Jackson v. Missouri Pacific R. Co.

Decision Date10 October 1986
Docket NumberNo. 85-2277,85-2277
Citation803 F.2d 401
Parties41 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. 1836, 41 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 36,662 Elvin JACKSON, Appellee, v. MISSOURI PACIFIC RAILROAD COMPANY, Appellant.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit

Douglas C. Herbert, Jr., Washington, D.C., for appellant.

Susan M. Rogers, Little Rock, Ark., for appellee.

Before LAY, Chief Judge, BRIGHT and ROSENN, * Senior Circuit Judges.

BRIGHT, Senior Circuit Judge.

Missouri Pacific Railroad (MOPAC) appeals from a judgment of the district court which held that MOPAC discriminated and retaliated against a black employee, Elvin Jackson, on the basis of his race in violation of 42 U.S.C. Secs. 1981, 2000e and 1988. For reversal, MOPAC asserts that the district court's findings are inadequate under Fed.R.Civ.P. 52. MOPAC also contends that the district court erred in finding that it discriminated against Jackson (1) in denying him a promotion, and (2) in the assignment of relief foreman work. MOPAC further argues that the district court erroneously concluded that MOPAC discriminated and retaliated against Jackson in discharging him. Finally, MOPAC asserts that the district court's damage award must be reversed. We affirm in part, and reverse in part and remand for further proceedings.

I. BACKGROUND

MOPAC hired Jackson in its North Little Rock terminal as a laborer in February of 1970, and promoted him to a journeyman carman position on April 1, 1973. In April of 1977, Jackson began working intermittently as a relief car foreman, and inquiring about promotion to a permanent car foreman position. According to the testimony of MOPAC officials, this promotion required at least three months of relief car foreman experience. MOPAC officials also testified that the railroad had a "preference" for promoting foremen away from their home base. In general, local officials would recommend candidates for promotion to MOPAC officials in St. Louis, who made the ultimate decision. Although Jackson testified that local officials indicated they were considering him for promotion as early as 1978, they did not formally recommend him for promotion until the fall of 1979.

In addition, under the collective bargaining agreement, a relief foreman could obtain an "automatic" promotion to permanent car foreman after performing relief work four days per week for a period of ninety days. To avoid such automatic promotions, MOPAC officials regularly "broke" the service of relief foremen, including Jackson, before they completed this ninety-day period.

Throughout 1978, 1979, and 1980, Jackson performed relief foreman work on a regular basis. In 1978 and 1979, MOPAC promoted four white carmen to the permanent car foreman position in the North Little Rock terminal. Prior to promotion, two of these employees were stationed at the North Little Rock terminal, while the other two transferred from out of town.

In January of 1980, MOPAC promoted Jackson to a permanent car foreman position in Kansas City, Missouri. However, due to the health of his family and the lack of job opportunities for his wife, Jackson resigned the position. Exercising his seniority rights as a carman, Jackson returned to work in the North Little Rock terminal in May of 1980. Again, Jackson regularly performed relief car foreman assignments.

In December of 1980, MOPAC "automatically" promoted a white employee from the North Little Rock terminal to a permanent car foreman position. In February of 1981, MOPAC promoted a black carman (also from the North Little Rock terminal) to a permanent car foreman position in the North Little Rock terminal in settlement of a lawsuit, and also promoted a white employee from out of town to a similar position. In February of 1982, MOPAC promoted another black employee (from the North Little Rock terminal) to a permanent car foreman position in the North Little Rock terminal. 1

In 1979, Jackson began to complain to MOPAC officials of discrimination in the scheduling of relief car foreman assignments. Although he was the most senior relief car foreman, Jackson generally received third shift and weekend schedules. In April of 1981, MOPAC stopped assigning Jackson relief car foreman work. Jackson testified that he requested relief car foreman work at a meeting with MOPAC officials in July of 1981. However, MOPAC officials testified that at this meeting Jackson refused to accept such assignments until MOPAC changed its scheduling procedures to be unbiased. Jackson testified that he again specifically requested relief car foreman work in late 1981, but received no assignments.

In December of 1981, MOPAC disciplined Jackson for failing to inspect and repair defects on a train which derailed. Jackson waived formal investigation and accepted a thirty-day deferred suspension.

