Jackson v. N.J. Juvenile Justice Comm'n

Decision Date03 January 2023
Docket NumberCivil Action 19-17950 (SDW) (AME)
PartiesANTHONY JACKSON, Plaintiff, v. NEW JERSEY JUVENILE JUSTICE COMMISSION, Defendant.
CourtU.S. District Court — District of New Jersey

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

OPINION

SUSAN D. WIGENTON, U.S.D.J.

Before this Court is Defendant New Jersey Juvenile Justice Commission's (Defendant) Motion for Summary Judgment (“Motion”) pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (“Rule”) 56. Jurisdiction is proper pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1367. Venue is proper pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b). This opinion is issued without oral argument pursuant to Rule 78. For the reasons stated herein, Defendant's Motion is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY[1]

This lawsuit arises from Plaintiff Anthony Jackson's (Plaintiff) claims that Defendant discriminated against him on the basis of his race and religion in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII) and the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination (“NJLAD”), and that Defendant retaliated against Plaintiff because he reported such discrimination. (See generally D.E. 1.) Plaintiff an African American man and practicing Muslim, is employed as a Senior Correctional Police Officer (“SCPO”) at Defendant's Jamesburg facility (“Jamesburg Facility”). (D.E. 48-2 ¶¶ 1, 2; D.E. 52-1 ¶¶ 1, 3-8, 15-16.) Defendant is a New Jersey state entity headquartered in Trenton, New Jersey. (D.E. 1 ¶ 2; D.E. 48-2 ¶ 2.) The following events preceded the instant suit.

A. Plaintiff's Employment History with Defendant

From 2005 until 2015, Plaintiff served as an officer at the New Jersey Department of Corrections (“DOC”). (D.E. 48-2 ¶ 11; D.E. 52-1 ¶¶ 14-15.) In 2015, Plaintiff was transferred from the DOC to serve as an SCPO at Defendant's Jamesburg Facility. (D.E. 48-2 ¶¶ 1, 11; D.E. 52-1 ¶¶ 14-15.) Plaintiff testified that he experienced and complained about unfair treatment at the Jamesburg Facility. (D.E. 52-1 ¶¶ 30-31.) Specifically, in September 2016, Plaintiff began filing written complaints about “unfair treatment” by his supervisor, Lieutenant Gene Tomsky. (Id. ¶¶ 30-31.) Plaintiff further testified that he made other written and verbal complaints throughout his employment, including complaints about the unequal training opportunities available to certain employees, the illegal presence of drugs and other contraband at the jail, and the inconsistent disciplinary actions taken against him and other employees. (Id. ¶ 31.) Indeed, between January 2017 and May 2018, Plaintiff was charged with seven disciplinary infractions- six for attendance-related violations and one “for violating an unspecified rule, regulation or policy.” (D.E. 48-2 ¶ 15.) On or about March 26, 2018, Plaintiff submitted to the EEOC a Charge of Discrimination (“Charge”) against Defendant; however, Defendant did not receive it until more than one year later when the EEOC provided to Defendant a “final determination” letter on June 18, 2019. (Id. ¶ 16; D.E. 48-25)

On April 2, 2018, Plaintiff was selected for a random drug test (“RDT”) pursuant to Defendant's Random Drug Testing Policy (Defendant's RDT Policy”). (D.E. 48-2 ¶¶ 12-14, 16.) This occasion was the first time that Plaintiff had been selected for an RDT while employed at the Jamesburg Facility. (Id. ¶ 12.) On April 10, 2018, Plaintiff completed the RDT. (Id. ¶ 14.) Less than two months later, Plaintiff was selected for another RDT. (Id. ¶¶ 12, 14.) Plaintiff did not complete the second RDT allegedly due to his religious obligations during and after the Islamic Holy Month of Ramadan. (D.E. 48-2 ¶¶ 34-45, 51-53; D.E. 52-1 ¶¶ 10-13, 22-26.) Because Plaintiff was unable or refused to provide a urine specimen on June 15, 2018 (June 15 RDT), he was immediately and indefinitely suspended from employment at the Jamesburg Facility. (D.E. 48-2 ¶¶ 51-54; D.E. 52-1 ¶¶ 16, 28.) The policies and circumstances surrounding the June 15 RDT are the main subjects of this litigation.

B. Defendant's RDT Policy

At all times relevant to this dispute, Defendant maintained an RDT policy. (D.E. 48-2 ¶¶ 3-4.) Prior to 2018, Defendant was permitted-but not required-to conduct RDTs of its law enforcement personnel pursuant to the then-current Drug Testing Policy from the New Jersey Office of the Attorney General (“NJAG”). (Id. ¶ 4.) In March of 2018, however, the NJAG changed course when it issued Directive 2018-2,[2] which effectively stripped all state, county, and municipal law enforcement agencies of their discretion to conduct RDTs of personnel. (D.E. 482 ¶ 7.) Directive 2018-2 mandated that all law enforcement agencies revise their RDT policies to, inter alia, subject all officers to the RDT process and drug test, at random, a minimum number of such officers per year-at least 10 percent in 2018 and 20 percent annually thereafter. (Id.) Moreover, Directive 2018-2 instructed agencies to ensure that their RDT policies were consistent with certain procedures set forth in the Attorney General's Law Enforcement Drug Testing Policy (“NJAG Testing Policy”), including: Specimen Acquisition Procedures; Submissions of Specimens for Analysis; Analysis of Specimens; Drug Test Results; Consequences of a Positive Test Result; Consequences of a Refusal to Submit to a Drug Test; Resignation/Retirement in lieu of Disciplinary Action; Record Keeping; and Central Drug Registry. (D.E. 48-17 at 22.)

