Jackson v. Motel 6 Multipurpose, Inc.

• Decision Date: 10 December 1997
• Docket Number: No. 97-2360,97-2360
• Citation: 130 F.3d 999
• Parties: 72 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 45,151, 39 Fed.R.Serv.3d 441, 11 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. C 852 Janet JACKSON, Delois Evans, Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. MOTEL 6 MULTIPURPOSE, INC.; Motel 6 G.P., Inc.; Motel 6 Operating L.P.; IBL Limited, Inc., d.b.a. Motel 6; Accor S.A.; Defendants-Appellants. Mario PETACCIA; Brenda Hatcher; Tanya Charles; Chervon Screen; Jennifer Bethel; James Sterns; Pitrell Lambert-Brown; Karl Baldwin; Marcian Killsnight, for themselves and all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. MOTEL 6 G.P., INC.; Motel 6 Operating L.P. d.b.a. Motel 6, Defendants-Appellants.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Eleventh Circuit

Page 999

130 F.3d 999

72 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 45,151, 39 Fed.R.Serv.3d 441,

11 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. C 852

Janet JACKSON, Delois Evans, Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. MOTEL 6 MULTIPURPOSE, INC.; Motel 6 G.P., Inc.; Motel 6

Operating L.P.; IBL Limited, Inc., d.b.a. Motel

6; Accor S.A.; Defendants-Appellants.

Mario PETACCIA; Brenda Hatcher; Tanya Charles; Chervon

Screen; Jennifer Bethel; James Sterns; Pitrell

Lambert-Brown; Karl Baldwin; Marcian Killsnight, for

themselves and all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. MOTEL 6 G.P., INC.; Motel 6 Operating L.P. d.b.a. Motel 6,

Defendants-Appellants.

No. 97-2360.

United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit.

Dec. 10, 1997.

Hala A. Sandridge, Charles Wachter, Katherine Claire Lake, Edward M. Waller, Jr., John W. Robinson, IV, Fowler, White, Gillen, Boggs, Villareal and Banker, Tampa, FL, John R. Erickson, Michael F. Marino, William O. Bittman, Reed, Smith, Shaw & McClay, McLean, VA, for Defendants-Appellants.

Kent Spriggs, John C. Davis, Spriggs & Johnson, Tallahassee, FL, for Petaccia.

Audrey J. Anderson, Hogan & Hartson, Washington, DC, C. Oliver Burt, III, Lauren S. Dadario, Burt & Pucillo, W. Palm Beach, FL, Joseph M. Sellers, Avis Buchanan, Washington Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights and Urban Affairs, Washington, DC, for Jackson.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida.

Before TJOFLAT and BIRCH, Circuit Judges, and MARCUS ^*, District Judge.

TJOFLAT, Circuit Judge:

Motel 6 Multipurpose, Inc. ("Motel 6") seeks a writ of mandamus ¹ vacating a district court order, issued on February 21, 1997, authorizing the plaintiffs in two consolidated race discrimination cases to advertise their allegations to the public at large and to communicate with current and former Motel 6 employees through mass mailings. Motel 6 also requests that the writ direct the district court to decertify one of the two putative classes. We conclude that the district court's February 21 order constitutes an abuse of discretion, and that the challenged class was erroneously certified. We therefore grant the petition and issue the writ.

I.

Motel 6 owns and operates over 750 motels across the United States. The instant petition for mandamus arises from two consolidated cases alleging that Motel 6 has a nationwide practice or policy of discriminating against its customers and its employees on the basis of race. In the first case, five Motel 6 patrons ("the Jackson plaintiffs") claim that Motel 6 unlawfully discriminated against them on the basis of their race. They claim that they were either denied accommodations at a Motel 6 motel or provided substandard accommodations pursuant to an alleged nationwide Motel 6 practice or policy of (1) refusing to rent otherwise vacant rooms to blacks and other non-white persons, (2) segregating black patrons and other non-white patrons from white patrons within a single facility, and (3) providing substandard housekeeping and other services to black patrons and other non-white patrons as compared to white patrons. Two of the five named plaintiffs allege that they were denied rooms at the same motel; the remaining three named plaintiffs each allege that they were subjected to discriminatory treatment at three separate other motels. The Jackson plaintiffs seek, on behalf of themselves and similarly situated patrons of Motel 6, injunctive relief and money damages under Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a et seq., ² and under 42 U.S.C § 1981. ³

In the second case, five former Motel 6 employees ("the Petaccia plaintiffs") claim that, as Motel 6 employees, they were required to discriminate against black and other non-white patrons, that Motel 6 retaliated against them when they refused to do so, and that Motel 6's discrimination against blacks and other non-whites created a "hostile work environment." The Petaccia plaintiffs seek, on behalf of themselves and all Motel 6 employees who have been required to work in the alleged hostile environment, injunctive relief and money damages under § 1981 and the retaliation provision of Title II. ⁴

After the cases were consolidated, the plaintiffs moved for an order allowing them relief from the Middle District of Florida's Local Rule 4.04(e), which provides that

[i]n every case sought to be maintained by any party as a class action, all parties thereto and their counsel are hereby forbidden, directly or indirectly, orally or in writing, to communicate concerning such actions with any potential or actual class member, not a formal party to the case, without approval by the Court.

