Jackson v. People

• Decision Date: 02 October 1888
• Citation: 18 N.E. 286,126 Ill. 139
• Parties: JACKSON v. PEOPLE.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

126 Ill. 139

18 N.E. 286

JACKSON

v.PEOPLE.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

October 2, 1888.

Error to appellate court, First district.

Forrest & May, for plaintiff in error.

G. Hunt, Atty. Gen., for the State.

Plaintiff in error was indicted in the criminal court of Cook county for obtaining money under false pretenses. In the indictment he was charged with having knowingly, designedly, and falsely pretended to one John Hines that a certain horse which he proposed to sell, and did sell, to said Hines for the sum of $110 was a healthy horse, perfectly sound in all parts of its body, without bad habits or trick, was a good traveler, capable of trotting one mile in three minutes, and a good horse to be used in a buggy or wagon; whereas, on the contrary, said horse was unhealthy and diseased, and not perfectly sound in all parts of its body; and whereas, said horse was lame, balky, foundered, and unsound; and whereas, said horse was not without bad habits, but was tricky, and of bad habits; and whereas, said horse was not a good traveler; and whereas, said horse was not a good horse to be used in a buggy or wagon, or of the value of $110, but, on the contrary, said horse was utterly unfit to be used in a buggy or wagon or other vehicle whatsoever, and was wholly worthless, and of no value whatever; all of which the defendant well knew, etc. A jury was waived and trial had by the court, resulting in a finding of guilty, and sentence under the statute. On writ of error from the appellate court a judgment of affirmance was there rendered, and the defendant prosecutes this writ of error from this court.

SHOPE, J., ( after stating the facts as above.)

This is an indictment under section 96, Crim. Code, for obtaining money under false pretenses. The offense charged is that the defendant knowingly and falsely pretended to one Hines that a horse defendant was proposing to sell to Hines was healthy, perfectly sound, free from bad habits or tricks, was a good traveler, and a good horse to be used in a buggy or wagon. The errors assigned are that the verdict is not supported by the evidence; that improper evidence was admitted on behalf of the people; and that the court refused to hold as law applicable to the case certain propositions submitted in writing.

It is objected that the court erred in admitting, against the objection of defendant, parol evidence of representations made by the defendant to Hines at the time of the sale of the horse, for the reason, that certain instruments in writing were executed by the respective parties, as follows:

‘CHICAGO, June 22, 1885. I, Henry Jackson, sell and deliver to Mr. J. Hines one sorrel horse I warrant free from all incumbrance. He is seven years old, has good eyes, good wind, kind to handle in and out of stable, and I warrant he will trot a mile in three minutes; and I promise that, if the said horse don't come up to the above warranty, at the expiration of twenty days I will take him back, and refund the money, providing he is returned in the same condition as when delivered. And I, Mr. J. Hines, in consideration of this warranty alone, and not upon any verbal or other representations, pay to Henry Jackson the sum of $110. Received payment in full. HENRY JACKSON.’

‘CHICAGO, June 22d, 1885. I, Mr. J. Hines, bought from Henry Jackson one sorrel horse, which he warrants free from all incumbrance. He is seven years old, has good eyes, good wind, kind to handle in and out of the stable, and he warrants he will trot a mile in three minutes. And he promises, if said horse don't come up to the said warranty, at the expiration of twenty days he will take him back, and refund the money, providing he is returned in the same condition as when delivered. And I, Mr. J. Hines, in consideration of this warranty alone, and not upon any verbal or other representations, pay to Henry Jackson the sum of $110. Mr. J. HINES.’

It appears from the uncontradicted evidence of Hines that the representations alleged, and which were permitted to be proved, were made and the sale completed, including the payment of the money by Hines, and the receipt of it by the defendant, before the signing and delivery of said instrument. He testifies that, after the contract had been completed, including the payment of the money, the defendant produced the instrument before set out, and asked the witness to sign the latter one of them, which he did. It is not shown that any fraud was used to induce the execution of said instrument by Hines; but it is evident that while Hines signed the paper prepared and produced by defendant, he was induced to make the contract of purchase, relying upon the representations previously made by the defendant. He had told the defendant that he knew nothing about horses, and must rely upon his (defendant's) word as to the character and value of the horse. The witness asked defendant if he had a buggy with which the horse could be tried, to which defendant replied that the buggy had been sold separately, when the witness again said to the defendant, ‘I will have to take you at your word.’ The particular contention, however, is that the previous negotiations were merged in the writing, and parol evidence thereof was therefore inadmissible. And it is also said that the representations in the writing are warranties, and that a criminal prosecution cannot be predicated on a warranty. As before stated, the trade had been made, and the money obtained from Hines, upon the alleged fraudulent representation of the defendant, before the writings were produced by him. This is not a civil suit upon a contract, nor is the prosecution based upon the written warranty, but upon the fraud alleged to have been committed in obtaining the consent of Hines to part with his money, and neither rule contended for can therefore have any application to this case. It is needless to say that-even if Hines had understood the last clause of the instrument signed by him; that is, that, in consideration of the warranty alone, and not upon any verbal or other representation, he paid to defendant the money-the people would not be precluded from showing the true state of facts, and the consideration upon which the money was in fact paid. No statement or declaration of Hines, made after parting with his money upon the fraudulent representations of the defendant, would change the character of the transaction. The offense charged consisted in the fraud practiced by the defendant in knowingly and falsely representing and pretending that to be true which was not true, and by reason of which false and fraudulent pretenses Hines was induced to part with his money. If the rules contended for are to be applied in such case, every person selling property and obtaining money therefor by false pretenses can escape the penalty provided by law, by simply inducing the purchaser to accept a bill of sale in which some warranty may be inserted, and thus, by a show of fairness, be enabled the more effectually to perpetrate the fraud. The instrument prepared for execution beforehand, as was here done, might contain, in the form of warranty, the very representations relied upon by the purchaser, and if the acceptance of such instrument would absolve the defendant from criminal responsibility for pretenses before then made, he would be enabled, by changing the form, but not the substance, of his representations to more effectually carry out his fraudulent purposes. Careful as the law is of the rights of persons, we cannot lend our sanction to the application of the rules where it would be attended with such consequences.

It is further insisted that, even if it be clear that the...