Jackson v. King
| Decision Date | 30 March 2013 |
| Docket Number | No. 2:12-CV-00421-MCA-RHS,2:12-CV-00421-MCA-RHS |
| Parties | JOHN W. JACKSON and SECOND AMENDMENT FOUNDATION, INC., Plaintiffs, v. GARY KING, in his Official Capacity as Attorney General of the State of New Mexico, and BILL HUBBARD, in his Official Capacity as Director of the Special Investigations Division of the New Mexico Department of Public Safety, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of New Mexico |
THIS MATTER is before the Court on Plaintiffs' Motion for Preliminary Injunction. [Doc. 18] The Court conducted oral argument on Plaintiffs' motion on December 18, 2012. [Doc. 27] Having considered the submissions, the relevant case law, and otherwise being fully advised in the premises, the Court grants Plaintiffs' motion.
On April 24, 2012, Plaintiffs John W. Jackson and the Second Amendment Foundation, Inc. (SAF), filed their Complaint [Doc. 1] "pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for deprivation of civil rights under color of law, [seeking] equitable, declaratory, and injunctive relief challenging the State of New Mexico's prohibition on otherwisequalified non-U.S. citizens who legally reside in New Mexico from obtaining a concealed carry permit, pursuant to section NMSA 1978, § 29-19-4(A)(1) of the New Mexico Concealed Handgun Carry Act." [Doc. 1 at 1] Plaintiffs allege that the citizenship requirement in Section 29-19-4(A)(1) violates the equal protection clause of the United States Constitution, the right to keep and bear firearms in the Second Amendment to the United States Constitution, and is preempted by federal immigration law. [Doc. 1 at 6-7]
On May 17, 2012, Defendants Gary King, Attorney General of the State of New Mexico, and Bill Hubbard, Director of the Special Investigations Division of the New Mexico Department of Public Safety, filed their Answer to Plaintiffs' Complaint. [Doc. 10] In their Answer Defendants admitted that "legal resident aliens are prohibited from carrying concealed weapons" and that "only citizens may carry concealed weapons." [Doc. 10 at 2]
On August 9, 2012, Plaintiffs filed Plaintiffs' Motion for Preliminary Injunction. [Doc. 18] In support of their motion, Plaintiffs submitted the Declaration of John W. Jackson, who averred that he is a permanent legal resident of the United States residing in Rio Rancho, Sandoval County, New Mexico, and that he is "prohibited by NMSA 1978, § 29-19-4A(1) from obtaining a concealed carry permit, and thus carrying a handgun in a concealed manner for self-defense." [Doc. 19] Plaintiffs also submitted the Declaration of Julianne Versnel, who is the Director of Operations of SAF. Ms. Versnel averred that SAF has "individual members and supporters who are adversely impacted by NMSA 1978, § 29-19-14(A)(1)" and that "[b]ut for criminal enactments challenged in thiscomplaint, SAF members who are legal aliens residing within New Mexico would obtain concealed carry permits and carry concealed firearms for their own defense." [Doc. 19] Plaintiffs contend that they are entitled to preliminary injunctive relief because "[t]he deprivations of constitutional rights subject Plaintiffs to irreparable harm, and is such a clear-cut constitutionally-inflicted harm that Plaintiffs are likely to succeed on the merits by the conclusion of this litigation." [Doc. 19 at 6] Plaintiffs further contend that the balance of the equities and the public interest would be served by awarding them the preliminary injunctive relief that they seek.
Defendants do not dispute that permanent resident aliens "are entitled to Second Amendment rights under the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment." [Doc. 20 at 4] Defendants contend, however, that no Second Amendment rights are at issue in this case because "the concealed carry of a firearm is not a constitutional right." [Id.] Defendants point out that Plaintiffs are free to carry firearms openly and to carry concealed firearms in their own home, on their own property, and in their own vehicle. Because there is no constitutional violation, Defendants argue that Plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction should be denied.
