Jackson v. O'Reilly Auto. Stores, Inc.

• Decision Date: 17 September 2015
• Docket Number: No. 3:12 C 01215.,3:12 C 01215.
• Citation: 131 F.Supp.3d 756
• Parties: Robert S. JACKSON, Plaintiff, v. O'REILLY AUTOMOTIVE STORES, INC., Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Middle District of Tennessee

131 F.Supp.3d 756

Robert S. JACKSON, Plaintiff,

v.O'REILLY AUTOMOTIVE STORES, INC., Defendant.

No. 3:12 C 01215.

United States District Court, M.D. Tennessee, Nashville Division.

Signed Sept. 17, 2015.

Kerry E. Knox, Castelli & Knox, LLP, Murfreesboro, TN, Stephen W. Grace, Grace and Rudy, Nashville, TN, for Plaintiff.

R. Dale Bay, Daniel W. Olivas, Samuel L. Jackson, Lewis, Thomason, King, Krieg & Waldrop, P.C., Nashville, TN, for Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

MARVIN E. ASPEN, District Judge.

Plaintiff Robert S. Jackson alleges that his former employer, Defendant O'Reilly Automotive Stores, Inc., discriminated against him by terminating his employment on January 6, 2011, in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"). Plaintiff also alleges that Defendant failed to engage in the interactive process required by the ADA and failed to reasonably accommodate his disability. A jury trial is scheduled to begin on October 6, 2015. Presently before us are five motions in limine filed by the parties in preparation for trial.

As set forth below, we grant Plaintiff's motion concerning evidence of collateral source benefits and Defendant's motion concerning evidence of the Letter of Determination issued by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC"). (Dkt. Nos. 48, 58.) We deny Plaintiff's additional motions without prejudice. (Dkt. Nos. 46–47.) We also grant Defendant's motion to exclude evidence of its May 7, 2012 letter to the EEOC under Rule 408

. (Dkt. No. 57.) We decline to rule on Defendant's related 29 C.F.R. § 1601.26(a) argument at this juncture.

To the extent that we herein deny the parties' motions for lack of specificity, the parties should submit additional briefs, on or by Monday, September 21, 2015, identifying the particular evidence in question and asserting the grounds for exclusion.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

"A district court's inherent authority to manage the course of its trials encompasses the right to rule on motions in limine. " Highland Capital Mgmt., L.P. v. Schneider, 551 F.Supp.2d 173, 176–77 (S.D.N.Y.2008)

(citing Luce v. United

States,

469 U.S. 38, 41 n. 4, 105 S.Ct. 460, 463, 83 L.Ed.2d 443 (1984) ). "The Federal Rules of Evidence, the Federal Rules of Criminal and Civil Procedure and interpretive rulings of the Supreme Court and this court all encourage, and in some cases require, parties and the court to utilize extensive pretrial procedures—including motions in limine —in order to narrow the issues remaining for trial and to minimize disruptions at trial." United States v. Brawner, 173 F.3d 966, 970 (6th Cir.1999) ; see United States v. Huff, 10 CR 73, 2011 WL 4916195, at *1 (E.D.Tenn. Oct. 27, 2011). Because a ruling on a motion in limine is "subject to change as the case unfolds," this ruling constitutes a preliminary determination in preparation for trial. See Luce, 469 U.S. at 41, 105 S.Ct. at 463 ; United States v. Yannott, 42 F.3d 999, 1007 (6th Cir.1994). A district court's rulings on in limine motions will be reversed only where the court abuses its discretion, that is, "when it relies on clearly erroneous findings of fact, when it improperly applies the law, or when it employs an erroneous legal standard." United States v. Gunter, 551 F.3d 472, 483 (6th Cir.2009) ; United States v. Cline, 362 F.3d 343, 348–49 (6th Cir.2004).

ANALYSIS

We first shall briefly address two unopposed motions and then will consider the disputed motions in greater detail.

Plaintiff filed three motions in limine, seeking to preclude Defendant from: (1) asking leading questions of defense witnesses called by Plaintiff; (2) offering evidence of any irrelevant work misconduct; and (3) introducing evidence of collateral source benefits. (See Dkt. Nos. 46–48.) Defendant has not filed any opposition to motion concerning collateral source benefits, (Dkt. No. 48), and that motion is hereby granted. Defendant shall not offer any evidence concerning Plaintiff's receipt of payments from collateral sources, including, for example, unemployment compensation or insurance benefits. See, e.g., Jackson v. City of Cookeville, 31 F.3d 1354, 1359 (6th Cir.1994)

("The collateral source rule is a substantive rule of law that bars a tortfeasor from reducing damages owed to a plaintiff by the amount of recovery the plaintiff receives from sources that are collateral to the tortfeasor.").

