Jackson v. Nys Dep't Of Labor

Decision Date26 April 2010
Docket NumberNo. 09 Civ. 6608 (VM).,09 Civ. 6608 (VM).
Citation709 F.Supp.2d 218
PartiesShelley JACKSON, Plaintiff,v.NYS DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, Defendant.
CourtU.S. District Court — Southern District of New York

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Shelley Jackson, Flushing, NY, for Plaintiff.

Wesley Eugene Bauman, New York State Office of the Attorney General, New York, NY, for Defendant.

DECISION AND ORDER

VICTOR MARRERO, District Judge.

Pro se plaintiff Shelley Jackson (Jackson) brought this action against the New York State Department of Labor (DOL), claiming violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2 to 2000e-17 (Title VII); New York State Human Rights Law, N.Y. Exec. Law §§ 290 to 297 (“NYSHRL”); and New York City Human Rights Law, N.Y.C. Admin. Code §§ 8-101 to 131 (“NYCHRL”). Jackson alleges that DOL discriminated against her based on her race, sex, and religion. DOL moves pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) (Rule 12(b)(6)) and 12(b)(1) (Rule 12(b)(1)) to dismiss Jackson's complaint, dated July 15, 2009 (the “Complaint”), for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and failure to state a claim.1 Specifically, DOL asserts that (1) Jackson's Title VII claims should be barred as untimely; (2) Jackson may not maintain NYSHRL and NYCHRL claims against a state agency; (3) Jackson's NYSHRL and NYCHRL claims are barred pursuant to the election-of-remedies provisions in those laws; and (4) Jackson does not provide sufficient factual allegations in support of her claims. For the reasons stated below, DOL's motion to dismiss is GRANTED.

I. BACKGROUND 2

Jackson submitted her Complaint, which alleges violations of Title VII, NYSHRL, and NYCHRL, to this District's Pro Se Office on July 15, 2009. The Complaint was filed on July 24, 2009, after Jackson was granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis. According to her Complaint and Supplemental Pleading, DOL discriminated against her based on her race, sex, and religion, although she fails to identify her race or religion, leaving those spaces blank on the form complaint provided by the Pro Se Office.

Jackson alleges that DOL's discriminatory conduct included the “unequal terms and conditions of [her] employment,” “retaliation,” “harassment,” and “hostile work environment.” (Complaint ¶ II.A.) Jackson also asserts that the discriminatory conduct took place in 2007 and 2008, and finally, that she “was transferred to an undesirable work reassignment.” ( Id. ¶ II.E.) In her Supplemental Pleading, Jackson alleges “sexual harassment” and “retaliation,” which occurred in February 2008. (Supplemental Pleading ¶ II.A.) Jackson seeks relief in the form of “unspecified monetary damages.” ( Id. ¶ IV; Complaint ¶ IV.)

Attached to Jackson's Complaint is her first right-to-sue letter from the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) dated April 15, 2009 (the “Initial Right-to-Sue Letter”). ( See Complaint Ex. A.) She submitted her second right-to-sue letter, dated May 7, 2009 (the “Second Right-to-Sue Letter”), with her Supplemental Pleading. ( See Supplemental Pleading Ex. A.) Both letters indicate that the EEOC closed its files on Jackson's federal employment discrimination charges because it “adopted the findings of the state or local fair employment agency that investigated this charge.” ( Id.; Complaint Ex. A.) The findings relevant to the Initial Right-to-Sue Letter are described in the Determination and Order After Investigation issued by the New York State Division of Human Rights (the “SDHR”) and dated December 30, 2008. ( See Declaration of Counsel, dated December 2, 2009, Ex. B (the “SDHR Order”).) The Court has not been provided any SDHR documentation related to Jackson's Second Right-to-Sue Letter.

The SDHR Order states that Jackson filed a complaint with the SDHR on March 19, 2008 (the “SDHR Complaint”), alleging “that she was retaliated against for filing an internal complaint alleging she was being discriminated against because of her race and religion.” ( Id. at 1.) The SDHR found Jackson's claim meritless, noting that at the time she filed her SDHR Complaint she was still employed by DOL at the same title and pay grade she held before filing the internal complaint. The SDHR Order also observed that Jackson had a “contentious relationship” with Norma Aird, her supervisor, which “involved a record of cross-allegations of disrespect.” ( Id.)