The district court granted relief from Local Rule 4.04(e) in a February 21, 1997, order that authorized the plaintiffs to:

1) establish a 1-800 number to which potential class members may call;

2) publish notices of the ongoing litigation in publications nationwide and solicit information about potential class members and their alleged experiences with discrimination at Motel 6 motels;

3) respond to requests for information from those who respond to the advertisements or call the 1-800 number;

4) distribute mass mailings to Motel 6 employees soliciting information regarding the plaintiffs' allegations of discrimination at Motel 6 motels; and

5) further communicate ex parte with any "persons who may have knowledge of" the alleged discrimination, except for current Motel 6 management or supervisory employees.

The district court entered this order allowing communication with potential class members even though it had not yet ruled on either the Jackson plaintiffs' or the Petaccia plaintiffs' motions for class certification. ⁵

Motel 6 then moved the lower court for a stay of the communications order pending appeal; that motion was denied. See Jackson v. Motel 6 Multipurposes, Inc., 172 F.R.D. 469 (M.D.Fla.1997). Motel 6 then appealed the denial of the motion for a stay and filed a petition for a writ of mandamus, on the ground that the lower court had misapplied the controlling precedents of Bernard v. Gulf Oil Co., 619 F.2d 459 (5th Cir.1980) (en banc) ⁶ and Gulf Oil Co. v. Bernard, 452 U.S. 89, 101 S.Ct. 2193, 68 L.Ed.2d 693 (1981). This court declined to stay the discovery order on appeal and denied the petition for mandamus. On May 1, 1997, Motel 6 requested a stay of the order from the Supreme Court. On May 2, Circuit Justice Kennedy denied that request.

On August 15, 1997, the district court certified the Jackson plaintiffs as class representatives and referred the question of certification of the Petaccia plaintiffs to a magistrate judge for further consideration.

Motel 6 now petitions for mandamus again, arguing that the communications order was an abuse of discretion ab initio, and also that because the Jackson plaintiffs cannot properly be certified as class representatives, that portion of the communications order allowing the Jackson plaintiffs to advertise their allegations nationwide and to communicate with current and former Motel 6 employees is entirely unnecessary and an abuse of the district court's discretion. ⁷ We agree that the communications order was an abuse of discretion from the beginning, and we agree that the Jackson class was erroneously certified. We therefore grant the writ and direct the district court to decertify the Jackson class and to vacate that portion of its February 21 order allowing the Jackson plaintiffs to communicate with putative class members. We also conclude that the February 21 order constitutes an abuse of discretion insofar as it authorizes the Petaccia plaintiffs to advertise their claims nationwide and conduct mass mailings to Motel 6 employees. We therefore also direct the district court to vacate the communications order insofar as it applies to the Petaccia plaintiffs. ⁸

II.

In In re Estelle, 516 F.2d 480 (5th Cir.1975), we outlined the purview of mandamus:

The Writs of Mandamus and Prohibition are granted sparingly. Such writs are reserved for really extraordinary cases, and should be issued only when the right to such relief is clear and indisputable. To some extent they are supervisory in nature and are used to confine an inferior court to a lawful exercise of its prescribed jurisdiction or to compel it to exercise its authority when it is its duty to do so. They are not to be used as a substitute for appeal, or to control the decision of the trial court in discretionary matters.

The Writ is thus a drastic remedy, that must not be used to regulate the trial court's judgment in matters properly left to its sound discretion, but that may be available to confine the lower court to the sphere of its discretionary power.

Id. at 483 (internal citations and quotations omitted). We may issue the writ "only in drastic situations, when no other adequate means are available to remedy a clear usurpation of power or abuse of discretion." In re Temple, 851 F.2d 1269, 1271 (11th Cir.1988).

We hold that the instant petition warrants the issuance of mandamus because the district court's order allowing the plaintiffs to communicate with potential class members was an abuse of discretion. The communications order was entered months prior to any decision regarding whether either of the two proposed classes would in fact be certified. While we cannot say that orders authorizing communication with potential class members may never precede class certification, district courts must strive to avoid authorizing injurious class communications that might later prove unnecessary. An order authorizing class communications prior to class certification is likely to be an abuse of discretion when (1) the communication authorized by the order is widespread and clearly injurious and (2) a certification decision is not imminent or it is unlikely that a class will in fact be certified. In such circumstances, the danger of abuse that always attends class communications--the possibility that plaintiffs might use widespread...