Defendant filed two motions in limine, seeking to exclude: (1) the EEOC's May 15, 2012 Letter of Determination and any pertinent materials or testimony; and (2) Defendant's statements in a May 7, 2012 letter it sent the EEOC during the conciliation process. (See Dkt. Nos. 57–58.) Plaintiff represents that he does not intend to offer the Letter of Determination into evidence and does not contest Defendant's related motion. (Pl.'s Resp. (Dkt. No. 74) at 1.) Accordingly, we grant Defendant's motion concerning the Letter of Determination, (Dkt. No. 58). Plaintiff shall not introduce the Letter of Determination, the additional letter enclosed with it, or any related testimony.

A. Plaintiff's Motion Concerning the Use of Leading Questions for Adverse Witnesses

In his first motion in limine, Plaintiff states that he intends to call "certain of Defendant's agents and representatives as witnesses." (MIL re: Leading (Dkt. No. 46) at 2.) Although he has not identified any particular witness, he seeks permission to ask leading questions of those agents and employees during direct examination, as they are adverse to his position. (Id. at 1–2.) Plaintiff further asks that we preclude Defendant from likewise using leading questions on cross-examination of such witnesses. (Id. ) Defendant opposes the motion. (Dkt. No. 69.)

As for the first part of Plaintiff's request, it is uncontroversial that a party may use leading questions during direct examination of a hostile or adverse witness. Fed. R.Evid. 611(c)(2)

("Ordinarily, the court should allow leading questions ... (2) when a party calls a hostile witness, an adverse party, or a witness identified with an adverse party."). This issue, however, is not appropriately addressed in a motion in limine. When Plaintiff actually calls particular witnesses at trial, he may explain why they are adverse and ask our permission at that time to use leading questions. Absent any unusual circumstances, we will permit him to do so. See, e.g., Robinson v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 86 Fed.Appx. 73, 76 (6th Cir.2004) (noting that Rule 611(c)(2) does not create an absolute right but requires consideration under the specific facts).

As for the second part of Plaintiff's request, the Advisory Committee note to Federal Rule of Evidence 611(c)

addresses this specific situation. Fed.R.Evid. 611(c) advisory committee's note. It explains that the rule provides "a basis for denying the use of leading questions when the cross-examination is cross-examination in form only and not in fact, as for example the ‘cross-examination’ of a party by his own counsel after being called by the opponent (savoring more of a redirect) ..." Id.; see also Morvant v. Constr. Aggregates Corp., 570 F.2d 626, 635 (6th Cir.1978) ("If the witness is friendly to the examiner, there is the same danger of suggestiveness as on direct; and consequently the court may, in its discretion, forbid the use of leading questions."). The language of Rule 611 is not mandatory-whether to allow leading questions under these circumstances is entirely within our discretion. Woods v. Lecureux, 110 F.3d 1215, 1221 (6th Cir.1997) ("[A] district court's decision to allow leading questions when a party is cross-examining his own witness is a matter within the court's traditional discretion to control the mode of interrogation.") (internal quotations omitted); Morvant, 570 F.2d at 635.

Because we will be in a better position to determine how to exercise our discretion during the course of trial, we deny Plaintiff's motion at this time. Our presumption at trial, however, will be to allow leading questions during Defendant's cross-examination of these witnesses only if the questioning amounts to cross-examination in fact (and not simply in form) or as necessary to effectuate the purposes of Rule 611

. Fed.R.Evid. 611(a) (suggesting that the court "exercise reasonable control over the mode and order of examining witness" so as to encourage efficient ascertainment of the truth, "avoid wasting time," and "protect witnesses from harassment"); see also Robinson, 86 Fed.Appx. at 76 (affirming district court's denial of request to ask leading questions during cross-examination of defendant's former employee, because the witness was not an adverse party under the specific facts); Woods, 110 F.3d at 1221. Defendant should expect to conduct the substantial part of such witnesses' testimony without leading questions.

For these reasons, Plaintiff's motion concerning the leading of defense-aligned witnesses called by Plaintiff is denied without prejudice.

B. Plaintiff's Motion Concerning Evidence of Alleged Work Misconduct

In his second motion, Plaintiff asks that we preclude Defendant "from introducing or referring to at trial any evidence of any alleged misconduct by Plaintiff that was not a factor in Defendant's decision to terminate Plaintiff's employment." (MIL re: Misconduct (Dkt. No. 47) at 1.) Plaintiff contends that such evidence is irrelevant and would be unfairly prejudicial. Thus, according to Plaintiff, such evidence is inadmissible under Rules 402 and 403.

(Id. ) In its response, Defendant argues that Plaintiff's motion lacks particularity and, moreover, that evidence of Plaintiff's employment and disciplinary history beginning in October 2010 is highly relevant to the issues pending for trial. (Dkt. No. 70.)

Rule 402 provides that only relevant evidence may be admitted, while Rule 401 explains that relevant evidence is evidence that "has any tendency to make a fact more or less probable" where that "fact is of consequence in determining the action." Fed.R.Evid. 401

–02. Rule 403...