Jackson v. Jones
| Decision Date | 28 November 1995 |
| Docket Number | 78097,Nos. 77785,s. 77785 |
| Citation | 907 P.2d 1067,1995 OK 131 |
| Parties | Daniel JACKSON and Cheri Denise Cox, Plaintiffs-Appellants and Counter-Appellees, v. Roxie T. JONES, Abraham B. Hagens, Shelby L. Perry, Mid-Century Insurance Company and The City of Oklahoma City, Defendants-Appellees and Counter-Appellants. |
| Court | Oklahoma Supreme Court |
Richard A. Nelson, Oklahoma City, for Appellant, and Counter-Appellee, Daniel Jackson.
R. Lyle Clemens, Clemens, Holshouser, Pate & Klein, Oklahoma City, for Appellant, Cheri Denise Cox.
Harry R. Palmer, Jr., Oklahoma City, for Appellee, Roxie T. Jones.
Greg D. Givens, Brian Husted and Robert D. Ramage, Edmonds, Cole, Hargrave, Givens & Witzke, Oklahoma City, for Appellee and Counter-Appellant, Abraham B. Hagens.
William J. Molinsky, Don Manners Law Office, David D. Wilson and Joseph T. Acquaviva, Jr., Wilson, Cain & McAtee, Oklahoma City, for Appellee, Shelby L. Perry.
Lana Cohlmia, Culp, Heath, Sushnik, Percival & Percival, Oklahoma City, for Appellee, Mid-Century Insurance Co.
James G. Hamill, Municipal Counsellor, Richard N. Mann, Richard C. Smith, John M. Jacobsen and Deborah L. Jacobson, Assistant Municipal Counsellors, Oklahoma City, for Appellee, The City of Oklahoma City.
Two issues are dispositive on certiorari: (1) Did the trial court err when it entered judgment against the plaintiffs upon sustaining the three defendants' demurrers to the evidence? (2) Is the appellate court's decision granting nisi prius costs to the jury-exonerated defendant reviewable on certiorari now before us? We answer the first question in the affirmative and the second in the negative.
Roxie T. Jones [Jones] was travelling westbound on Interstate 40 in the left-hand lane near Westminster Road in Oklahoma County. She was following an Oklahoma City [City] Police Officer [Officer]. Traffic, which had just completed its passage through a construction stretch of the Interstate highway where it had been choked down to a single lane, had begun to diffuse into multiple lanes. The Officer activated his emergency lights (but not his audible siren) and turned into the center median to pursue an eastbound speeder. Interpreting his action as an order for her to stop, Jones pulled over onto the median about one quarter mile ahead of the Officer. She stopped with part of her station wagon extending backwards into the fast traffic lane. Shelby L. Perry [Perry], who was following Jones in his motor home, succeeded in stopping behind her vehicle. 1 An unidentified truck hauling a boat trailer (which was in line of traffic following Perry) maneuvered around the mobile home into the adjacent right-hand lane. Daniel Jackson [Jackson or motorist], whose vehicle was following immediately behind the truck/boat trailer, collided with the Perry mobile home, injuring both him and his passenger Cheri Denise Cox [Cox or passenger]. Their light truck came to rest at an angle with the right side exposed to traffic. Abraham B. Hagens' [Hagens] car struck the Jackson/Cox truck on the passenger side, resulting in a more extensive injury to its occupants. According to some testimony, the entire sequence of events transpired within a few seconds.
Jackson and Cox brought negligent tort actions 2 against the City, Jones, Perry and Hagens. Their claims against the City are rested upon its Officer's violation of a statutory duty which, they allege, constitutes negligence per se. 3 The case went to a jury. At the close of Jackson's and Cox's case the trial court sustained demurrers to the evidence interposed by the City, Jones and Perry. It ruled that (1) the Officer was not primarily negligent because the double-impact collision was not a foreseeable result of his act of turning into the median, (2) Perry was not primarily culpable because his behavior was reasonable and, (3) regardless of the Officer's and Jones' negligence, Perry's acts constituted a supervening cause which effectively insulated the others from liability. Jackson's suit against Hagens (the only remaining defendant in the case) proceeded to verdict without Cox's participation. Her claim against Hagens had been settled. 4 Jackson was adjudged 80% negligent and Hagens 20%. In a post-trial proceeding Hagens sought to recover his nisi prius court costs, which the trial court denied. Jackson and Cox, whose new trial quests were also refused, appealed for review of (1) the judgment on demurrers' sustention and of (2) the new trial denial. 5 Hagens appealed for corrective relief from denial of his nisi prius costs. 6 The Court of Appeals affirmed the nisi prius judgment on demurrers but reversed the decision on costs. The latter were ordered taxed against Jackson. Jackson and Cox were granted certiorari review of that portion of the appellate court opinion which affirmed the trial court's judgment on demurrers and its denial of new trial; Jackson did not seek relief from the Court of Appeals' costs award to Hagens.