On September 19, 2012, the Court held a telephonic status conference regarding Plaintiffs' motion. At the status conference, the parties agreed that an evidentiary hearing was unnecessary, but requested oral argument. [Doc. 25] Oral argument on Plaintiffs' motion was held on Tuesday, December 18, 2012. [Doc. 27]
Following oral argument, Defendant King moved to dismiss Plaintiffs' Complaintfor failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted and for lack of standing, alleging that he is not responsible for the execution and administration of the Concealed Handgun Carry Act, NMSA 1978, § 29-19-1, et seq. and, therefore, Plaintiffs injuries are not traceable to him, nor redressable by him. [Doc. 28] The Court agreed and granted Defendant King's motion to dismiss. [Doc. 41] Accordingly, Defendant King is no longer a party to this case.
The decision to grant a preliminary injunction is within the Court's discretion. See Winnebago Tribe of Nebraska v. Stovall, 341 F.3d 1202, 1205 (10th Cir. 2003). "Because a preliminary injunction is an extraordinary remedy, the right to relief must be clear and unequivocal." Greater Yellowstone Coal. v. Flowers, 321 F.3d 1250, 1256 (10th Cir. 2003). "To obtain a preliminary injunction, the moving party must demonstrate: (1) a likelihood of success on the merits; (2) a likelihood that the movant will suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief; (3) that the balance of equities tips in the movant's favor; and (4) that the injunction is in the public interest." Attorney Gen. of Oklahoma v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 565 F.3d 769, 776 (10th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). "Generally, where the moving party has established that the [latter] three harm factors tip decidedly in its favor, the probability of success requirement is somewhat relaxed and the movant need only show questions going to the merits so serious, substantial, difficult and doubtful, as to make them a fair ground for litigation." Nova Health Sys. v. Edmondson, 460 F.3d 1295, 1298 n.6 (10th Cir.2006) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). However, this relaxed standard does not apply to the "three types of disfavored injunctions," which are:
(1) preliminary injunctions that alter the status quo; (2) mandatory preliminary injunctions; and (3) preliminary injunctions that afford the movant all the relief that it could recover at the conclusion of a full trial on the merits. When a preliminary injunction falls into one of these categories, it must be more closely scrutinized to assure that the exigencies of the case support the granting of a remedy that is extraordinary even in the normal course. A district court may not grant a preliminary injunction unless the moving party makes a strong showing both with regard to the likelihood of success on the merits and with regard to the balance of harms.
Awad v. Ziriax, 670 F.3d 1111, 1125 (10th Cir. 2012) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
Plaintiffs contend that the relaxed standard is applicable to this case because the "latter three elements weigh heavily in its favor." [Doc. 19 at 10 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)]. However, in Nova Health Systems, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals held that "where . . . the plaintiff seeks to enjoin the enforcement of a statute, a showing that the questions are 'fair ground for litigation' is not enough; the plaintiff must meet the traditional 'substantial likelihood of success' standard." 460 F.3d at 1298 n.6; see also Heideman v. South Salt Lake City, 348 F.3d 1182, 1189 (10th Cir. 2003) . Accordingly, the Court concludes that the relaxed standard is inapplicable to this case.
Schrier v. Univ. Of Colorado, 427 F.3d 1253, 1260 (10th Cir. 2005) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). In Nova Health Systems, the Court expressed no opinion as to whether a preliminary injunction seeking to enjoin the enforcement of a statute would alter the status quo and, therefore, be a disfavored injunction subject to the heightened standard of review. 460 F.3d at 1298 n.5.
The District of Kansas addressed this issue, however, in American Civil Liberties Union of Kansas and Western Missouri v. Praeger, 815 F.Supp.2d 1204 (D. Kan. 2011). In that case, the plaintiff sought "declaratory and injunctive relief to halt the enforcement of a Kansas statute which took effect on July 1, 2011." Id. at 1207. The Court held that, because the statute was newly enacted, the "last uncontested status between the parties before the dispute arose would be that which existed prior to the challenged statute taking effect." Id. at 1208. In arriving at this conclusion, the Court relied on the concurrence in O Centro Espirita Beneficiente Uniao Do Vegetal v. Ashcroft, 389 F.3d 973, 977 (10th Cir. 2004), which noted that "[w]hen a statute is newly enacted, and its enforcement will restrict rights citizens previously had exercised and enjoyed, it is not uncommon fordistrict courts to enjoin enforcement pending a determination of the merits of the...
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