division, No. 89-07208; John W. Potter, J.
Before: BOGGS and SUHRHEINRICH, Circuit Judges; and BROWN, Senior Circuit Judge.
Plaintiff Ernest Jackson, Sr. ("Jackson") appeals final judgment for defendants Raymond Hoylman ("Hoylman") and Robert Bidwell ("Bidwell"), federal deputy marshals, in a Bivens action challenging Jackson's arrest by the defendants. Jackson alleged several theories of liability.
Initially, the district court denied, in part, the defendants' summary judgment motion in which they asserted defenses and relied on qualified immunity. The defendants then appealed this denial and this court affirmed. Jackson v. Hoylman, 933 F.2d 401 (6th Cir.1991). On remand, at the trial, the jury rendered a verdict for the defendants. On this second appeal, Jackson contends that the district court erred in granting, prior to the trial, summary judgment to defendants with respect to other theories of liability upon which the defendants relied, and erred at the trial in other respects. The defendants cross-appeal, but we need not, in view of our disposition of the issues, resolve the cross-appeal.
Upon the prior appeal, in addressing the question whether the district court erred in denying in part the defendants' summary judgment motion, this court outlined the facts as follows:
This case arises from the attempt by Deputy United States Marshals Hoylman and Bidwell to arrest Ernest Jackson, Jr. [defendant's son] for failure to appear in response to a summons for service as a grand juror. After receiving a warrant for Jackson's arrest, the marshals telephoned the number listed on the warrant and spoke to a man who identified himself as Ernest Jackson. Jackson refused to go to the courthouse for jury duty and told the marshals that they would have to come get him. Approximately fifteen minutes later, Hoylman and Bidwell arrived at Jackson's home. They knocked at both the front and back doors, loudly announced themselves as deputy marshals with a warrant for Jackson's arrest, and asked that he come forward. There was no response. Seeing a light on in the back of the house, the marshals entered and again shouted their identities and ordered Jackson to come forward. Still, there was no response. When they found no one downstairs, they proceeded upstairs.
The marshals found Jackson [Sr.] in his bedroom talking on the telephone. It is impossible for us ... to determine what happened next. Plaintiff and defendants offer radically different versions of what occurred....
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Jackson [Sr.], a black man, alleged that he was talking on the telephone in his bedroom when two white strangers, dressed in plainclothes, appeared unannounced in the doorway. The room was dark and Jackson did not see them show any identification. He became frightened at their presence and asked them to leave. He asked the person to whom he was speaking on the telephone to call the police. He contends that his hands were in plain view and that there was nowhere that he could have hidden a gun. Hoylman immediately grabbed the telephone out of Jackson's hand, climbed onto the bed and told him to relax. Hoylman then pushed Jackson back on the bed with his arm under Jackson's neck. Bidwell, as ordered, handcuffed Jackson who, because of previous back surgery, was unable to resist in any way. Jackson claims that prior to handcuffing him, the marshals made no effort to verify that Jackson was the person named in the warrant.
Hoylman testified that he and his partner announced themselves "twenty times in that house, loudly" but received no response. When they finally found Jackson in the upstairs bedroom, they identified themselves as marshals and repeatedly asked whether he was Ernest Jackson. Jackson responded only by swearing and shouting that they should get out of his house and that they had no rights there. Hoylman approached the bed with the warrant in his hand and tried once again to identify himself and explain their purpose in being there. Jackson swung at him and they Hoylman testified that he only asked Bidwell to handcuff Jackson when Jackson, after being held down on the bed by Hoylman, continued to swing and kick at the marshals.
A criminal complaint was filed against Jackson for forcibly assaulting, resisting, opposing, impeding, and interfering with the marshals, but the grand jury did not indict him. Jackson then filed a Bivens action 1 against the marshals in an Ohio state court, but the case was removed to federal district court. The district court dismissed, on summary judgment, the Fourth Amendment claims for an unlawful search of Jackson's home and for arrest of Jackson on a warrant that was actually issued for his son if he was arrested under the warrant and not for resisting arrest, and held that Jackson presented constitutional claims of unlawful arrest and excessive force. After this court, as stated, affirmed such denial of summary judgment for the marshals, Jackson, 933 F.2d at 402-403, upon remand and trial, the jury rendered a verdict for the marshals on all issues presented to it.
On appeal, Jackson presents five issues: (1) whether the trial court erred in granting summary judgment on his claim that his Fourth Amendment rights were violated by his arrest on a warrant actually issued for his son; (2) whether the trial court erred in granting summary judgment on his claim that an illegal search of his home violated his Fourth Amendment rights; (3) whether the trial court abused its discretion in denying his motion for default judgment and permitting the defendants to file an answer instanter; 2 (4) whether the trial court erred in admitting evidence of Jackson's prior medical history and past encounters with law enforcement officers as being relevant to his claims of physical and emotional damages following his arrest; and (5) whether the jury instructions were proper.
Summary judgment is appropriate where "there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and ... the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56. This court reviews the district court's grant of summary judgment de novo. United States v. TRW, Inc., 4 F.3d 417, 423 (6th Cir.1993).
We first address the question whether the trial court erred in granting summary judgment on Jackson's claim that his Fourth Amendment rights were violated by arresting him on a warrant issued for his son. On November 22, 1988, Magistrate James G. Carr signed a "Show Cause Order Under 28 U.S.C. 1866(g)" ordering "Ernest Jackson" to appear on November 29 to show cause why he failed to comply with a grand jury summons. It is undisputed that the member of the grand jury was Jackson's son, Ernest Jackson, Jr. When Jackson, Jr. did not appear on November 29, the magistrate issued a "Warrant for Arrest" of "Ernest Jackson." On the back of the warrant was inscribed a name (Ernest J. Jackson); last known residence (1459 Palmetto, Toledo, OH 43606 Phone: [ ]; last known employment (Minister); date of birth (Age 23 as of January 1988); social security number (300-66-7451); sex (Male); and race (Black).
In arguing that the district court erred in granting summary judgment to the marshals on his claim that his arrest on a warrant issued for his son violated his Fourth Amendment rights, Jackson asserts that prior to making an arrest, officers must have probable cause that the person they are arresting is the person named in the warrant.
However, "the Constitution does not guarantee that only the guilty will be arrested; police ... may rely on facially valid arrest warrants even in the face of vehement claims of innocence by reason of mistaken identity or otherwise." Masters, 872 F.2d at 1253 (citing Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 145 (1979)). In Baker, one McCollan was arrested and detained for three days under a warrant for his brother. Similarly, in this case, Jackson was arrested under a warrant for his son. Since the arrest warrant in Baker conformed to Fourth Amendment requirements, the Supreme Court held McCollan did not state a federal constitutional claim. 443 U.S. at 144. Addressing the Fourteenth Amendment due process claim, the Court noted:
Respondent's innocence of the charge contained in the warrant ... is largely irrelevant to his claim of deprivation of liberty without due process of law....
[W]e do not think a sheriff executing an arrest warrant is required by the Constitution to investigate independently every claim of innocence, whether the claim is based on mistaken identity or a defense such as lack of requisite intent.
Id. at 145-146 (footnote omitted).
Since the arrest was based on the warrant, the marshals relied on a facially valid arrest warrant issued by Magistrate Carr. Therefore, under Masters, Baker, and the specific facts of this case, the marshals could arrest Jackson, Sr., even if he claimed he was not the person named in the warrant, without incurring liability. The trial court's grant of summary judgment on this issue was proper. 3
We next appraise whether the trial court erred in granting summary judgment on Jackson's claim that an illegal search violated his Fourth Amendment rights. Jackson asserts...
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