On March 1, 1982, Jackson filed this suit alleging that MOPAC denied him a promotion based on his race. On August 5, 1982, Jackson inspected a train which later derailed sixty miles from the North Little Rock terminal. An investigation revealed the probable cause of the derailment to be lack of oil in a journal box which caused the box to overheat and burn out. After a hearing, MOPAC dismissed Jackson on August 22, 1982, for failure to properly inspect and service the journal box which caused the derailment. At the same time, MOPAC discharged Jackson's co-worker for the same reason. After Jackson appealed his discharge, MOPAC reinstated Jackson as a carman in June of 1983.

In March and July of 1983, Jackson amended his complaint to allege that his discharge constituted further discrimination and retaliation for filing this lawsuit against MOPAC.

After a four-day bench trial, the district court held that MOPAC: (1) denied Jackson a promotion to permanent car foreman in the North Little Rock terminal based on his race; (2) denied Jackson relief car foreman assignments after April of 1981 based on his race; (3) discharged Jackson based on his race and in retaliation for filing this lawsuit. The district court ordered MOPAC to appoint Jackson to the next available permanent car foreman position in the North Little Rock terminal, and to backdate Jackson's seniority in this position to June 1, 1979. The district court further ordered MOPAC to pay Jackson the difference in salary and benefits he would have received as permanent car foreman retroactive to June 1, 1979, and awarded Jackson backpay and benefits for the period during which he was discharged. Finally, the district court directed the parties to stipulate to the exact amount of backpay due Jackson, and retained jurisdiction of the matter to resolve issues of damage calculations.

II. DISCUSSION
A. Standard of Review

MOPAC first asserts that the district court's findings of fact are conclusory and lack sufficient specificity and detail to afford this court a clear understanding of the basis of its decision. See Christensen v. Great Plains Gas Co., 418 F.2d 995, 1000 (8th Cir.1969). In addition, MOPAC notes that the district court practically adopted verbatim Jackson's proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law. MOPAC contends that these deficiencies entitle this court to employ a de novo standard of review, rather than the clearly erroneous standard of Fed.R.Civ.P. 52(a). We disagree.

In Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 105 S.Ct. 1504 (1985), the Supreme Court reaffirmed that Fed.R.Civ.P. 52(a) bars reviewing courts from deciding factual issues de novo, and requires the exercise of even greater deference to findings based on credibility determinations. Id. 105 S.Ct. at 1512. In Anderson, the Supreme Court also observed that "even where the trial judge adopts proposed findings verbatim, the findings are those of the court and may be reversed only if clearly erroneous." Id. at 1511 (citations omitted). Because this case presents factual findings of intentional discrimination and retaliation, we must employ the clearly erroneous standard of review. "[A] finding is 'clearly erroneous' when although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed." United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395, 68 S.Ct. 525, 541-42, 92 L.Ed. 746 (1948). Under this standard of review, we turn to MOPAC's allegations of error.

B. Discriminatory Promotion

In deciding Jackson's discrimination claims, the district court applied the three-stage analysis for disparate treatment claims set forth in Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 101 S.Ct. 1089, 67 L.Ed.2d 207 (1981) and McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973). MOPAC contends that the district court erred in finding that it discriminatorily denied Jackson a promotion to the permanent car foreman position in the North Little Rock terminal. In support of this contention, MOPAC makes four specific allegations of error. First, MOPAC disputes the finding that Jackson qualified for promotion in April of 1977. MOPAC asserts and Jackson concedes that three months' experience as a relief car foreman constituted the minimum qualification for promotion to permanent car foreman. The record demonstrates that Jackson began to perform relief car foreman work in April of 1977, continued working "off and on" in this capacity throughout 1977, and almost exclusively worked in this capacity throughout 1978 and 1979. We agree that the district court erred in concluding Jackson qualified for promotion as of April 1977. However, because the record shows that Jackson would have satisfied the three-month experience requirement in early 1978 and the district court only compensated Jackson's claim from June 1, 1979, when he clearly qualified for promotion, we believe this finding constitutes harmless error.

MOPAC also argues that the district court erroneously concluded that MOPAC pursued a ...

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