Jackson v. Jackson

• Court: Texas Court of Appeals
• Writing for the Court: Walthall
• Citation: Jackson v. Jackson, 35 S.W.2d 830 (Tex. App. 1931)
• Decision Date: 29 January 1931
• Docket Number: No. 2475.,2475.
• Parties: JACKSON et ux. v. JACKSON.

35 S.W.2d 830

JACKSON et ux. v. JACKSON.

No. 2475.

Court of Civil Appeals of Texas. El Paso.

January 29, 1931.

Rehearing Denied February 19, 1931.

Appeal from District Court, Taylor County; W. R. Chapman, Judge.

Action by Mrs. Newton Jackson, Jr., against I. N. Jackson, Sr., and wife. From a judgment for plaintiff, defendants appeal.

Affirmed.

Scarborough, Ely & King, of Abilene, for appellants.

Kirby, King & Overshiner, of Abilene, for appellee.

WALTHALL, J.

Mrs. Newton Jackson brought this suit against I. N. Jackson and wife, Mrs. Elma Jackson, to recover damages, actual and exemplary, alleging that by wrongful acts, and actuated by malice, they (defendants) induced her husband, Newton Jackson, to abandon her as his wife. Briefly stated, plaintiff alleged that she was married to Newton Jackson; that Newton Jackson was the son of the defendants, I. N. Jackson and wife, Elma Jackson, and that by reason of the facts alleged, instigated by malice, defendants alienated the affections of their son from her, and caused him to abandon her as his wife.

Defendants answered by general demurrer, general denial, and special denial of each and every allegation of plaintiff's petition.

By trial amendment defendants pleaded that, should it be found that Newton Jackson left plaintiff on the advice of defendants, same was not willful, but was done in good faith for what was considered best for the welfare of their son, Newton Jackson.

The case was tried to a jury and submitted upon special issues.

Upon the special issues submitted the jury found: That I. N. Jackson and wife, Mrs. Elma Jackson, by wrongful acts, induced Newton Jackson to abandon his wife, and that, in inducing Newton Jackson to abandon his wife, I. N. Jackson and Mrs. Elma Jackson were actuated by malice. The jury found and stated the sum of money which, if paid now, would compensate plaintiff for the damages sustained by her on account of the loss of affections, love, and companionship of her husband. The jury also found and assessed against defendants, jointly, a sum of money as exemplary damages. The jury found that in inducing Newton Jackson to abandon his wife such action on their part was not done in good faith and for the best welfare of their son.

The court entered judgment in conformance with the verdict.

The court overruled defendants' motion for a new trial, to which defendants excepted, gave notice of record, and perfected this appeal. Defendants also filed assignments of error.

Opinion.

Appellants present forty-two propositions. We think we may group them in what we may say.

Appellee had testified that when her husband left her in California he left her without funds or friends; that she was about to become a mother. She was then permitted to testify, over objection, that she called upon appellants to assist her financially and that they refused to do so. Again, appellee was asked: "Did you ask Mrs. Jackson for financial support on account of the fact that you were to become a mother?" In answer appellee was permitted to testify, over objection, "she (referring to Mrs. Jackson) said she would help. She said she would pay my doctor's bill and buy me a little clothes for my baby. So they wrote to Dr. Pickard telling him that they would be responsible for the doctor's bill." Again, appellant, I. N. Jackson, was asked: "Did you not tell the plaintiff that you would pay for the clothes for her and her baby?" Witness was permitted to answer, over objection: He "would not turn any body loose to charge things to him." To which counsel for appellee said: "Then you visited your displeasure upon the child of your own blood?" Again, appellant was asked by counsel for appellee: "Have you contributed anything to the support and maintenance of your grandson, the plaintiff's child?" Witness was permitted to say, over objection, he "had not contributed anything to the support of plaintiff or her child."

Appellant, Mrs. I. N. Jackson, was asked the same question last above stated, and, over objection, she made a similar answer. The objection to each of the above questions and answers was that appellants were under no obligation to support appellee or her child, and that the questions and answers, and the conduct of appellee's counsel were prejudicial and inflammatory.

Appellants submit that they were under no obligation to support appellee or her child, and that the cases and authorities referred to sustain their position.