In relevant part, Defendant's RDT Policy provides that [a]ll Officers employed by [Defendant] are eligible for random drug testing, regardless of rank or assignment.” (D.E. 48-2 ¶ 4.) Each time Defendant conducts a random selection, it chooses “5% of those employees eligible for selection,” but [Defendant] reserves the right to change th[at] percentage.” (Id.) “Once the percentage to be tested is set,” the [third-party computer] program cannot be manipulated.”[3] (Id. ¶¶ 4, 8.) The program then “assign[s] a random number to each eligible employee.” (Id. ¶ 4.) “The employee list [is] sorted in the ascending order of the randomly assigned number,” and the “employees who fall in the specified percentage of the randomly sorted list [are] tested.” (Id.) The RDT selection process is “conducted on the first business day of every month,” and is “done in its entirety each and every time a selection takes place, with no regard to previous selections.” (Id. ¶¶ 4, 10.) Indeed, “each and every Officer, regardless of rank or assignment, has an equal chance to be selected for drug testing each and every time a selection is conducted.” (Id. ¶ 4.) This process means that the RDT program could select the same employee, at random, in consecutive RDT selections. (Id. ¶ 9.)

After an individual is selected, an investigator from the Office of Investigations (“OOI”) will notify the individual of his or her selection.[4] (Id. ¶ 4.) “Upon such notice, the individual . . . report[s] immediately to the area designated in order to submit a urine sample.” (Id.) In accordance with the NJAG Testing Policy, Defendant's RDT Policy allowed only urine specimens to be used for drug testing. (Id. ¶¶ 4-5.) Defendant's RDT Policy mandates that [a]n order to provide a urine sample for random drug testing is a direct order,” and [n]o Officer has the right to refuse the order or fail to provide all necessary information to complete the random drug testing procedure.” (Id. ¶ 4.) Moreover, [n]o Officer has the right to delay the order for any reason.” (Id.)

Defendant's RDT Policy regarding the inability or refusal to produce urine-the key policy at issue here-provides:

Individuals that initially are unable to produce a urine specimen may remain under the supervision of the test monitor until the monitor is satisfied that the individual cannot produce a specimen. While the individual is under supervision, the monitor may allow the individual to drink fluids in an attempt to induce the production of a specimen. Failing to provide the urine specimen as required or leaving the specified area within an eight (8) hour time period will constitute a refusal.

(Id.; D.E. 48-10 at 7-8.) Further, “[officers who refuse to submit to a drug test ordered in response to . . . random selection . . . will be immediately suspended from all duties.” (D.E. 48-2 ¶ 4.)

“Upon a finding that the Officer did in fact refuse to submit a sample, the Officer will be terminated from employment with [Defendant] and permanently barred from future law enforcement employment in New Jersey.” (Id.) Defendant's RDT Policy governed the June 15 RDT and Plaintiff's subsequent suspension.

C. The June 15 RDT

On June 15, 2018, between approximately 10:27 and 10:40 a.m Plaintiff periodically drank from a water bottle as he walked in or around the New Jersey Training School (“NJTS”) Gatehouse Lobby and a nearby parking lot. (D.E. 48-2 ¶¶ 24-26; D.E. 52-1 ¶¶ 17-18.) At approximately 10:40 a.m., Plaintiff was ordered to report to the OOI. (D.E. 48-2 ¶ 27; D.E. 52-1 ¶ 18.) At that time, Plaintiff was unaware of his selection for an RDT. (D.E. 48-2 ¶¶ 28-29; D.E. 52-1 ¶¶ 18-19.) At 10:42 a.m., Plaintiff-with a water bottle in his hand-arrived at OOI. (D.E. 48-2 ¶ 29; D.E. 52-1 ¶ 17.) Upon arrival, Investigator Gary Saraceni informed Plaintiff that he had been selected for an RDT and that he would have to provide a urine specimen. (D.E. 48 ¶¶ 29-30; D.E. 52-1 ¶ 19.) Plaintiff explained that he had just used the bathroom because he believed he was going to OOI to meet with an investigator from the New Jersey Office of Equal Employment Opportunity (“EEO”). (D.E. 48-2 ¶¶ 28, 30; D.E. 52-1 ¶¶ 18, 20.) In accordance with Defendant's RDT Policy, Investigator Saraceni offered Plaintiff another bottle of water to help him produce a urine specimen. (D.E. 48-2 ¶¶ 4, 31; D.E. 52-1 ¶ 23.) Plaintiff...

To continue reading

Request your trial

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT