Jackson v. Post Properties, Inc.
Decision Date | 01 March 1999 |
Docket Number | No. A98A1980.,A98A1980. |
Citation | 236 Ga. App. 701,513 S.E.2d 259 |
Parties | JACKSON v. POST PROPERTIES, INC. |
Court | Georgia Court of Appeals |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Carter & Ansley, Keith L. Lindsay, Robert A. Barnaby II, Atlanta, for appellant.
Johnson & Kane, Stephen R. Kane, Atlanta, for appellee. BLACKBURN, Judge.
Kim Jackson appeals the trial court's order granting Post Properties, Inc.'s (Post) renewed motion for summary judgment in this premises liability action. Jackson was raped by an unknown assailant after moving from an upper level unit to a ground level unit at Post Brook Apartments. She contends that issues of material fact involving inadequate security preclude summary judgment. We agree that issues of material fact exist and, therefore, reverse the trial court.
We review de novo a trial court's grant of summary judgment. Bandy v. Mills, 216 Ga.App. 407, 454 S.E.2d 610 (1995). Lau's Corp. v. Haskins, 261 Ga. 491, 405 S.E.2d 474 (1991).
The general rule is that a landlord is not an ensurer of his tenant's safety, Lau's Corp, supra at 492, 405 S.E.2d 474; however, the landlord does have a duty to exercise ordinary care to prevent foreseeable third-party criminal attack upon tenants. See Sturbridge Partners v. Walker, 267 Ga. 785, 482 S.E.2d 339 (1997). A tenant will be precluded from recovery, however, as a matter of law against the landlord when he or she has equal or superior knowledge of the risk and fails to exercise ordinary care for his or her own safety. O'Steen v. Rheem Mfg. Co., 194 Ga.App. 240, 242, 390 S.E.2d 248 (1990) (). See also Clark v. Carla Gay Dress Co., 178 Ga.App. 157, 342 S.E.2d 468 (1986).
Here Jackson knew of the risk of third-party criminal attack. Before Jackson was raped, another tenant had been raped in a ground floor apartment at Post Brook. When this rape occurred, Jackson lived at Post Brook in an upper level apartment where she had previously been the victim of an unsolved burglary. Post, in response to the rape, conducted town hall-type meetings with the residents and distributed community newsletters to address the residents' safety concerns. Jackson learned by attending these meetings and receiving the newsletters that the previous rape occurred in a ground floor unit and the suspect had not been apprehended. With knowledge of the prior rape and the experience of being the victim of an unsolved burglary, Jackson was on notice of the risk of third-party crime at Post Brook. When Jackson moved from her upper level apartment to the ground floor, she and Post had equal knowledge of the risk of third-party criminal attack, including rape. Thus, the central issue is whether Jackson could have taken any action in the exercise of ordinary care to avoid the consequences of Post's alleged negligence. Post and Jackson were equally aware of the risk of third-party criminal attack.
"[O]rdinary [care] is that degree of care which is exercised by ordinarily prudent persons under the same or similar circumstances." OCGA § 51-1-2. (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Lau's Corp. v. Haskins, supra at 493(2), 405 S.E.2d 474. Whether a party has failed to exercise ordinary care may be decided by the court only in cases in which "undisputable, plain and palpable facts exist on which reasonable minds could not differ as to the conclusion to be reached." (Punctuation omitted.) Bishop v. Mangal Bhai Enterprises, 194 Ga.App. 874, 875(2), 392 S.E.2d 535 (1990).
1. A question of fact exists as to the proper use of the window locks. Jackson alleges that the assailant entered through her sunroom window which was closed and locked. She claims that the night she was raped, the sunroom window was locked with the manufactured "spoon lock" and the "thumbscrew" locks which Post provided to all ground floor residents. Post contends that Jackson was improperly using the "thumbscrews" and, as a result, the assailant was able to gain entry through her sunroom window.
Our review of the record reveals a factual issue regarding the proper use of the "thumbscrews." Jackson admits in her deposition that she had been told by Post to place the "thumbscrews" at the bottom of the top frame. The night she was attacked the "thumbscrews" in her sunroom window were six to eight inches above the base of the frame so that she could more easily open the window for fresh air. The Executive Vice President of Services for Post deposed that Post had previously disseminated information in newsletters to residents regarding a proper use of the "thumbscrews." The newsletters indicated that a proper use of the "thumbscrews" required placing them at a point approximately six inches from the bottom. When Jackson was raped, her "thumbscrews" were placed at a point in compliance with this instruction.
2. Post contends that Jackson was responsible for reporting defects in the window...
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