In her counter proposition appellee submits that the evidence was admissible as tending to show malice, on the issue of exemplary damages, and as showing appellants' unkind and hostile attitude toward appellee, a circumstance which might be taken with other circumstances tending to show that appellants brought about the separation.

This is not a case where appellee is suing appellants for support of herself and child. The issues presented by appellee, and submitted, are that appellants wrongfully induced her husband to abandon her as his wife, and that in doing so they were actuated by malice, and asked for actual and exemplary damages.

In addition to the general denial, the only special issue, tendered and submitted by appellants, was that, if they did induce their son to abandon appellee as his wife, in doing so they acted in good faith and for the best welfare of their son.

Appellants' son, Newton Jackson, was of age when he married appellee, and when appellee requested and appellants refused financial assistance to appellee. For the purpose of the proposition that appellants were under no legal obligation to send money to appellee, or to render her or her child any financial assistance whatever, under any of the circumstances under which financial assistance was requested of them by appellee, it might be conceded that appellants were under no legal obligation to render appellee or her child financial or other assistance. The question still remains, Was the evidence admissible as tending to prove or disprove any issue in the case?

Without quoting from the evidence we think it unquestionably shows that appellants' son took appellee in his automobile from her home in Abilene with the intention, and in fact did take her to California, and while on the way married her. Appellants introduced in evidence the following telegrams, omitting formal parts:

                     "Apr. 12—29
                

"I. N. Jackson,

"Dear Mama Papa I married Irene Wininger November fourth please forgive love from us

   "[Signed] Newton Jackson 7:30 A. M."
                                        "April 13, 1929
                

"I. N. Jackson Mrs. Jackson Newton left me today account letter enclosed in Clara Letter without funds and to become a mother please wire some money to help needed badly Answer quick.

               "[Signed] Irene Jackson."
                

The following unsigned letter was introduced in evidence. Appellant, Mrs. Jackson, admitted having written it.

                          "Apr. 17
                

"Irene:

"We have just received your letter. We are certainly sorry all this has happened. You got yourself into this now you will have to get out the best you can. You know we were opposed to Newton having anything to do with you. You have caused us a great deal of trouble, and caused him to be away from home right now. If we had have known anything about all this we would have stopped it and saved a lot of trouble. Now you need not expect anything from us, now or hereafter."

At the time the above letter was written Newton had arrived at home (Abilene).

A portion of the following letter was introduced by appellee, and the rest by appellants, so we copy the whole of it. In the meantime appellee had returned to Abilene.

                  "Abilene, Texas. May 6
                

"Dear Newton:

"We have just received your letter. That girl came right over here. Now we don't want you to be like Leland. If you love that girl, now is the time to say so. I told her I would write you and show her the letter so you can write us one and write what you want her to know. I believe if you write us and say you are through forever with her, and expect to get a divorce, she will let up. She says she is from Mo. We are considering taking her to a Dr. at Sweetwater to see if it is true, if it is, we will buy her a ticket to St. Louis, where she says her sister is going. You see if we don't know her condition, she might try to show a child of her sister or someone else as that one and cause us a lot of trouble. We have certainly had a lot of trouble." (The rest of the letter, except in the close, refers to matters wholly foreign to any issues here.) The letter closes as follows:

  "Papa will send the money. Write soon
                    "Love,                    Mama."
                

The letter does not give Newton's address, but the evidence shows that he was in Fort Worth. Appellants introduced in evidence a letter from Newton to his mother. It is without date and does not give his address. It is lengthy, and we state only some of its contents. It acknowledges receipt of a letter from his mother the day he wrote, and with reference to "the girl I married, asking me whether or not I loved her." The letter states he does not love her, but hates her, and would never as long as he lived consider living with her, and planned to quit her weeks before he did; states he loaths and despises her, and prays that he "may never see her again in this life or in the hereafter"; advises against giving her money, consideration, or sympathy; did not know her condition and did not care, and all that he could "wish for her in this life is eternal trouble," and saying: "I would not take her back nor help her even if you asked me to, nor do I have any sympathy for her. I must close hoping that I have expressed myself clearly."

The above letter was read to appellee before appellee went to Fort Worth.

We state some uncontroverted facts from the record. When appellee returned from California she went to see the appellants at their home in Abilene. That was about...