DEFENDANTS' DEMURRERS
THE STANDARD OF REVIEW FOR THE NISI PRIUS JUDGMENT ON
When a trial court considers a demurrer to the evidence 7 it must take as true all evidence (together with all reasonable inferences) favorable to the party against whom relief is sought and disregard any conflicting evidence that may favor the demurrant. 8 A demurrer should be overruled unless there is an entire absence of proof tending to show a right to recover. 9 In short, the demurrer must be denied if the opponent has made out a prima facie case. 10 A reviewing court will examine the record in light most favorable to the plaintiff (disregarding conflicts or contrary inferences) but will disturb the nisi prius sustention of a demurrer only if there is competent evidence to support the material elements of the plaintiff's cause of action. 11
EITHER DISPUTED FACTS OR CONFLICTING INFERENCES DEDUCIBLE
FROM UNDISPUTED FACTS WILL COMPEL SUBMISSION OF
THE OFFICER'S AND PERRY'S DIRECT
Three evidentiary elements essential to a prima facie case of negligence are (1) a duty owed by the defendant to protect the plaintiff from injury, (2) a failure properly to exercise or perform that duty and (3) the plaintiff's injuries proximately caused by the defendant's breach. 12 If facts relevant to the question of primary negligence are in dispute, the issue must be submitted to the jury. 13 Whenever uncontroverted proof lends support to conflicting inferences, the choice to be made between opposite alternatives also presents an issue of fact for the trier. 14
It is uncontroverted that the Officer entered the median without operating his audible siren. Neither is it disputed that traffic behind him was fanning out into the unblocked beginning of the right lane. One potential inference from this evidence is that, under the circumstances, the Officer may have created a foreseeable risk of harm. Although this inference is permissibly drawn from undisputed facts, the Officer's primary negligence nonetheless presents a question for the trier. 15
Whether Perry had sufficient opportunity to negotiate around the protruding Jones vehicle is in controversy. On this record it is impossible for us to say as a matter of law that Perry's stopping was consistent with due care because his conduct was free from a reasonably foreseeable risk of harm.
NEITHER THE CONDUCT OF PERRY NOR THAT OF JACKSON (OR BOTH
Jackson and Cox urge reversible error in the trial court's ruling that sustained the three defendants' demurrers to their evidence. That decision was grounded in the notion that as a matter of law Perry's actions constitute a supervening event. Negligence is not actionable unless it proximately causes the harm for which liability is sought to be imposed. 17 In a negligent tort case the question of proximate cause 18 is generally one of fact for the jury. 19 It becomes one of law only when there is no evidence from which a jury could reasonably find a causal nexus between the act and the injury. 20 The presence of competent evidence to show this causal connection--i.e., whether there is any competent evidence that would support a jury finding of causation--is in turn a law question for the court. 21
The general rule is that the causal chain between a negligent act and an injury may be broken by an intervening event--a supervening cause. 22 Not every intervening event severs the causal link between negligent act and injury. 23 For example, when a cause merely combines with another act to produce injury, 24 or several events coincide to bring about a single injurious result, 25 each negligent actor may be held accountable. For an occurrence to rise to the magnitude of a supervening cause it must possess three attributes: (1) independence from the original negligent act, (2) adequacy of itself to bring about the complained-injury and (3) reasonable unforseeability. 26 The question of an intervening event's foreseeability calls for an evaluative determination 27 by the trier of fact. Whether the injurious consequences that resulted from the original negligence could have been reasonably foreseen is an issue traditionally within the realm of fact, not law. 28 If the intervening force is of a character which (under the circumstances) would induce belief that it might be reasonably expected to occur, the final element is not met and the causal chain will remain unbroken. 29
Disputed, relevant facts call for the jury's evaluative determination on this issue. 30 Whether Perry had sufficient room to remain in the left lane and still avoid Jones is in controversy. This means that whether Jones could reasonably anticipate Perry's stopping at the time and place in suit is a pure...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Beyrer v. Mule, LLC
...(Lerma v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. , 2006 OK 84, ¶ 5 n.2, 148 P.3d 880 ; Hough v. Leonard , 1993 OK 112, ¶ 1, 867 P.2d 438 )).18 1995 OK 131, 907 P.2d 1067.19 Id ., 907 P.2d at 1074.20 Taracorp, Ltd. v. Dailey , 2018 OK 32, n.4, 419 P.3d 217, 219 (quoting 12 O.S.Supp. 2013, Ch.15, App.1, Okla.......
-
Akin v. Missouri Pacific R. Co.
...Thompson v. Inman, 1971 OK 32, p 38, 482 P.2d 927, 937; Holloway v. Ward, 84 Okl. 247, 203 P. 217, 219 (1921).75 Jackson v. Jones, 1995 OK 131, p 5, 907 P.2d 1067, 1071-1072.76 McKellips v. St. Francis Hosp. Inc., 1987 OK 69, p 9, 741 P.2d 467, 471; Prest-O-Lite Co., Inc., v. Howery, 169 Ok......
-
Lockhart v. Loosen
...beyond the scope of our reviewing cognizance. Nichols v. Mid-Continent Pipe Line Co., 933 P.2d 272, 281 (Okla.1996); Jackson v. Jones, 907 P.2d 1067, 1074 n. 37 (Okla.1995); Morrow Dev. v. American Bank and Trust, 875 P.2d 411, 413 (Okla.1994); Hough v. Leonard, 867 P.2d 438 (Okla.1993).2 H......
-
Nealis v. Baird
...76. See text at Part II of this opinion. 77. Akin v. Missouri Pacific RR Co., 1998 OK 102, ¶ 36, 977 P.2d 1040, 1054; Jackson v. Jones, 1995 OK 131, ¶ 5, 907 P.2d 1067, 1071-1072; Lay v. Dworman, 1986 OK 85, ¶ 5, 732 P.2d 455, 457; Thompson v. Presbyterian Hosp., Inc., 1982 OK 87, ¶ 7, 652 ......