According to the SDHR Order, although Jackson was issued disciplinary notices after she filed her internal discrimination complaint, she was also “issued disciplinary notices detailing insubordinate behavior” on January 1, 2007, and May 24, 2007, prior to when Jackson filed her internal discrimination complaint on June 5, 2007. ( Id. at 2.)

The SDHR Order further states that Jackson was instructed to attend training sessions in Buffalo and Albany, New York, even though she lives in the New York City metro area. The investigation revealed that Jackson ultimately took the required courses in the New York City metro area. Finally, the SDHR Order reports that Jackson was transferred out of her department.

II. LEGAL STANDARD
A. SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION

The inquiry on a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1) concerns whether the district court has the statutory or constitutional power to adjudicate the case. See Makarova v. United States, 201 F.3d 110, 113 (2d Cir.2000). [J]urisdiction must be shown affirmatively, and that showing is not made by drawing from the pleadings inferences favorable to the party asserting it.” Shipping Fin. Servs. Corp. v. Drakos, 140 F.3d 129, 131 (2d Cir.1998). “A plaintiff asserting subject matter jurisdiction has the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that it exists.” Makarova, 201 F.3d at 113. In reviewing a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, a court may consider evidence outside the pleadings. See id.

B. FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM

In assessing a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), dismissal of a complaint is appropriate if the plaintiff has failed to offer factual allegations sufficient to render the asserted claim plausible on its face. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, --- U.S. ----, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) ( quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007)). To state a facially plausible claim, a plaintiff must plead “factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. However, a court should not dismiss a complaint for failure to state a claim if the factual allegations sufficiently “raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955. The task of a court in ruling on a motion to dismiss is to “assess the legal feasibility of the complaint, not to assay the weight of the evidence which might be offered in support thereof.” In re Initial Publ. Offering Sec. Litig., 383 F.Supp.2d 566, 574 (S.D.N.Y.2005) (quotation marks and citation omitted).

For the purposes of deciding a motion to dismiss, the Court accepts the factual allegations in a complaint as true, and draws all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff's favor. See Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1950 (“When there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.”); Chambers v. Time Warner, Inc., 282 F.3d 147, 152 (2d Cir.2002). However, allegations that are no more than legal conclusions “are not entitled to the assumption of truth.” Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1950.

In the context of a discrimination claim, [t]he Iqbal plausibility standard applies in conjunction with employment discrimination pleading standards.” See Gillman v. Inner City Broad. Corp., No. 08 Civ. 8909, 2009 WL 3003244, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 18, 2009). Employment discrimination claims need not contain specific facts establishing a prima facie case of discrimination. See Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 514-15, 122 S.Ct. 992, 152 L.Ed.2d 1 (2002). Rather, an employment discrimination complaint “must include only a short and plain statement of the claim ... [that] give[s] the defendant fair notice of what the plaintiff's claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Id. at 512, 122 S.Ct. 992 (quotation marks and citations omitted); see also Patane v. Clark, 508 F.3d 106, 113 (2d Cir.2007) (applying Swierkiewicz to NYCHRL and NYSHRL discrimination claims).

In Twombly, the Supreme Court explicitly affirmed the Swierkiewicz pleading standard for employment discrimination claims. See 550 U.S. at 569 n. 14, 127 S.Ct. 1955 (“Here, our concern is not that the allegations in the complaint were insufficiently particular[ized]; rather, the complaint warranted dismissal because it failed in toto to render plaintiffs' entitlement to relief plausible.” (quotation marks and citations omitted)); see also Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1953 (“Our decision in Twombly expounded upon the pleading standard for all civil actions, and it applies to antitrust and discrimination suits alike.” (quotation marks and citation omitted)). The Swierkiewicz standard applies to all claims “that the McDonnell Douglas framework covers,” Boykin v. KeyCorp et al., 521 F.3d 202, 212 (2d Cir.2008) (quotation marks omitted), including claims of retaliation, disparate treatment, and hostile work environment. See, e.g., Kassner v. 2nd Ave. Delicatessen Inc., 496 F.3d 229, 241 (2d Cir.2007); Williams v. New York City Housing Auth., 458 F.3d 67, 72 (2d Cir.2006). Accordingly, [a]t the pleading stage of the case ... plaintiffs need not plead a prima facie case of discrimination ... so long as they provide in the complaint a short and plain statement of the claim that shows that plaintiffs are entitled to relief and that gives the defendant fair notice of plaintiffs' claim ... and the grounds upon which that claim rests.” Kassner...

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